Contrarian Corpus
activist letter proxy fight
2019-02-28 · 16 pages

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company BMY

Bristol-Myers' $91bn Celgene acquisition buys pharma's largest patent cliff; Starboard urges shareholders to vote it down and replace directors to pursue a standalone plan or sale.

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
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Thesis

Starboard opposes Bristol-Myers Squibb's proposed $91 billion acquisition of Celgene, arguing that BMY — already underperforming peers by nearly 37% over three years under CEO Giovanni Caforio — is pursuing a 'bet the company' deal to acquire one of pharma's largest-ever patent cliffs. Celgene's REVLIMID generates 63% of revenues and faces generic competition beginning 2022, while BMY management's base case requires Celgene's unproven pipeline to replace over $17 billion of revenue by 2028 through optimistic CAR-T and ozanimod assumptions management itself has already walked back. With only two weeks of full data room access and no exploration of alternatives, the process appears defensive. Starboard will solicit votes against the share issuance at the April 12 Special Meeting and has nominated directors to hold the Board accountable and pursue a standalone path, tuck-ins, or a sale of BMY at a premium.

SCQA

Situation

Bristol-Myers Squibb is a leading immuno-oncology pharmaceutical company whose shares have underperformed S&P 500 peers by roughly 37% over three years under CEO Giovanni Caforio, amid repeated OPDIVO clinical-trial setbacks.

Complication

Rather than fixing its own strategy, BMY is pursuing a $91bn 'bet the company' acquisition of Celgene, inheriting a massive REVLIMID-driven patent cliff and banking on an unproven pipeline to replace over 60% of Celgene revenue.

Resolution

Starboard will solicit shareholders to vote down the share issuance at the April 12 Special Meeting and has nominated a slate of directors for the 2019 Annual Meeting to hold the Board accountable and pursue alternatives.

Reward

A better path — margin expansion toward the 38% peer average, targeted tuck-ins, or a sale of BMY as a premier oncology asset at a strategic premium — could unlock substantial value versus the risk-laden Celgene deal.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    BMY is buying pharma's largest-ever patent cliff: REVLIMID is 63% of Celgene revenue and faces generics in 2022

  2. 2

    Celgene pipeline must replace >90% of revenue by 2028, relying on repeatedly-missed CAR-T and ozanimod assumptions

  3. 3

    Two-week full data room rushed a 'bet the company' deal with no exploration of a BMY sale that could attract strategic premium

Primary demands

  • Vote against the share issuance proposal related to the proposed Celgene acquisition at the April 12, 2019 Special Meeting
  • Elect Starboard's nominated slate of director candidates at the 2019 Annual Meeting to hold the Board accountable
  • Explore all strategic alternatives for Bristol-Myers, including remaining standalone with improved margins and cost discipline or pursuing a sale of the Company at a premium
  • Provide books and records under Delaware law to investigate the diligence process leading to the Celgene deal

KPIs cited

3-Year Total Shareholder Return vs S-4 Peer Group
BMY underperformance of (36.7%) over 3 years; (42.0%) over 5 years; (60.9%) over 10 years
TSR during Caforio tenure as CEO
BMY (11.9%) vs peer group +17.5%, underperformance of (29.4%)
REVLIMID share of Celgene revenue at LOE
63% — vs 11-33% for comparable blockbusters (SINGULAIR, LIPITOR, CRESTOR, CYMBALTA, PLAVIX)
Share of 2028 Celgene revenue from un-commercialized pipeline
~90% / ~$17bn must come from yet-unlaunched products
Phase I FDA approval rate (per BMY 10-K)
92% of Phase I studies fail — only 2-3 of ~20 early-stage Celgene assets likely to be approved
R&D as % of revenue (5-year average)
BMY 30% vs 17% peer average — highest in the peer group
FY2018 EBITDA margin
BMY 32% vs 38% peer average
NTM P/E multiple premium vs peers
Compressed from 19.8x premium in 2015 to (2.7x) discount currently
Full data room access pre-announcement
Only ~2 weeks to diligence ~30 highly technical pipeline products
Celgene cumulative R&D spend since last major drug launch (2014)
$22bn spent with no new major drug brought to market

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (5)

Notes

16-page shareholder letter filed as proxy solicitation exhibit (EX1 to DFAN14A) opposing BMY's January 2019 agreement to acquire Celgene for ~$91bn. Hybrid format: letter prose with ~15 institutional charts and CEO-quote callout boxes interspersed. Signed by Jeffrey C. Smith, Managing Member of Starboard Value LP. Filed Feb 28, 2019, ahead of April 12, 2019 Special Meeting share-issuance vote. Standout rhetorical moves: (i) patent-cliff framing — REVLIMID at 63% of Celgene revenue is unprecedented vs peer blockbusters (11-33%); (ii) serial CEO-quote contradictions on GED-0301, ozanimod, JCAR017 timelines; (iii) annotated stock chart tying first-activist/second-activist involvement to the 'defensive' merger decision. Stake size not disclosed in this filing. No sum-of-parts; valuation argument is peer multiple discount (BMY now 2.7x below peers vs 19.8x premium in 2015). Wellington Management publicly opposed the deal around the same time — Starboard positions itself alongside 'numerous other large, long-term shareholders'. Outcome: Starboard ultimately lost — the Celgene acquisition closed November 2019 after proxy advisors ISS and Glass Lewis supported BMY management.