Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck proxy fight
2015-04-21 · 87 pages

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD

DuPont is bottom-quartile under Ellen Kullman; electing Trian's four nominees unlocks $120/share by 2017 by cutting $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and ending 'crony' compensation.

N 5 Narrative
V 4 Visual
C 4 Craft
Original source ↗

Thesis

Trian Partners argues that DuPont — a seven-segment chemicals/agriculture conglomerate run by CEO Ellen Kullman since 2009 — has been bottom-quartile on EPS growth since 2011 (-7% vs ~30% peer median), with EBITDA margins lagging peers in 5 of 7 segments and ROIC 40% below cost of capital across two-thirds of the revenue base. The Coatings/Axalta case study, where private-equity owners grew EBITDA 150% after DuPont sold the unit for cash, exposes $2-4bn of excess corporate costs burdening the remaining businesses. Compounding this: a board that paid management 80-100% on 'individual performance' the same year it assigned a 0% 'corporate performance' score, and a Chemours spin loaded with anti-takeover entrenchment. Trian asks shareholders to vote the GOLD proxy card to elect Peltz, Myers, Winkleblack and Zatta, implying $120/share by 2017 (21% IRR).

SCQA

Situation

DuPont is a $60bn seven-segment chemicals and agriculture conglomerate with 70,000 employees, led by CEO Ellen Kullman since 2009 and reliant on long-term targets of 7% revenue and 12% EPS growth.

Complication

Performance is bottom-quartile across every peer group: EPS down 7% since 2011, margins lag peers in 5 of 7 segments, ROIC 40% below WACC ex-Ag, and an estimated $2-4bn of excess corporate costs burden the businesses.

Resolution

Elect Trian's four highly qualified nominees — Nelson Peltz, John Myers, Arthur Winkleblack and Robert Zatta — to bring an ownership mentality, eliminate excess costs, end 'crony' compensation, and assess portfolio structure objectively.

Reward

Trian's Summary White Paper implies a target value in excess of $120 per share by year-end 2017 — a 21% IRR — with additional upside if the $2-4bn of excess corporate costs is eliminated.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    DuPont's EPS growth has been bottom-quartile vs every peer group (-7% 2011-14 vs ~30% peer median)

  2. 2

    Coatings/Axalta proves $2-4bn of excess corporate costs — same business, +68% EBITDA under PE owners

  3. 3

    Board rewards management for missing targets: 0% corporate-performance score, but 80-100% individual-performance payouts

Primary demands

  • Elect Trian's four nominees (Peltz, Myers, Winkleblack, Zatta) to the DuPont board
  • Eliminate $2-4bn of excess corporate costs burdening every segment
  • Assess corporate structure / separate the portfolio if management cannot deliver peer-level margins
  • End 'crony' compensation — align pay with operating performance
  • Improve governance, including at the Chemours spin-off (remove staggered board, supermajority provisions)

KPIs cited

DuPont EPS growth 2011-2014
-7%, bottom quartile vs proxy peers (median ~20%) and chemicals/industrials peers (median ~24%)
Segment EBITDA margins vs peers
Lag peers in 5 of 7 segments (~64% of revenues): e.g. Nutrition 16% vs 24% peers; Industrial Biosciences 21% vs 35% Novozymes
ROIC ex Agriculture & Pharma
5.0% actual vs 8.4% WACC — 40% below cost of capital on ~2/3 of revenue base
Excess corporate costs
$2-4bn estimated by Trian via Coatings/Axalta extrapolation; even DuPont's own methodology implies $1.7bn
Coatings EBITDA: same business, same year
$339m as reported by DuPont (2011) vs $568m as reported by Axalta S-1 (+68%)
Implied target value
>$120/share by year-end 2017 — 21% IRR — at 9.9x blended NTM EV/EBITDA
Long-term incentive plan payout 2013
113% of target despite TSR in 25th percentile of peers
2014 short-term comp
0% corporate-performance factor BUT 80-100% individual-performance factor
CEO Kullman stock sales
Sold ~54% (~$80m) of her stock since Trian first invested; 23% in the week after Trian's White Paper
Different '2011 EPS' figures DuPont has reported
Nine — ranging from $2.03 to $4.32 across filings since 2012
Sales CAGR 'New DuPont' (ex-PChem) 2007-2014
0% revenue CAGR; 2.5% adj. PTOI CAGR (and flat ex-ethylene-spread tailwind)
Dividend growth under current management
12% vs 66% for proxy peers

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • Heinz (Peltz/Winkleblack 2006-2013, sold to 3G/Berkshire at 20% premium)
  • Rockwood (Zatta/Ghasemi — 364% TSR, 48% multiple re-rating via separation)
  • Snapple/Triarc turnaround (Peltz, HBS case study)
  • Coatings → Axalta (DuPont sold for cash; EBITDA +150% under PE)
  • Family Dollar (Trian defended board, ultimately sold to Dollar Tree)
  • BNY Mellon (Trian backed management vs dissident)
  • Ingersoll-Rand / Allegion spinoff
  • Mondelez / Kraft separation
  • Recent shareholder-friendly spinoffs: Time Inc., PayPal, Gannett

Notable slides (6)

Notes

April 21, 2015 proxy-fight 'Discussion Points' deck — every page footer carries the 'VOTE THE GOLD PROXY CARD' badge. Closing branded slide is page 40 ('DuPont Can Be Great'); the deck then continues 41-87 with appendices (director credentials, stock-price attribution, third-party perspectives, excess-cost methodology). Stake of 2.7% inferred from Appendix C activity table (page 39, 'Highest % of Total Company Owned by Trian'); not stated as a current SEC-filed beneficial ownership %. Outcome (filled later): Trian narrowly lost the May 2015 proxy vote but Kullman resigned in October 2015 and DowDuPont merger followed in 2017 — campaign widely seen as a partial/delayed win. Notable rhetorical devices: 'Rhetoric vs Reality' two-column page (31), 'Saga of DuPont's 2011 EPS' showing 9 different figures (33), and the 0% vs 80-100% bonus juxtaposition (26).