"While these inconsistencies suggest that there may be discrepancies in the sell side's view of the base of the market, we are intrigued most by the fact that, regardless of how analysts identify and measure the market, they appear to significantly underestimate the pace of competitive market share gains: again, the sell side appears to assume that Penumbra will lose 2-3% market share per year, while Medtronic claims to have gained 15% in under a year and to be on pace to capture another 10% this year."
Callouts & quotes from 709+ activist slides
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"On May 4, 2020, we completed the divestiture of the Security & Detection Systems and MacDonald Humfrey Automation solutions business ("airport security and automation business") to Leidos, Inc. for $ 1 billion (net cash proceeds of $ 950 million after selling costs and estimated purchase price adjustments), subject to final customary purchase price adjustments as set forth in the definitive sale agreement, and recognized a pre-tax loss of $26 million during the quarter ended July 3, 2020."
"As we discussed earlier, just 4% of men over 70 have prostates above 100g, and our research found that Aquablation is most competitive versus MISTs and other resective procedures for larger prostates, above 80-100g. Thus, even if we assume 10% of active patients have large prostates, 9.6 million patients, and a 2% annual intervention rate, that implies only 19,200 of the annual 192,000 estimated annual BPH interventions are “best suited” for Aquablation."
"Spruce Point believes that consensus estimates for future aspiration catheter revenues are not analytically robust. Yet, as with most companies, the market interprets these estimates as a good indicator of future sales, and as perhaps the most educated, rigorous, and analytically complete assessment of future performance. Accordingly, we believe that Penumbra shares are currently valued according to estimates which likely feature a high degree of error."
"The other key observations from our derivation of estimated Live metrics are that (1) Consumer segment revenue grew faster before the launch of Live (FY 2016-2018) than it has over the past three years (FY 2022-2024), suggesting Live's massive revenue growth may just be fueled by cannibalization of non-Live revenue, and (2) Consumer segment revenue growth ex-Live is very modest, we believe calling into question the sustainability of the franchise."
"The customer concentration is striking when one adds the volumes from a just a few others, whose questionable practices we detail in other sections: UCSD, which we estimate does 100 TransMedics cases; University of Utah, which we suspect will do over 50; and a center run by another Lebanon-trained physician, who told us he’s on track for 50 OCS pumps in 2024; and one in LA using 50 – another 250 devices."
"Assuming Samsara’s LTV:CAC was 9x before declining to 7x in FY2023, we estimate that: (1) Samsara’s churn has nearly doubled since FY2020, (2) Its current quarterly churn of nearly 8% is relatively unattractive, (3) Samsara’s YoY growth in new ARR added has slowed to historic lows, and (4) the Company’s churned ARR relative to new ARR has increased dramatically, from 14% in FY2020 to 46% in FY2023."
"The Street believes that VRNT shares trade at a ~35% discount to SaaS peers. However, we estimate that VRNT trades just above the industry median, despite its chronically low organic growth, destructive acquisitions, and inability to generate cash flow growth despite frequent M&A – a stark contrast to the many fast-growing and highly-profitable true cloud businesses which occupy the space."
"Limbach trades at over 18x our estimate for its FY26E Adj. EBITDA, a large premium when compared to peers. We believe this premium is unwarranted considering the Company's decelerating organic revenue growth, non-existent free cash flow growth, and its aggressive accounting methods which we believe may overstate earnings quality and obscure the true underlying volatility of the business."
"The WFG Convention brought in an estimated 33,000 attendees in 2024. Ticket prices went for $300+ per person, thus the convention likely grossed ~$10 million. We have concerns about whether senior WFG leaders are financially incentivized to increase convention attendance, which would lead us to question whether the convention is merely another way to extract money from low-level agents."
"We believe it will be difficult for Zillow to grow as long as its Premier Agent business is in decline. Our estimates for 2024 assume continued weakness in Premier Agent offset by strong gains in its Rentals business paired with a comparable operating expense structure to 2023. Based on these estimates, we believe Zillow could produce $200 to $260 million of free cash flow in 2024."
"How can TurboTax disclosed Paying ARPR only increase 7% from 2020 to 2023 when (1) Online and Live average list prices rose 10% and 9%, (2) Intuit launched the highest ASP Full Service offering in 2021, and (3) we estimate that higher list ASP Live as a percent of total paying returns grew from 7% to 18% over the same period. We believe this suggests weak price realization."
"In an absolute best case scenario in which ABML successfully builds and ramps its facility, secures adequate battery supply to operate at full capacity, and finds customers willing to purchase material at ABML’s estimated prices, and assuming ABML should trade in-line with a mix of battery value chain and recycling players, we believe ABML is worth less than $1.00/share."
"To estimate 2016 revenues per program, we used the following data and estimates: Our revenue cohort assumptions for 2016, 2016 revenues by school disclosed in company filings, 2016 top ten programs by new student enrollment, Tuition data (credits to complete degree and cost per credit) obtained on schools websites where available, UNC enrollment data (from FOIA request)."
"Part II: Twist’s “DNA chip” narrative - 10,000X higher throughput and lower cost - is fraudulent, covering up a manual, labor-intensive, and fatally-flawed manufacturing process crippled by errors, bottlenecks, and pitiful yields – thereby driving gross margins we estimate to be negative, not unlike Theranos which claimed to run blood tests on its “chip” but wasn’t."
"Notice carefully that LSPD's prospectus cloud image (right) fails to disclose customers, instead focusing on 47,000+ "Customer Locations". However, LSPD left a clue that allows us to calculate implied customers from the $500,000 GTV per customer. We estimate LSPD had 27,200 customers at IPO. This is 46% fewer customers than it reported just 5 months earlier."
"We believe Nuvei is a mixture of acquisitions which on average have been acquired at approximately 5.6x revenues. We estimate up to 40% of revenues are acquired and do not deserve to increase the value of the entire company given numerous issues we've identified with specific acquisitions such as Base Commerce, Smart2Pay, SafeCharge and Vantage Payments."
"BEKE claims that its GTV from new home sales on its platform was RMB 908 billion in Q2-Q3, 2021. Based on the number of new home sales collected and the average sales price reported by BEKE, we estimate that BEKE's actual GTV from new home sales was only RMB 402 million, indicating that BEKE likely inflated new home GTV by at least approximately ~126%."
"BR's CEO cited many records in FY 2022, but what he doesn't point out is that cash flow declined. By adjusting the results for the onerous UBS project investment and COVID-19 effects, as well as the inorganic acquisition contribution from Itiviti, we estimate that BR's core business experienced declining Cash From Operations by approximately -17.2%."
"Spruce Point believes part of what has driven Weis' share price is the belief that its operating cash flow grew 550% YoY in Q1'18. However, by pro forma adjusting results for its aggressive accounting change to accelerate accounts receivables as cash, and a one-time incentive payment (cash flow drag) from Q1'17, we estimate the growth rate was 74%."
"Free cash flow growth should be a strong driver of equity valuation and sell-side analyst price targets. What we find is that Stryker's 2022E Free Cash Flow estimates have been contracting. Yet, not a single analyst has downgraded the stock, and in fact some brazen analysts claim shrinking Free Cash Flow merits a price increase and a "Buy"."
"We estimate that, at best, EPS would have been flat or modestly down without Cintas’ crafty financial and accounting gamesmanship that involved lowering its tax rate, redirecting capital towards share repurchases despite repeatedly saying it was the lowest capital priority, and lowering amortization expense for G&K service contracts."
"With the FOIA data collected from the Florida DOT indicating a -22% decline in contact awards, and ROAD's commentary that new backlog over the period that Florida revenues ramped supported higher margins, we estimate the impact to the Company's EBITDA in FY25 to be approximately $10 - $15 million or approximately 3% - 5% of EBITDA."
"To estimate 2017 revenues per program, we used the following data and estimates: 2017 revenues by school disclosed in company filings, 2017 top 15 programs by new student enrollment, Tuition data (credits to complete degree and cost per credit) obtained on schools websites where available, UNC enrollment data (from FOIA request)."
"Harmony’s sales are dependent on a handful of physicians, paid via a speakers program that ex-employees described as a blatant kickback scheme; one of Harmony’s top speakers estimated that he and four others he knows are responsible for 5-700 of all Wakix patients - 20-30% of total revenue depending on how one does the math"
"ENFN claims that managed service revenue increased by $1.6 million from new clients and $2.7 million from existing clients, offset by churn (which is not quantified) for a total of $4.3 million. However, total segment revenue only increased by $2.7 million. Therefore, we estimate revenue lost from churn to be ~$1.6 million."
"AMR uses a discount rate for certain pension obligations near 2.6%, its weighted average financing lease expense is 9.6%, and its Term-Loan interest cost is 10%. Using these range of assumptions for its incremental borrowing cost, we estimate that AMR’s “Hidden” Interest-Bearing debt obligations are $138 to $690 million."
"We identify at least four factors that are temporarily inflating OCF by an estimated 67%-78%. We also point out numerous errors and inconsistencies with management's figures. We believe at best, these are just sloppy errors, and at worst case these are intentional acts by management to obscure its strains from investors."
"When we put the pieces together, including all-time high DSOs, all-time high finished goods inventory (equating to as much as 2.6 quarters of handpieces), generally flat utilization, and a smaller than estimated procedure market size, we can only surmise that Procept and its customers are stuffed with excess handpieces."
"We find it extremely suspicious that management conveniently chose to stop disclosing this number this year, just as their TAM runway is beginning to run out by our estimates, and just as product-level sales growth patterns appear to reveal sales growth has been driven by factors other than growth in the patient base."
"The estimate of net realizable value of inventory is impacted by assumptions regarding general semiconductor market conditions, manufacturing schedules, technology changes, new product introductions and possible alternative uses, and require management to use significant judgment that may include uncertain elements."
"Heska’s market cap grew 218% from the close of the scil transaction through the end of 2020. However, despite scil adding a relatively large chunk of negative-growth, ~30% gross margin revenue and Heska consensus 2021E EBITDA estimates not changing, the implied value of scil and CVM grew 282% over just eight months."
"Lumen has not disclosed the exact prepayment amount for the $5bn in contracts (neither for 2024 nor in aggregate) but based on the company's change in FCF outlook guidance and the management comments regarding the upfront nature of cash paid in advance of construction, we estimate ~$1.3bn will be received in 2H24E."
"We believe that the FY25 revenue guidance increase earlier this month of $10 million is substantially explained by the expected contributions from the Ambry Genetics acquisition and the new Pathos/AstraZeneca deal, two factors that we estimate should have added nearly $46 million to projected revenue for the year."
"Spruce Point has serious concerns about DV’s treatment of the Zentrick deferred payment termination accounting. It recorded the lowest possible expense given its estimated range of $2.8 - $5.5 million in 2021. Yet, in early 2022 DV disclosed that it recorded a $5.6 million payment, above the high end of its range."
"The average monthly GZ 1-1 revenue would be at most only Rmb 14.7 million, less than half of the Rmb 32.9+ million draw down needed to cover the difference between our low-end estimate of the deferred revenue’s Rmb ~75 million carrying value and the Rmb 42.1 million shown on the SAIC files as at December 31, 2016."
"We estimate gross profit per system will continue to drop as the solar investment tax credit steps down over the next 2 years. Lower margins and a reduced benefit for tax equity investors look to pressure an industry which already has tight margins and relies on tax equity to support their negative cash flows."
"We estimate GLOB founders sold (or transferred) over $80m of stock in the IPO, each of the subsequent secondary offerings, and multiple open market sales. Additionally, we believe that the irrevocable trusts may not have to file its sales in the open market, making it difficult to track their current ownership"
"Kornit’s share price is effectively at the average analyst price target which is near all-time highs, yet none of the analysts have closely investigated the impact of Amazon payments and revenues tapering off, but instead anchor their estimates to management hitting ambitious long-term $500m revenue targets."
"Based on our analysis of VIE charges for services rendered, average physician hourly rates, and disclosed annual consultations, we estimate that the average physician consultation in 2022 was under five minutes, even after the introduction of mental health counseling services that generally last an hour."
"At an average sensor and transmitter revenue per patient per day of $2.00 – close to the Libre’s current level of $2.04 – Abbott would realize a gross margin of 59% on the Libre 2 (vs. our estimate of 60% today), while Dexcom would realize a gross margin of -7% on the G6 (vs. our estimate of 70% today)."
"We believe that the most recent (February 2017) MRE contains flaws similar in scope and form to those of earlier Nkran estimates. There are indications the models have been smeared, which means to overweight positive results – extrapolating them out broadly – but underweight or ignore “zero intercepts.”"
"Spruce Point believes that, with Penumbra U.S. Stroke revenue growth set to slow in the face of heavy competition, and with consensus peripheral thrombectomy sales expectations far too aggressive, company-wide sales growth is set to be cut almost in half from Street estimates, from FY19 through FY21."
"Spruce Point believes that, with Penumbra U.S. Stroke revenue growth set to slow in the face of heavy competition, and with consensus peripheral thrombectomy sales expectations far too aggressive, company-wide sales growth is set to be cut almost in half from Street estimates, from FY19 through FY21."
"A number of KOL’s indicated why the 33% explants rate in the NANS paper actually underestimates how often Nevro’s device fails: many patients just turn the device off and don’t bother to have it surgically removed because “they don’t want to go back to their doctor because he sold them on the idea.”"
"It's easy to see how Kratos has destroyed significant value. Since 2008, Kratos spent nearly $1bn on acquisitions that have contributed an estimated $801m and $129m of revenues and EBITDA, respectively. Yet, recent results suggest over $237m and $69m of sales and EBITDA losses, net of divestitures."
"At the current level of g-fees and a 2.5% equity ratio, the GSEs’ guarantee business could have maintained a positive net worth while absorbing the same level of credit provisions (an accounting charge that represents an estimate of future credit losses) they incurred during the financial crisis"
"Management has collected ~$35 million dollars in performance compensation, growing at an 11% CAGR vs. organic growth CAGR of ~1%, tied to revenue and EBITDA targets while PBH has missed organic growth estimates for 4 out of 5 years and missed FCF guidance in 3 out of 5 years between 2015 – 2019."
"We also double checked the numbers from the Consumer International and Direct segment reporting, which includes the FLAWLESS acquisition. Again, FLAWLESS revenues are estimated at $7.5m - $8.2m, slightly different than $7.2m - $8.1m we previously estimated from the consolidated net sales level."
"With the same toxic combination of leverage and cash burn, we believe investors underestimate Nevro’s risk of becoming the next Nuvectra, especially if the FDA takes any action against its product, or if the OIG’s Nov 16th Special Fraud Alert on speakers programs is predictive of what’s coming."
"Assuming 5-year useful lives for the intangibles related to customer lists from the Credit Karma and Mailchimp acquisitions results in estimated 21% to 26% reductions in GAAP net income in each of the past three fiscal years and a near halving of GAAP net margins since FY 2020 from 24% to 14%."
"Based on the $250-$275 million revenue range and $1 billion estimated backlog, the business looks incredibly cheap at 0.55x revenues and 0.15x backlog which leads us to question the quality of the deal especially in light of an industry source referencing “past due invoices” from contractors."
"Step 5: TIP REIT pays a taxable dividend (at the 15% dividend tax rate to non-corporate taxpayers) to shareholders equal to its allocated portion of Target’s $16bn of retained Earnings and Profits (“E&P”), estimated to be $8bn based on the implied mid-point valuation of TIP REIT/Target Corp"
"Again, while generously assuming no lost reserves, and now allowing for the company to respond to lower prices with 20% cuts in its key cost areas such as rig day rates, horsepower for fracking, and raw materials, we estimate Pioneer's existing reserves to be worth less than $22 per share."
"If all of Premier's member owner hospitals were to demand and receive a market-rate shareback beginning in FY22 – the earliest point at which their current terms could be amended – consensus sales estimates for FY22-23 would fall by 26%, and EBITDA estimates would be cut by more than half."
"The table below showing Casino's market share versus its "Real" EBITDA (i.e., excluding our estimate of gains on sale in 2014 and 2015) strongly casts doubt on the notion that there's any relationship between Casino's present market share and EBITDA generated by selling products in stores."
"When we adjust Samsara's Adj. EBITDA calculation for incremental device cost and sales commission amortization, we estimate it to be overstated by $134 million in the past two fiscal years and that FY2023 adjusted EBITDA margin stands at -22% as opposed to the -10% reported by the Company."
"Altogether, we estimate the $25 million cash payment and tangible concessions linked to the valuable Meridian assets could over time represent a nine-figure cost in the coming years for Norfolk Southern - far exceeding the $84 million that CSX paid to hire industry legend Hunter Harrison."
"Step 6: TIP REIT pays a taxable dividend (at the dividend tax rate to non-corporate taxpayers) to shareholders equal to its allocated portion of Target’s $16bn of retained Earnings and Profits (“E&P”), estimated to be $8bn based on the implied mid-point valuation of TIP REIT/Target Corp"
"Thus, even if we assume iRhythm can achieve the low end to consensus of Wall Street analyst revenue estimates for 2026, which we doubt, applying a more appropriate 2x to 4x revenue multiple range yields approximately 40% to 70% stock price downside and material underperformance risk."