AST SpaceMobile, Inc. ASTS
AST SpaceMobile is a $1.8bn 2021-SPAC promoting a physically implausible direct-to-handset satellite broadband dream; the technology won't work as hyped, timelines keep slipping, and SpaceX/Apple competition eliminates any lead.
Thesis
Kerrisdale is short AST SpaceMobile, a $1.8bn 2021-vintage SPAC promising direct-to-handset mobile broadband from a planned 168-satellite LEO constellation. Interviews with former JPL, SpaceX, and OneWeb engineers call the 64-square-meter BlueWalker-3 prototype structurally and thermally unsound: panels likely to flap, heat dissipation inadequate, and accurate ground testing virtually impossible. RF analysis by a leading satcom textbook author yields only a 19 dB fade margin — adequate outdoors but failing inside buildings or cars, gutting the 'connected everywhere' pitch. BlueBird-1, the true production satellite, is already two years behind schedule with rising costs and depends on SpaceX's Starship — from a company that just launched its own D2D service with T-Mobile, alongside Apple/Globalstar's iPhone 14 offering. MOUs with Vodafone, AT&T and others are non-exclusive, non-binding marketing props, not captive revenue. Management promised financing risk was 'substantially eliminated,' yet just tapped a $150m ATM at ~$6.50.
SCQA
AST SpaceMobile is a $1.8bn 2021-vintage SPAC attempting to build the first LEO constellation that connects standard mobile handsets directly from space, promising 'connected everywhere' broadband via 168+ giant phased-array satellites partnered with MNOs like Vodafone and AT&T.
Interviews with JPL, SpaceX and OneWeb veterans describe the BlueWalker-3 prototype as structurally and thermally unsound; RF math yields only a 19 dB fade margin that fails indoors or in cars; BlueBird-1 is two years delayed and capex is ballooning.
Short ASTS: the science project is unlikely to work reliably, the TAM is niche for covered populations and unmonetizable for the underserved, and SpaceX/T-Mobile and Apple/Globalstar have already entered the direct-to-device market.
AST must keep issuing dilutive equity — a recent raise priced at ~$6.50 implies ~35% downside — while the promised $1bn 2024 EBITDA will instead be deeply negative for years as BlueBird-1 slips further.
The three reasons
- 1
64-square-meter phased-array antenna is structurally and thermally unsound; experts doubt it can function reliably
- 2
BlueBird-1 is two years delayed while SpaceX/T-Mobile and Apple/Globalstar launch competing D2D service
- 3
$1bn 2024 EBITDA guidance is fantasy; financing risk is growing, not 'substantially eliminated'
KPIs cited
Pattern membership
Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.
Notable slides (5)
Notes
Short-seller research note in long-form memo format (not a slide deck); 20 pages of Arial body text with blue Kerrisdale section headers, a capitalization table, a BW3 photo, and two visuals reproduced from AST's own investor deck (network diagram, financial projections). Expert-interview driven: quotes from former JPL physicist, former SpaceX engineering director, former OneWeb spacecraft engineer, defense-prime supply chain consultant, and a satcom RF textbook author anchor the technical critique. Thesis layers physics (antenna structural/thermal risk) → RF reliability (19 dB fade margin) → program risk (BlueBird-1 delays) → TAM critique (niche for covered, unmonetizable for underserved) → competition (SpaceX/T-Mobile, Apple/Globalstar) → capital needs (dilutive ATM). No formal valuation framework — thesis rests on execution failure rather than multiple rerating. Precise date unclear; filename says 2022-09 and the report references a Sept 8 $150m ATM, so early-to-mid September 2022; defaulted to 2022-09-01.