Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck follow up
2017-05-16 · 39 pages

BHP Billiton BHP

N 5 Narrative
V 4 Visual
C 4 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    US$46bn value unlock: demerger (+$15bn) + capital return (+$20bn) + franking credits (+$11bn)

  2. 2

    Management destroyed US$23bn in US onshore petroleum — 78% of value, a -29% IRR

  3. 3

    BHP has underperformed Rio Tinto by 128% since 2008 despite best-in-class assets

Primary demands

  • Initiate an in-depth, open and truly independent review of BHP's petroleum business, overseen by a committee including management, shareholder representatives and outside experts
  • Full or partial demerger and separate listing of BHP's US petroleum business (South32 precedent)
  • Unify the dual-listed company (DLC) structure into a single Australian-incorporated BHP retaining ASX and LSE listings
  • Return excess capital to shareholders via disciplined discounted off-market buybacks rather than value-destructive acquisitions
  • Monetize c.US$9.7 billion of stranded franking credits via post-unification off-market buybacks

KPIs cited

Total value unlock opportunity
US$46bn across demerger (+$15bn), capital return (+$20bn), franking credits (+$11bn)
US onshore petroleum value destruction
US$29.2bn invested now worth US$6.5bn consensus — 78% destroyed, -29% IRR
Petroleum exploration spend vs. value
c.US$8bn spent since 2002 for near 100% loss (zero broker value attributed)
Total shareholder return vs. Rio Tinto
128% underperformance since Nov-2008; 127% vs. Comparable Portfolio
TSR vs. top Australian superfund stocks (8-yr)
BHP Ltd chronic 174% below average of peers
Share buyback P/B multiples paid
Average 4.56x P/B (range 4.07x-6.23x); US$9bn value destroyed vs. buying at current 1.55x P/B
EBITDA volatility vs. Rio Tinto (2003-2016)
BHP 32.9% stdev vs. Rio 27.5% — opposite of claimed diversification benefit
BHP-operated share of petroleum assets
29% operated by BHP, 71% not operated (by CY2017 production)
Permian acreage flip by buyer
BHP sold 44,000 acres to Silverback for US$75m in 2014; re-sold to Centennial for US$855m in 2016 — 86% of value foregone
Unification cost estimate
Elliott's c.US$200m real cost vs. management's claimed US$1.3bn (c.US$1.1bn Elliott labels not-costs)
South32 demerger precedent TSR
South32 outperformed BHP Limited by 47% since May 2015 demerger
Incremental franking credits released post-unification
+65.2% from off-market buybacks; US$853m wasted via DSM in FY June 2016
Forward cumulative free cash flow (2018-2027)
US$71bn cumulative; net debt / EBITDA trending from ~0.5x to ~(1.8x)

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (9)

Notes

Second Elliott presentation on BHP, follow-up to the April 10, 2017 initial Value Unlock Plan. Structured as a direct rebuttal to BHP management's response: each section addresses an alleged management misrepresentation (unification costs, franking credit wastage, diversification benefits, transparency). Rhetorical toolkit is unusually rich: (1) chairman Jac Nasser 'terrific job trading assets' quote juxtaposed with the 86% Permian flip loss to Silverback/Centennial; (2) CEO Mackenzie's Feb-2014 'reshape our company' demerger quote reused against him; (3) a full-bleed press-clippings collage (p.32) attacking BHP on tax avoidance/Singapore marketing hub/Panama Papers; (4) a dramatic red-arrow waterfall (p.8/16) of US onshore value destruction. South32 demerger is the central precedent. Typography/layout is clean institutional Elliott house style (orange + charcoal, Calibri-like sans serif) — good specimen but not Ackman-CP tier (some slides are dense text-only). Section-divider slides with large italic pull-quotes on dark orange gradient (pp. 23, 26, 29) are strong standalone design moments. Outcome: BHP eventually did exit US onshore petroleum (2018 sale to BP for ~$10.8bn) and unified the DLC structure (2022) — substantive activist win, though on Elliott's long timeframe.