Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck initial thesis
2011-08-22 · 53 pages

The McGraw-Hill Companies MHP

McGraw-Hill's conglomerate structure masks four independently attractive assets; separating MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business plus an accelerated buyback unlocks ~60% upside to ~$65.

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 2 Craft
Original source ↗

Thesis

McGraw-Hill has persistently traded at a ~25% conglomerate discount to peers (12.6x forward P/E vs 15.9x weighted peer average) and returned just 2% over three years versus a 31% peer average, despite housing four independently attractive businesses: S&P Ratings, MH Financial, MH Education and Information & Media. JANA Partners and Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan argue the structure delivers no real synergies, drives sub-peer margins (S&P Ratings 38% vs Moody's 42%; MH Financial 24% vs MSCI 38%) and lets regulatory overhang from S&P Ratings infect the whole portfolio. They demand immediate separation of MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business, collapsed corporate overhead to bridge the peer margin gap, accelerated buybacks, and an independent oversight figure at S&P Ratings — a combination that bridges the stock from $40.75 to roughly $65 per share.

SCQA

Situation

McGraw-Hill houses four independently attractive businesses — S&P Ratings, MH Financial, MH Education and Information & Media — inside a conglomerate that just announced a portfolio review and intent to take 'significant actions' in 2011.

Complication

The structure delivers no synergies, drives sub-peer margins, ties every segment to S&P Ratings' regulatory overhang, and produced a 2% three-year TSR versus 31% for peers; a muted market reaction signals investors doubt management will go far enough.

Resolution

Separate MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business, collapse corporate overhead to reach peer margins, accelerate the authorized share buyback, and install an independent oversight figure at S&P Ratings.

Reward

Eliminating the conglomerate discount (~$11), cutting corporate costs (~$6), executing the buyback (~$3.50) and bridging the peer margin gap (~$4) takes McGraw-Hill from $40.75 to roughly $65 — ~60% upside.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    McGraw-Hill trades at ~25% conglomerate discount to peers (12.6x vs 15.9x fwd P/E)

  2. 2

    No real synergies across S&P Ratings, MH Financial, Education and Information & Media

  3. 3

    Breakup, cost cuts and buyback bridge share price from $40.75 to ~$65 (~60% upside)

Primary demands

  • Separate McGraw-Hill Education
  • Separate Information & Media
  • Separate the S&P Index business
  • Collapse corporate overhead and right-size segment cost structures to achieve peer margins
  • Accelerate the authorized share buyback ahead of the separations
  • Bolster S&P Ratings with a well-known independent oversight figure

KPIs cited

Forward P/E multiple (3-yr average)
MHP at 12.6x vs 15.9x weighted peer average (~25% discount); trails all peers except Gannett
3-year total shareholder return (to 6/13/2011)
MHP 2% vs 31% peer weighted average (29 pts behind)
Peak-to-trough TSR (10/09/07-3/09/09)
MHP (66%) vs peer weighted (48%); 18 pts worse
10-year TSR (2001-2011)
MHP 50% vs Moody's 174% — 124 pts of underperformance
S&P Ratings adjusted EBIT margin (2010)
38% vs Moody's MIS 42%; margin gap expanded from parity in 2008
MH Financial adjusted EBIT margin (2010)
24% vs MSCI 38% and FactSet 35%
IHS forward P/E multiple (2010)
21x for IHS vs 13x for MH I&M despite similar asset base
Sum-of-parts bridge
$40.75 closing price → $51 (discount) → $58 (corp cost) → $61 (buyback) → $65 (peer margin)
Broadcasting % of total EBIT
~2% — cited to argue divestiture announced so far is insufficient

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • IHS standalone focus and acquisition-driven value creation
  • Moody's Corporation post-Dun & Bradstreet spin as a pure-play rating agency

Notable slides (6)

Notes

Joint filing by JANA Partners and Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (OTPP); disclaimer page names both as 'the Shareholders'. No stake percentage disclosed in the deck body. Structural critique rather than personal — no CEO named as villain, but CEO Harold McGraw III is quoted (Q2 2011 call: 'McGraw-Hill Financial is a completely different business than S&P') to support the breakup logic. Deck was filed as Exhibit B to a 13D amendment on SEC EDGAR; the PDF render alternates content pages with blanks (artifact of the SEC HTML-to-PDF conversion), so the 53 PDF pages correspond to ~26 actual slides. Classic conglomerate-discount sum-of-parts playbook; precedent invoked is IHS. Outcome: McGraw-Hill agreed in September 2011 to spin off Education (ultimately sold to Apollo 2013) and rebrand as McGraw-Hill Financial — largely a JANA win.