Contrarian Corpus
short seller research note initial thesis
2020-02-25 · 59 pages

GSX Techedu Inc. GSX

GSX Techedu's too-good-to-be-true 70%+ margins and triple-digit growth are propped up by inflated profits, brushed student enrollments, alter-ego related parties, and suspected CAPEX fraud — it is a fraud worth zero.

N 4 Narrative
V 2 Visual
C 2 Craft
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Thesis

GSX Techedu, a Chinese online K-12 tutor that IPO'd on the NYSE in June 2019 and tripled to a $10bn+ market cap, is portrayed by management as the only profitable player in the space, with gross margins climbing from 56% to 79% in eight quarters. Grizzly argues the financials are fabricated: SAIC credit reports for GSX's seven main operating entities show consolidated 2018 net profit overstated to the SEC by 74.6%. The firm allegedly uses unconsolidated alter-ego entities such as Beijing Youlian to absorb costs, has a long history of paying third parties to 'brush' fake student orders, and just paid RMB 333.8m for Zhengzhou buildings whose total project investment was only RMB 75m — likely CAPEX fraud to wash off phantom cash. With insiders, co-founders and the prior CFO all selling or leaving, Grizzly believes GSX is the worst publicly traded education company.

SCQA

Situation

GSX Techedu is a Chinese online K-12 tutoring company founded by ex-New Oriental executive Larry Chen, listed on NYSE in June 2019, and the only Chinese online education peer reporting consistent profitability with ~70-80% gross margins.

Complication

PRC credit-report filings for GSX's seven operating entities show 2018 net profit overstated to the SEC by 74.6%, and operations are propped up by alter-ego related parties, brushed student orders, fake teacher profiles and suspected CAPEX fraud on a Zhengzhou real-estate purchase.

Resolution

Investors should sell or short GSX, and the auditor Deloitte and underwriters Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, BofA and Credit Suisse should perform genuine due diligence on the alter-ego entities, real-estate purchase and student-enrollment figures.

Reward

Grizzly does not publish a price target but, having disclosed a short position, expects substantial downside as the fraud is exposed; the stock had risen ~300% from the $10.50 IPO price to ~$42 prior to publication.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    PRC credit reports show 2018 net profit overstated by 74.6% versus SEC filings

  2. 2

    Order brushing and web/app traffic data suggest student enrollments are largely fake

  3. 3

    January 2020 RMB 333.8m real estate deal is 4x the project's RMB 75m total investment, hinting CAPEX fraud

Primary demands

  • Investors should not trust GSX's reported financials and should treat the stock as a short candidate
  • Auditor (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu) and underwriters (Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America, Credit Suisse) should perform genuine due diligence on the company
  • GSX management should explain the RMB 333.8m commercial real estate purchase and the role of suspected alter-ego related parties

KPIs cited

Stock return since IPO
~300% rise from $10.50 IPO (Jun 2019) to $42.07 high — annualized ~450%
Gross margin (GSX standalone)
Climbed from 56% in Q1-18 to 79% in Q4-19, vs. peers TAL 54.6%, DAO 30%, HK1797 55% in 2018
Net profit overstatement vs PRC credit reports
74.6% overstatement in 2018 (SEC RMB 19.65m vs credit-report sum RMB 11.25m)
Revenue reconciliation vs PRC credit reports
Within 2% (1.5% in 2017, -1.3% in 2018), pointing to profit-line manipulation specifically
Beijing Youlian related-party expense
Recognized expense grew from RMB 33k (2017) to RMB 2.05m (2018) to RMB 3.6m (9M 2019)
Zhengzhou real-estate deal
GSX paid RMB 333.8m vs. project's official total investment of only RMB 75m — over 4x
Order-brushing volume cited
One vendor brushed ~RMB 400k/month of GSX orders, with 20+ fake accounts per class
Insider/early investor selling at IPO
$252m sold by existing shareholders at $14/ADS — 4 of 6 co-founders leaving or expected to leave

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns. Orange cells are present in this deck; neutral cells are not.

Composition what's on the 56 slides

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Notes

Classic short-seller research note format: 59-page Word/PDF document, Grizzly Reports bear logo on every page, Calibri body text with embedded Yahoo Finance / Alexa / Baidu Index / SAIC screenshots and Excel-style tables — competent but not designed. Eight-pillar argument (margin disconnect, credit-report mismatch, alter-ego related parties, CAPEX fraud, fake enrollments, web-traffic gap, fake teachers, CFO/insider exits) with a strong opening cover slide. Disclosed short position but no explicit price target. No precedents to other short campaigns invoked despite the playbook resembling other China-fraud shorts (Muddy Waters, Citron). Subsequent campaigns by Citron and Muddy Waters on GSX followed in 2020.