Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck proxy fight
2013-04-15 · 161 pages

Hess Corporation HES

Hess's world-class assets are squandered by 17 years of John Hess's undisciplined, unaccountable leadership; electing Elliott's five nominees unlocks $96-128 per share of intrinsic value.

Thesis

Hess Corporation owns world-class assets — a premier Bakken position, long-life Southeast Asian oil reserves, valuable midstream infrastructure, and salable downstream — that Elliott values at $96-128 per share ($39-50bn) versus a stock languishing in the $60s. Under 17-year CEO John Hess, the company has underperformed proxy peers by 47% / $9.4bn of market cap foregone, cycled through seven restructurings, destroyed $4bn in exploration and $6.7bn in hedging, and switched benchmark peer groups repeatedly to obscure the gap. Elliott, a 4.52% owner with its largest-ever initial equity position, blames a culture of denial: a staggered board John Hess himself voted to preserve, zero analyst days for seven years, and a 2013 'transformation' Hess insists predates Elliott's campaign. The remedy is electing five independent nominees — Golub, Kurz, Smith, McManus, Chase — to impose focus, capital discipline, and accountability.

SCQA

Situation

Hess Corporation is a ~$20bn integrated oil & gas company whose assets — a premier Bakken position, long-life Southeast Asian oil reserves, Bakken midstream infrastructure, and salable downstream — Elliott sums to $96-128 per share.

Complication

Under 17-year CEO John Hess, Hess has underperformed proxy peers by 47%, destroyed $4bn in exploration and $6.7bn in hedging, cycled through seven restructurings, and entrenched a staggered board that insulates management from accountability.

Resolution

Elect Elliott's five independent nominees — Harvey Golub, Karl Kurz, Mark Smith, David McManus, Rodney Chase — to impose focus, capital discipline, operational rigor, and genuine oversight that Hess's hand-picked directors cannot deliver.

Reward

Closing the discount to intrinsic asset value implies $96-128 per share versus sub-$70 trading — roughly 40-90% upside — with the Bakken position alone worth $13.0-14.4bn TEV.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Hess has underperformed every relevant peer over every time frame of John Hess's 17-year CEO tenure

  2. 2

    Woefully flawed capital allocation: $4bn destroyed in exploration, $6.7bn lost in hedging (9% of E&P revenues)

  3. 3

    Six failed restructurings and a culture of denial; only externally-imposed board change can fix entrenched problems

Primary demands

  • Elect Elliott's five shareholder nominees (Golub, Kurz, Smith, McManus, Chase) to the Hess board at the 2013 AGM
  • Reassess and focus the portfolio by divesting non-core international operations (spin off Hess International)
  • Instill capital discipline: halt wasteful exploration, exit proprietary trading/HETCO, return more cash to shareholders
  • Restore accountability: de-stagger the board, separate Chairman/CEO, reset governance culture
  • Execute an effective, credible restructuring rather than the seventh failed 'transformation'

KPIs cited

Relative TSR vs proxy peers, 17-year Hess CEO tenure
Underperformed by 333% (460% vs revised proxy peers)
Relative TSR vs Bakken operators, 5-year
Underperformed by 984% despite Hess holding one of the largest Bakken positions
Exploration value destruction, 5-year
~$4bn of value lost; worst in peer group at ~(20%) of market cap
Realized hedging gains/(losses) 2002-2012
($6.7bn) cumulative, equal to 9% of E&P revenues vs peer average of +1%
Proprietary trading losses since 2009 (HETCO + corporate)
Implied ~$400mm of losses, disclosure refused
Dividend CAGR 2002-2012
0% for Hess; bottom of 17-peer set where leaders EOG/Devon grew at 21%
Cash return as % of market cap, 2002-2012
6% for Hess (second-lowest of 17 peers, vs BP 90%, COP 88%)
Capex as % of average market cap
28% five-year average; 47% in 2012; 26% guided for 2013
Countries of significant operations
Hess operates in 12 countries vs peers of similar market cap averaging 3
% production from oil
70% — highest in peer group, yet still underperformed during Brent rally
Underperformance vs S&P 500, 5-year
(58)% as of Jan 2013 despite Brent up 25% over the period
Analyst days / update calls 2007-2013
Zero for Hess vs 6-7 for proxy peers
Shareholder de-stagger vote 2008
97%+ of outside shares voted for de-staggering; blocked by John Hess's 37mm family shares
Sum-of-parts TEV (Elliott estimate)
$39-50bn: Unconventionals $13.0-14.4bn + Conventionals $21.4-30.2bn + Midstream $2.0-2.5bn + Downstream $3.1-3.5bn
Market cap foregone under 17-year tenure
$9.4bn of value destruction / 47% underperformance vs. revised proxy peers

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns. Orange cells are present in this deck; neutral cells are not.

Precedents cited

  • ConocoPhillips / Phillips 66 spin-off (integrated to pure-play E&P transition)
  • Marathon Oil / Marathon Petroleum spin-off
  • CN Rail transformation under Hunter Harrison (operational-excellence analogue via nominee track records)

Composition what's on the 161 slides

Visual + textual elements counted across every slide in this deck. Hover a box for what that element is; click to see every slide in the corpus that uses it.

Slide gallery ·

All 161
No slide inventory yet

Pass-2 extraction may still be in progress for this deck.

Notes

161-page proxy-fight deck released ~mid-April 2013 (data cutoff 4/12/2013; exact day not printed on cover — 'April 2013' only). Companion URL www.ReassessHess.com. Notable rhetorical craftsmanship: (1) Elliott co-opts Hess's own green corporate branding and logo on every page — the deck visually reads as a Hess document arguing against Hess management. (2) Recurring six-pillar skeleton slide ('Unrelenting Underperformance / Lack of Focus / Undisciplined Capital Allocation / Operational Mismanagement / Endless Ineffective Restructurings / Abysmal Governance Culture') serves as navigation, with a red box highlighting the current chapter; then mirrored later as 'Deny Stock Performance / Deny Lack of Focus / ...' to frame the 'culture of denial'. (3) Heavy weaponization of CEO quote contradictions — e.g., 'You can't judge us on a one-year basis' paired with 'Since July 24, 2012 [six-month] Hess shares have increased'. (4) Explicit before/after via a red trendline (47% underperformance / $9.4bn foregone market cap under 17-year tenure) vs a tiny green recovery (5% outperformance since Elliott involvement). (5) Page 87 exposes original Hess slate's independence failures: two joint executors of Hess family estate, one officer of Hess. Campaign phase = proxy_fight: Elliott filed definitive proxy April 3, 2013 nominating five directors (Golub, Kurz, Smith, McManus, Chase) for the 2013 AGM. Follows Elliott's earlier 'Perspectives on Hess' deck (Jan 2013), but proxy_fight is more specific than follow_up here.