Contrarian Corpus
activist letter follow up
2014-02-26 · 3 pages

Nintendo Co., Ltd. 7974.T

Nintendo should port Mario, Zelda and Donkey Kong to iOS/Android and buy a free-to-play studio — the casual gamer has moved to mobile, where $100bn of attention value awaits.

N 3 Narrative
V 1 Visual
C 1 Craft
Source URL unavailable

Thesis

Oasis Management, a Nintendo shareholder, follows up on its June 2013 letter to CEO Satoru Iwata urging him to release Nintendo's library on iOS and Android and embrace free-to-play economics. The argument leans on three analogues: Facebook's $19bn WhatsApp purchase and the $100bn+ aggregate value of mobile 'attention share'; Netflix's 21% revenue growth and 296% 2013 stock return on a platform-neutral distribution model; and King Digital's leap from $8m to $568m in net income on just $15m of capex — a profit level Nintendo has not reached since 2011. Meanwhile WiiU unit sales keep disappointing despite a $50 price cut. Fischer proposes Nintendo partner with or acquire a proven free-to-play studio, citing Zynga's $527m purchase of Natural Motion as template, to preserve IP relevance and unlock huge upside for all stakeholders.

SCQA

Situation

Nintendo, holder of arguably the largest library of casual games — Mario, Donkey Kong, Zelda — has tied its future to proprietary console hardware like the WiiU while its casual-gamer audience has migrated to smartphones.

Complication

WiiU units keep disappointing even after a $50 price cut, while Facebook paid $19bn for WhatsApp and King Digital leapt from $8m to $568m net income on only $15m of capex — a profit level Nintendo has not reached since 2011.

Resolution

Release the Nintendo library on iOS and Android via the App Store and Google Play, and partner with or acquire a proven Top-10-grossing free-to-play studio to de-risk the shift into in-game revenue economics.

Reward

Capture a meaningful share of the $100bn+ mobile attention economy, extend the life of Nintendo IP through free-to-play in-game revenue, and deliver 'huge' upside for shareholders when the pivot lands.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Mobile attention share is worth $100bn+ and Nintendo's IP is perfectly placed to capture it

  2. 2

    WiiU sales keep disappointing despite a $50 price cut — consoles no longer move the casual gamer

  3. 3

    King Digital went from $8m to $568m net income on just $15m of capex — mobile ROIC dwarfs hardware

Primary demands

  • Develop and sell Nintendo games on iOS and Android via the App Store and Google Play
  • Partner with or acquire an experienced free-to-play development studio (Top 10 grossing) to de-risk the transition
  • Embrace platform-neutral, in-game revenue (free-to-play) economics rather than tying future to proprietary console hardware

KPIs cited

Facebook/WhatsApp acquisition price
$19 billion — signals value of mobile attention share
WhatsApp time-share on smartphones
up to 25% of user time in many countries per media reports
Aggregate mobile attention-economy value
well over $100 billion across firms competing for smartphone attention
Netflix 2013 revenue growth
+21% year on year
Netflix 2013 share-price return
+296% — best S&P 500 performer
WiiU price cut
$50 cut in September 2013 did little to lift unit shipments
King Digital installs
500 million installs, 1.2 billion daily game plays
King Digital net income
$8m in 2012 → $568m in 2013 — levels Nintendo has not hit since 2011
King Digital capex
just $15m in 2013 to deliver that profit — extraordinary ROIC
Zynga / Natural Motion Games deal
$527 million acquisition to buy free-to-play expertise

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • Netflix 2013 platform-neutral distribution (House of Cards across iPad/TV/smartphone)
  • Facebook acquisition of WhatsApp for $19bn
  • King Digital US IPO prospectus (Feb 18, 2014)
  • Zynga acquisition of Natural Motion Games for $527m

Notable slides (1)

Notes

Three-page open letter from Seth Fischer (CIO, Oasis Management, Hong Kong) to Nintendo CEO Satoru Iwata, a follow-up to an earlier letter dated June 11, 2013. Document is clearly dated February 26, 2014 on the cover and all page headers — the filename prefix '2016-08' appears to be incorrect/archival mislabeling. Tone is strikingly polite and analogy-driven rather than adversarial: Fischer uses Netflix, WhatsApp, King Digital and Zynga as templates, never names a villain, and even invokes Iwata's own 'history of pivoting' phrase supportively rather than as a gotcha. No stake disclosed, no price target, no quantified upside. Scanned PDF with visible OCR artifacts ('repofts', 'Febrr-rary'). Historically notable: this letter presaged Nintendo's eventual mobile pivot (DeNA partnership 2015, Super Mario Run 2016, Pokémon GO licensing).