Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck initial thesis
2017-04-10 · 39 pages

BHP Billiton BHP

BHP's DLC structure, stranded US petroleum, and undisciplined capital allocation depress value; unifying, demerging, and running 14% discounted buybacks unlocks ~49% upside and US$46bn.

Thesis

BHP Billiton operates under a legacy 2001 dual-listed company structure pairing BHP Ltd (Australia) and BHP Plc (UK), whose inefficiencies — a 12.7% average Plc-to-Ltd discount, US$9.7bn of stranded Australian franking credits, and constraints on off-market buybacks — have left it trailing comparable mineral and petroleum peers on TSR, P/B and P/NAV across 3-, 5- and 9-year windows. Elliott argues three complementary actions close the gap: unify the DLC into a single Australian tax-resident listco; demerge and separately list the US petroleum business, whose shale and Gulf of Mexico assets imply c.US$22bn standalone versus broker consensus of c.US$12.3bn inside BHP and carry no synergies with the mineral portfolio; and adopt an ongoing 14%-discount off-market buyback program in place of value-destructive cash M&A such as Petrohawk and Fayetteville. The combined Value Unlock Plan could deliver c.48.6% upside for Ltd holders and c.51.0% for Plc holders — roughly US$46bn of incremental shareholder value.

SCQA

Situation

BHP Billiton is a first-class global miner running under a 2001 dual-listed structure that joins Australian-listed BHP Ltd and UK-listed BHP Plc, and is projected to generate c.US$31bn of excess free cash flow over 2018-2022.

Complication

The DLC strands US$9.7bn of franking credits, sustains a 12.7% Plc-to-Ltd discount, and has been paired with value-destructive cash acquisitions (Petrohawk, Fayetteville; US$13.1bn of write-downs), leaving BHP trailing comparable peers on TSR, P/B and P/NAV across every measured horizon.

Resolution

Unify the DLC into a single Australian tax-resident listco, demerge BHP's US petroleum business onto the NYSE, and run an ongoing 14%-discount off-market share buyback program alongside the existing 50% dividend payout.

Reward

The Value Unlock Plan would deliver up to c.48.6% upside for Ltd holders and c.51.0% for Plc holders — c.US$46bn of incremental value comprising +US$15bn from demerger, +US$20bn from capital-return accretion, and +US$11bn from franking-credit release.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    DLC structure traps US$9.7bn of franking credits and a persistent 12.7% Plc/Ltd discount

  2. 2

    US petroleum standalone re-rating worth c.US$22bn vs broker consensus US$12.3bn — no mining synergies

  3. 3

    Total Value Unlock Plan delivers +US$46bn / up to 48.6%-51.0% per-share upside

Primary demands

  • Unify the dual-listed company (DLC) structure into a single Australian-headquartered, Australian tax-resident listed company
  • Demerge and separately list BHP's US petroleum business (US Onshore + Gulf of Mexico) on the NYSE
  • Adopt a policy of consistent 14% discounted off-market share buybacks (initial at least US$6bn) on top of the 50% dividend payout
  • Stop value-destructive large-scale cash acquisitions such as Petrohawk and Fayetteville

KPIs cited

Total shareholder return since BHP's bid for Rio Tinto (Nov 2008)
BHP +42.5% vs comparable portfolio +172.6%
5-year total shareholder return
BHP -31.7% vs comparable portfolio -12.4%
3-year total shareholder return
BHP -38.1% vs comparable portfolio -24.0%
TSR since South32 demerger (May 2015)
BHP Ltd -17.1% vs South32 +36.4% vs S&P/ASX300 Metals & Mining +6.0%
P/B vs comparable portfolio
BHP 1.5x vs peers 1.8x — c.19.4% / US$18bn upside
P/NAV vs comparable portfolio
BHP 0.88x vs peers 1.06x — c.20.4% / US$19bn upside
Plc discount to Ltd since DLC inception
Average 12.7% trading discount since 2001 merger
EBITDA generated by Plc vs Plc shareholding
c.8.9% of EBITDA but Plc holds c.39.7% of shares
Franking credit balance
US$9.7bn in FY2016 (c.10% of market cap); projected >US$17bn by 2022
Wasted franking credits in March 2016 dividend
c.US$853m wasted via Dividend Share Mechanism on US$1,990m Plc dividend
US Onshore broker SoTP valuation
Broker average c.US$6.5bn — vs WoodMac US$11.4bn and top broker US$12.0bn
US petroleum implied standalone valuation
c.US$22bn using Hess/Apache/Anadarko/EOG comparables vs analyst consensus c.US$12.3bn
Expected excess cash flow
c.US$31bn over 2018-2022 assuming 50% payout
Buyback program impact (to 2022)
c.US$33bn returned, c.29% of capital repurchased, c.33% EPS accretion, c.US$20bn NPV uplift
Volatility / diversification claim
BHP RoE stdev 18.5% vs comparable portfolio 15.7%; ROIC stdev 13.1% vs 8.3% — diversification doesn't reduce risk
US Onshore write-downs
US$13.1bn cumulative write-downs since Petrohawk acquisition

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns. Orange cells are present in this deck; neutral cells are not.

Precedents cited

  • South32 demerger (May 2015)
  • Royal Dutch Shell DLC unification (2005)
  • Brambles DLC unwind
  • AMP / Henderson DLC unwind
  • ExxonMobil buyback program (c.US$225bn over 10 years — analyst-cited benchmark)

Composition what's on the 39 slides

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Notes

Elliott's opening salvo against BHP — accompanies a letter to the BHP Ltd and BHP Plc boards. Authored by Elliott Advisors (HK) Limited; no named human signatory on the slides (Paul Singer not referenced), so author_name is null. Tone is notably restrained for an Elliott campaign: framed as a collaborative 'Value Unlock Plan' with management rather than a personal attack on CEO Andrew MacKenzie, who is named only via an embedded analyst quote on p18. Classic template for the activist breakup playbook: SCQA (BHP is first-class but underperforming → 3 root causes → 3-step plan → +US$46bn). Heavy use of third-party analyst quote-walls (Barclays, Credit Suisse, UBS, JP Morgan, AFR on DLC; Citi, GS, DB, BofA, Bernstein on petroleum; Macquarie, UBS on capital returns) to outsource credibility. Visual design is functional banker-style — consistent blue/red palette, two-column layouts — but six near-blank divider pages waste real estate. Petrohawk and Fayetteville explicitly called out as 'value-destructive' — the closest the deck gets to villainization. Sum-of-parts waterfall on p4/p35 is the keystone visual. No stake disclosed in the document.