Taubman Centers TCO
Taubman's dominant Class A malls are still bustling and growing, yet TCO is down 25% YTD — management, not 'dead malls,' is the problem, with 50%+ upside if the board acts.
Thesis
Land & Buildings argues Taubman Centers' 25% YTD share-price decline is self-inflicted, not driven by the 'dead mall' narrative management keeps invoking. Q3 2017 data shows TCO growing — 2.8% sales growth (fifth consecutive positive quarter), 6.7% re-leasing spreads, 96.3% leased occupancy — while peer CEOs at GGP, Simon and Macerich spoke confidently about digital-native tenants gravitating to omnichannel brick-and-mortar. A photo tour of nine dominant Taubman properties (Short Hills, Beverly Center, Millenia, Dolphin, Cherry Creek, Westfarms, Twelve Oaks, International Plaza, Green Hills) generating nearly $1,000 PSF reveals packed parking lots and crowded concourses. L&B concludes Bobby Taubman's board is hiding behind a misleading industry story, flags the unilateral Michigan exclusive-forum by-law as entrenchment, and argues a 6% implied cap rate versus ~4% private-market cap rates puts NAV at roughly double the share price — 50%+ upside over 14 months if directors are held accountable.
SCQA
Taubman Centers owns a dominant U.S. Class A mall portfolio, including nine flagships like Short Hills, Beverly Center and Millenia generating ~$1,000 PSF, anchoring one of the highest-quality retail REITs in America.
Despite Q3 fundamentals — 2.8% sales growth, 6.7% re-leasing spreads, 96.3% leased — TCO is down 25% YTD and has lagged peers 19% since June 2017, masked by management's 'dead mall' excuses and entrenching by-laws.
Hold Bobby Taubman's board accountable: reject the exclusive-forum by-law, end the overpromise-underdeliver guidance cycle, and prepare to nominate a majority of new independent directors at the 2018 annual meeting if underperformance persists.
At ~4% private-market cap rates, TCO's NAV is roughly double the current share price; L&B projects 50%+ upside over 14 months if management fixes operating, capital-allocation and governance failures.
The three reasons
- 1
Class A malls are bustling — TCO grew sales 2.8% Q3 despite 'dead mall' narrative
- 2
TCO lagged Class A peers 19% since June 2017 vote under current board
- 3
NAV worth ~2x share price at 4% private cap rates vs 6% implied
Primary demands
- Hold the Board and Bobby Taubman accountable for operating, capital-allocation and governance failures
- Reverse the unilateral Michigan exclusive-forum by-law amendment that limits shareholder suits
- Correct misleading 'dead mall' narrative and align guidance with peer-confirmed fundamentals
- Prepare to nominate a majority of new independent directors at the 2018 annual meeting if course is not corrected
KPIs cited
Pattern membership
Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.
Precedents cited
- Brookfield preliminary talks to take GGP private (Nov 2017)
- Third Point (Dan Loeb) 5% activist stake in Macerich (Nov 2017)
- Jana Partners (Barry Rosenstein) activist position in Taubman
Notable slides (6)
Notes
Part of Land & Buildings' (Jonathan Litt) 'Save Taubman' campaign — branded microsite SaveTaubman.com on every page. Deck lost June 2017 proxy vote and is re-arming for the 2018 annual meeting. Distinctive rhetorical device: a 'photo tour' of nine dominant Taubman malls (packed parking lots, crowded concourses) to physically debunk the 'dead mall' media narrative — effectively visual ethnography as activist evidence. Contrasts Taubman's bleak guidance language with confident peer-CEO quotes from Simon, GGP, Macerich. Stake not disclosed in this document. No author signature; firm-branded.