Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck proxy fight
2013-07-01 · 54 pages

Health Management Associates HMA

HMA's insular 17-year-tenure board drove a Lost Decade of <1% TSR; replace all directors with Glenview's blue-chip slate to fix governance, compensation, and capital allocation.

N 5 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
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Thesis

Health Management Associates delivered less than 1% total shareholder return over the 2003-2012 Lost Decade, trailing hospital peers by 39% and the S&P 500 by roughly 99%, even as the board grew EBITDA 86% through a $1.2bn M&A spree. Glenview, which owns 14.6%, argues this gap reflects structural failures: an insular board averaging 17 years' tenure, a CFO who has missed guidance for three straight years and was recorded laughing through bad-news calls, incentive plans that paid 108% bonuses against missed external targets, zero share repurchases versus peers' buyback programs, and a 59% variable-rate debt load into a rising-rate environment. After Glenview's private outreach drew a poison pill, it is soliciting written consents to replace all eight independent directors with a blue-chip slate chaired by former Magellan CEO Steven Shulman to restore compliance oversight, compensation discipline, and per-share-focused capital allocation.

SCQA

Situation

HMA is a non-urban hospital operator with ~$1bn EBITDA, overseen by a board where seven of eight independent directors have served through the entire decade of underperformance, chaired since 1983 by founder William Schoen.

Complication

HMA returned <1% over 2003-2012 vs peers' 39% and S&P's 99%; management missed EBITDA/EPS guidance 6-7 of 10 years yet was paid 108% bonuses while facing two DOJ probes and an SEC investigation.

Resolution

Shareholders should execute written consents replacing all eight independent directors with Glenview's nine-nominee blue-chip slate chaired by Steven Shulman, redesign incentives around per-share metrics, and adopt balanced capital allocation including buybacks.

Reward

Restored governance, compliance oversight, and per-share-focused capital allocation — opportunistic buybacks at depressed prices, fixed-rate debt, cost discipline — would close the ~40% underperformance gap versus hospital peers and halt further value destruction.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Lost Decade: HMA returned <1% TSR vs peers' 39% and S&P's 99% (2003-2012)

  2. 2

    Board paid 108% bonuses despite missing guidance; 17-year average tenure, insular, poison pill adopter

  3. 3

    Only hospital company with zero buybacks; 100% of $656M capital allocation went to M&A

Primary demands

  • Replace all eight independent directors via written consent solicitation
  • Elect Glenview's nine-nominee blue-chip slate chaired by Steven Shulman
  • Adopt balanced capital allocation policy including share repurchases
  • Redesign management incentive compensation around per-share metrics aligned with external guidance
  • Install Alvarez & Marsal interim management team during CEO transition
  • Form dedicated Compliance & Quality Committee to oversee DOJ/SEC investigations

KPIs cited

10-year total shareholder return
HMA 0.5% vs Hospital Group 39% vs S&P 500 99% (2003-2012)
TSR underperformance vs Hospital Group
-104% (10yr), -40% (3yr), -26% (5yr), -20% (1yr)
EBITDA guidance misses
Missed low end 6 of 10 years; average miss 8% vs midpoint
EPS guidance misses
Missed low end 7 of 10 years; average miss 14% vs midpoint
2012 incentive compensation payout
Board paid 108% of cash incentives despite missing all external guidance metrics
Same-store admissions growth
HMA underperformed Hospital Group in 100% of last 4 quarters, 83% of last 12
Variable rate debt mix
HMA 59% vs Hospital Competitors 17% (post-Feb 2014)
Average board tenure
HMA 16.9 years vs peers 6.8-11.0 years; S&P 500 average 8.6 years
Share repurchases 2011-2012
HMA $0 vs HCA $1,503M, THC $792M, LPNT $270M, CYH $86M, UHS $80M
Capital allocation 2011-2012
HMA 100% M&A / 0% buyback vs peer average 45% M&A / 28% buyback
EBITDA growth vs TSR 2002-2012
86% EBITDA growth yielded only 0.5% total shareholder return
1Q13 results miss
Missed consensus EBITDA by 21%, EPS by 43%, admissions by 570bps

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • HCA 2006 leveraged buyout (PE interest in hospital sector)
  • Amylin Pharmaceuticals (Delaware 2009 poison-put fiduciary duty ruling)
  • 2007 HMA $10 special dividend (prior defensive tactic by same Chairman)

Notable slides (6)

Notes

Consent-solicitation proxy fight deck, not a first-look thesis — Glenview had been a holder for 2+ years and pivoted to activism after HMA adopted a poison pill on May 24, 2013. Definitive Consent Statement filed July 19, 2013. Unusual rhetorical devices: p13 stock chart annotated with 'CFO laughing' timestamps during April 10 earnings call; p34 resurrects 2007 Schoen quotes about fending off private equity as playbook for current entrenchment; p32 three-panel anatomy of the 'Rights Plan' poison pill language. Cover is unsigned; Larry Robbins named as principal in SEC filing on final page. Nine-nominee slate chaired by Steven Shulman (ex-Magellan CEO). No explicit target price or SOTP valuation — the value thesis is framed as peer-gap closure via governance and capital allocation reform rather than asset-level revaluation. Glenview self-describes as 'not an activist fund' — HMA is their first full board-replacement campaign.