Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck proxy fight
2015-04-17 · 45 pages

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) DD

DuPont is a chronic underperformer under CEO Kullman; electing Nelson Peltz and three nominees unlocks $2-4bn of excess costs and drives DuPont stock to $120 by 2017 (21% IRR).

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
Original source ↗

Thesis

DuPont has delivered bottom-quartile EPS growth versus its peers over 3-, 10- and 20-year horizons, and the 16-year unaffected stock decline reveals that CEO Ellen Kullman's 'higher growth, higher value' strategy has failed despite >$34bn of divestitures. Trian argues the root cause is conglomerate complexity: five of seven segments trail peers on both organic growth and EBITDA margins, while $2-4bn of excess corporate costs burden the business — evidenced by Axalta (the former Coatings segment) generating 68% more EBITDA under private-equity owners in the same year. With the CEO having sold 54% of her stock and management reporting nine different 2011 EPS figures, Trian seeks four board seats led by Nelson Peltz to eliminate bloat, rationalize the portfolio, and restore accountability. Trian targets $120/share by year-end 2017, a 21% IRR.

SCQA

Situation

DuPont is a 212-year-old diversified chemicals and industrials conglomerate operating seven segments spanning agriculture, nutrition, performance materials, electronics, safety and industrial biosciences, with a ~$35bn revenue base.

Complication

Under CEO Kullman, DuPont has delivered bottom-quartile EPS growth, trailed peers in five of seven segments on both growth and margins, and carries $2-4bn of excess corporate costs — as Axalta's post-spin EBITDA uplift exposed.

Resolution

Elect Trian's four nominees — Nelson Peltz, John Myers, Arthur Winkleblack and Robert Zatta — to the board to assess corporate structure, eliminate excess costs, fix capital allocation and strengthen governance.

Reward

Implied target of $120/share by year-end 2017, a 21% IRR, based on 9.9x NTM EV/EBITDA with peer-level margins, prudent leverage, 10% dividend CAGR and full excess-cost recovery.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    DuPont is bottom-quartile EPS growth vs peers over 3-, 10- and 20-year horizons

  2. 2

    Axalta's EBITDA jumped 68% post-spin in the same year — DuPont carries $2-4bn of excess corporate costs

  3. 3

    CEO Kullman sold 54% of her DuPont stock — she doesn't believe her own 'higher growth' strategy

Primary demands

  • Elect Trian's four nominees (Peltz, Myers, Winkleblack, Zatta) to the DuPont board at the 2015 Annual Meeting
  • Assess corporate structure — determine whether the existing portfolio can deliver best-in-class growth/margins or should be separated
  • Eliminate $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and ensure Fresh Start productivity flows through to the bottom line
  • Reassess capital allocation (R&D, capex, M&A) and return all excess free cash flow to shareholders with a 10% dividend CAGR
  • Improve corporate governance, transparency, and compensation alignment; reject Chemours' entrenchment provisions

KPIs cited

EPS growth 2011-2014
DuPont -7% vs proxy-peer median ~18%; bottom quartile on 3-, 10- and 20-year windows
EBITDA margin vs peers
DuPont trails peers in 5 of 7 segments (~64% of revenue) — e.g., Nutrition 16% vs peers 24%, Industrial Biosciences 21% vs Novozymes 35%
Organic revenue growth vs peers
DuPont trails peers in 5 of 7 segments (~71% of revenue); Performance Chemicals 1.3% vs peers 3.4%, Safety -0.2% vs 3M 3.2%
Return on Invested Capital (ex Ag & Pharma)
5.0% actual vs 8.4% WACC — 40% below cost of capital on 2/3 of the revenue base
Excess corporate costs
$2-4bn estimated burden; Coatings case implies 26-55% of incremental shareholder value
Axalta EBITDA vs DuPont Coatings (2011, same year)
$568m (Axalta S-1) vs $339m (DuPont reported) — +68% under new ownership
CEO stock sales since Trian invested
54% of equity position (~$80m) sold, incl. 23% in the week after Trian's White Paper at a 15-year high of $72.83
2011 EPS figures reported by DuPont
Nine different versions between $2.03 and $4.32 filed across 10-Ks, 8-Ks and DEFA14A from 2012-2015
Unaffected 16-year TSR (5/98-9/14)
DuPont 55% vs S&P 500 144% vs S&P Chemicals 257%
Top-day DuPont outperformance since 2009
+506bps on Trian White Paper release (9/17/14), +499bps on Trian stake first reported (7/17/13)
Target valuation multiple
9.9x blended NTM EV/EBITDA implying $120/share and 21% IRR to end-2017
2013 compensation payout vs performance
Long-term incentive paid out 113% of target despite 25th-percentile TSR; 2014 individual rating 80-100% despite 0% corporate rating

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • Axalta (ex-DuPont Coatings) under Carlyle/Berkshire — EBITDA +150% post-spin
  • Heinz (Trian board role, later acquired by 3G/Berkshire)
  • Wendy's / Tim Hortons
  • Ingersoll-Rand / Allegion spin
  • Mondelez / Kraft Foods split
  • Snapple turnaround (HBS case study N9-599-126)
  • Kraft spin from Mondelez — shareholder-friendly governance template
  • Time Inc. spin from Time Warner — governance template
  • PayPal spin from eBay — governance template
  • Triangle Industries / American National Can

Notable slides (6)

Notes

Filed as proxy presentation (DEFA14A exhibit c81061_ex-1) for DuPont's 2015 Annual Meeting. Campaign-defining deck in the most-watched activist proxy fight of the year; Trian nominated Peltz, Myers, Winkleblack, Zatta (Ed Garden as alternate). Custom 'DuPont Can Be Great' branding and microsite. Stake figure (2.7%) taken from slide 36's Trian track-record table — deck does not restate it explicitly on a dedicated slide. Thesis is primarily governance + operational + cost-cutting rather than breakup — Trian is expressly 'open-minded' on portfolio separation (slide 29) even though it diagnoses conglomerate complexity. Strong use of CEO-quote-contradiction (slide 29 'Rhetoric vs Reality'), before/after framing (Coatings/Axalta, slide 21), and peer-gap charts (slides 12-13, 16-17). Trian lost the proxy vote on 13 May 2015; Kullman stepped down later that year and the Dow-DuPont merger followed in December 2015 — outcome context (not in document).