Contrarian Corpus
activist 13D filing proxy fight
2022-01-12 · 61 pages

Huntsman Corporation HUN

N 4 Narrative
V 2 Visual
C 2 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    A decade of missed EBITDA targets: 2014, 2016 and 2018 Investor Day aspirations all unmet

  2. 2

    Stock has underperformed chemical index by 330% and S&P 500 by 337% since 2005 IPO

  3. 3

    Board is disenfranchising shareholders: abridged nomination window, refused Universal Proxy Card

Primary demands

  • Elect Starboard's slate of four director nominees (Gallogly, Lin, Schnabel, Smith) at the 2022 Annual Meeting
  • Refresh the Board with independent, shareholder-aligned directors unburdened by past loyalties
  • Adopt a Universal Proxy Card for the contested election
  • Hold management accountable for chronic EBITDA under-delivery and restore credibility on financial targets
  • Transform Huntsman into a best-in-class differentiated chemicals manufacturer

KPIs cited

2014 Investor Day Adjusted EBITDA target
$2.0bn target over 2-3 years; Adjusted EBITDA instead declined by over $350mn
2016 Investor Day Adjusted EBITDA target
$1.7bn target; Company fell short absent a $125mn one-time commodity price boon
2018 Investor Day target
10% Adjusted EBITDA CAGR and $27 share price uplift implying ~$60/share by 2020 — unmet, EBITDA declined $300mn+ between 2018-2019
Relative total shareholder return since IPO
Underperformed chemical index by 330% and S&P 500 by 337% from Feb 2005 through Sept 27, 2021
Beneficial ownership
Starboard group owns 18,817,818 shares (~8.6% of class)

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (6)

Notes

Schedule 13D/A (Amendment No. 1) filed as Exhibit 1 to a DFAN14A proxy solicitation filing. Primary argument lives in Exhibit 99.1 — a ~3-page letter from Jeffrey Smith to Chairman/CEO Peter R. Huntsman (dated Jan 12, 2022) followed by 2 pages of nominee bios with headshots. The body of the document (pp. 1-44) is standard SEC 13D boilerplate: reporting-person tables, ownership percentages, purchase history, Joint Filing & Solicitation Agreement (Ex. 99.2), indemnification and compensation letters for the non-Smith nominees at $25k + $25k (Ex. 99.3 / 99.4), and powers of attorney (Ex. 99.5). Narrative pattern is a classic broken-promises argument — cites three successive Investor Days (2014, 2016, 2018) where aspirational EBITDA targets were missed, culminating in the '330%/337% underperformance' shareholder-pain statistic. Governance grievances (abridged nomination window, refusal of Universal Proxy Card, reactive board refreshment) are framed as evidence that Board is actively disenfranchising shareholders. No charts, no sum-of-parts, no target price. Visual production is minimal — Starboard logo on the letter header and nominee photographs are the only graphical elements. Thesis type blend leans governance + operational turnaround; not a breakup story. Peer set (Celanese, Dow, Eastman) is named only in a footnote as Huntsman's self-identified 2014/2016 Investor Day peers. Campaign context: this Amendment No. 1 is the escalation step that announces nominations; the original 13D presumably disclosed the initial stake. Good example for study of a 'text-only' activist escalation — proxy-fight playbook without the slide deck.