Contrarian Corpus
activist conference presentation initial thesis
2019-11-14 · 23 pages

Ferguson plc FERG

Ferguson is a US specialty distributor trapped in a UK listing; demerging Wolseley and relisting in the US closes a 10.4x-vs-17.2x EBITDA peer gap.

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
Original source ↗

Thesis

Ferguson is the #1 North American specialty distributor of plumbing and HVAC products, generating ~95% of EBITDA in the US with ~23% ROIC and organic growth 300-400bps above market, yet it trades at just 10.4x CY2020 EV/EBITDA versus 17.2x for US specialty RMI peers like Pool Corp, Watsco, SiteOne and Beacon. Trian owns ~6.1% of the company and argues the discount is driven by Ferguson's UK listing, minimal US sell-side coverage (1 analyst vs peer average of 14), under-ownership by US institutions and persistent mis-comparison to UK building-materials or broadline MRO names. With the September 2019 announcement to demerge the UK business and install Kevin Murphy as Group CEO, Trian urges the Board to complete the pivot by relisting in the US — citing Invesco, Signet and Barrick-Randgold as precedents — so Ferguson can re-rate alongside its true specialty-distributor peer set.

SCQA

Situation

Ferguson plc is the #1 North American specialty distributor of plumbing and HVAC products, a $19bn market cap UK-listed business generating ~95% of EBITDA from the US with ~23% ROIC.

Complication

Despite organically outgrowing the market by 300-400bps, Ferguson trades at 10.4x CY2020 EBITDA versus 17.2x for US specialty RMI peers — the gap driven by its UK listing, minimal US analyst coverage and under-ownership by US institutions.

Resolution

Complete the September 2019 UK demerger, install Kevin Murphy as Group CEO, and relist Ferguson's primary listing on a US exchange so it is benchmarked against its true specialty-distributor peer set.

Reward

A re-rating toward the 17.2x specialty-distributor multiple — alongside peers worth 20x Ferguson's market cap — would unlock substantial upside as US investors recognize the North American growth and margin profile.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Ferguson trades at 10.4x EV/EBITDA vs 17.2x for US specialty RMI distributor peers

  2. 2

    ~95% of EBITDA is North American yet the stock lists in the UK with only 1 US analyst

  3. 3

    Only 9 of top 25 US specialty-distributor holders own Ferguson — a UK-listing liquidity and coverage gap

Primary demands

  • Move Ferguson's primary listing from the LSE to a US stock exchange
  • Complete the announced demerger of the UK (Wolseley) business
  • Reframe peer benchmarking around US specialty RMI distributors rather than UK building-materials or broadline MRO peers

KPIs cited

CY2020 EV/EBITDA multiple
Ferguson 10.4x vs US Specialty RMI Distributors 17.2x, Home Improvement Retail 13.4x, Broadline MRO 12.3x, UK Distributors 8.3x
North American EBITDA share
~95% of FY19 EBITDA from North America; 100% pro forma after UK demerger
US revenue CAGR 2014-2019
~9.5% total (7.5% organic + 2.0% M&A), ~300-400bps above market
US EBITA CAGR 2014-2019
~11.0% with EBITDA margins +50bps
ROIC
Improved to ~23%
US sell-side analyst coverage
Only 1 US-based analyst covers Ferguson vs peer average of 14 (Home Depot and Lowe's have >30)
Share turnover (90-day avg)
Ferguson 0.4% vs peer average 0.7%
Top 25 US specialty-distributor holders owning Ferguson
9 of 25 own Ferguson; $9.4bn of sector AUM held by non-owners
Revenue per branch (NA vs UK)
$11.5mm vs $4.1mm
Gross margin (NA vs UK)
30% vs 22%
Cumulative 5-year organic growth (NA vs UK)
+37% vs +4%
Cumulative 5-year EBITA growth (NA vs UK)
+68% vs -59%
Gross margin change, 5 yrs
Ferguson +130bps vs Grainger -510bps, MSC -360bps, Fastenal -340bps
Precedent relisting shareholder approvals
Invesco 97%, Signet 94%, Randgold 95%

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • Invesco LSE-to-NYSE relisting (2007)
  • Signet Jewelers LSE-to-NYSE relisting (2008)
  • Barrick Gold / Randgold Resources merger and LSE delisting (2018)

Notable slides (6)

Notes

Delivered by Brian Baldwin at Sohn London 2019. Unusually collaborative tone for an activist deck — Trian praises Ferguson as an 'exceptional business' and frames the campaign around a valuation/listing-structure mispricing rather than operational failure, crediting management (Kevin Murphy) for already moving in the right direction with the September 2019 UK demerger announcement. The deck's signature argument is the 'compared to wrong peers' reframe — pages 13-16 systematically walk through why Ferguson looks like US specialty RMI distributors (Watsco, Pool, SiteOne, Beacon) rather than UK building-materials or broadline MRO names. Precedent-heavy closing (Invesco, Signet, Barrick-Randgold) is classic activist playbook-by-analogy.