23 documents showing 1–23
BlackRock, Inc. BLK
BlackRock's governance trails the S&P 500 on every metric, its stewardship team is overwhelmed, and TSR has merely tracked the market since 2009 — separate Chair and CEO to restore independent oversight.
BlackRock BLK
BlackRock's combined Chair/CEO and below-peer governance have delivered only market-matching TSR since 2009 and fuel greenwashing risk; shareholders should vote FOR an Independent Chair at the 2024 AGM.
BlackRock BLK
BlackRock's combined CEO/Chair role and entrenched Lead Independent Director leave the board without true oversight; bylaws should mandate an Independent Chair from AGM 2025.
Legg Mason LM
Trian owns ~4.5% and returns as a significant shareholder
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD
DuPont is bottom-quartile under Ellen Kullman; electing Trian's four nominees unlocks $120/share by 2017 by cutting $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and ending 'crony' compensation.
The Bank of New York Mellon BK
BNY Mellon has squandered the 2007 Mellon merger under CEO Hassell; cutting ~10,000 excess FTEs and installing new leadership closes the State Street gap for 114% upside.
PepsiCo, Inc. PEP
PepsiCo's snacks and beverages are structurally incompatible — Trian demands a Mondelez merger plus beverage spin (or a clean snacks/beverages separation), unlocking up to $175/share by 2015 vs. $85 today.
Tessera Technologies Inc. TSRA
Tessera has squandered $517M on the failing Digital Optics business while its core patent-licensing franchise shrinks; Starboard's six-director slate and IP-focused plan can unlock best-in-class 60-70% EBITDA margins.
AOL, Inc. AOL
AOL's board lets management burn Access/Search cash on a Display strategy losing $500M+ a year; elect three Starboard nominees to enforce discipline and restructure or exit Patch.
Spreadtrum Communications SPRD
Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.
Duoyuan Global Water Inc. DGW
DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.
China MediaExpress Holdings CCME
CCME is a pump-and-dump: reported revenue is overstated ~5x, its bus network is half the claimed size, and management is cashing out — fair value $5.28 vs $16.61.
RINO International Corp. RINO
RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.
Orient Paper, Inc. ONP
ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.
Orient Paper Inc. ONP
Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.
General Growth Properties GGP
GGP is worth ~$20/share sum-of-parts ($15 PF GGP + $5 GGO) vs. $14 price — 43% upside by year-end
Mall REIT sector (long General Growth Properties) GGP
Mall REITs still trade at 7.8% cap rates vs. 6.3% Baa — a historically wide spread
Corrections Corporation of America CXW
CXW trades at a 12% cap rate vs ~7% for Health Care REITs with near-identical attributes
Realty Income Corporation O
Tenant base is mostly junk-rated discretionary retailers with high bankruptcy risk
General Growth Properties GGWPQ
GGP's assets materially exceed liabilities — this is a liquidity bankruptcy, not insolvency
Target Corporation TGT
Target board lacks senior operating experience in retail, credit cards, and real estate
Target Corporation TGT
Target trades at only 5.8x '09E EV/EBITDA while REITs trade 14.5x-35.7x — 22% of EBITDA mispriced
Target Corporation TGT
Target owns 95% of its buildings — more real estate than any big-box peer, worth $39bn replacement value