25 documents showing 1–25

Apr 09, 2024

Bluebell Capital

BlackRock, Inc. BLK

BlackRock's governance trails the S&P 500 on every metric, its stewardship team is overwhelmed, and TSR has merely tracked the market since 2009 — separate Chair and CEO to restore independent oversight.

N4 V3

Apr 09, 2024

Bluebell Capital

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined Chair/CEO and below-peer governance have delivered only market-matching TSR since 2009 and fuel greenwashing risk; shareholders should vote FOR an Independent Chair at the 2024 AGM.

N4 V3

Apr 09, 2024

Bluebell Capital

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined CEO/Chair role and entrenched Lead Independent Director leave the board without true oversight; bylaws should mandate an Independent Chair from AGM 2025.

N4 V2

Apr 02, 2020

Spruce Point Capital

WD-40 Company WDFC

WD-40 is a promotional, no-moat lubricant company hiding a balance-sheet hole and bloated inventory behind a 28x EBITDA multiple — Spruce Point sees 55-60% downside to $75-$85.

N5 V4

Dec 19, 2019

Spruce Point Capital

Plug Power Inc. PLUG

Plug Power's $1.5B valuation rests on a fake 'inflection to profitability' manufactured by ASC 842 lease accounting; strip the add-backs, face 80% dilution, and the stock trends to $0.

N5 V3

May 20, 2019

Trian Partners

Legg Mason LM

Trian owns ~4.5% and returns as a significant shareholder

N1 V2

Aug 01, 2015

Pershing Square

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

Herbalife's fastest-growing segment — China, ~10% of sales — operates as an illegal pyramid scheme, with royalties disguised in SEC filings as 'China Sales Employees' SG&A to hide identical multi-level compensation.

N5 V2

Apr 21, 2015

Trian Partners

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD

DuPont is bottom-quartile under Ellen Kullman; electing Trian's four nominees unlocks $120/share by 2017 by cutting $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and ending 'crony' compensation.

N5 V4

Mar 01, 2015

Marcato

The Bank of New York Mellon BK

BNY Mellon has squandered the 2007 Mellon merger under CEO Hassell; cutting ~10,000 excess FTEs and installing new leadership closes the State Street gap for 114% upside.

N4 V4

Jul 01, 2013

Trian Partners

PepsiCo, Inc. PEP

PepsiCo's snacks and beverages are structurally incompatible — Trian demands a Mondelez merger plus beverage spin (or a clean snacks/beverages separation), unlocking up to $175/share by 2015 vs. $85 today.

N5 V3

Apr 30, 2013

Starboard Value

Tessera Technologies Inc. TSRA

Tessera has squandered $517M on the failing Digital Optics business while its core patent-licensing franchise shrinks; Starboard's six-director slate and IP-focused plan can unlock best-in-class 60-70% EBITDA margins.

N4 V3

May 23, 2012

Starboard Value

AOL, Inc. AOL

AOL's board lets management burn Access/Search cash on a Display strategy losing $500M+ a year; elect three Starboard nominees to enforce discipline and restructure or exit Patch.

N4 V3

Jun 28, 2011

Muddy Waters

Spreadtrum Communications SPRD

Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.

N4 V1

Apr 04, 2011

Muddy Waters

Duoyuan Global Water Inc. DGW

DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.

N5 V2

Feb 03, 2011

Muddy Waters

China MediaExpress Holdings CCME

CCME is a pump-and-dump: reported revenue is overstated ~5x, its bus network is half the claimed size, and management is cashing out — fair value $5.28 vs $16.61.

N4 V2

Nov 10, 2010

Muddy Waters

RINO International Corp. RINO

RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.

N5 V2

Jul 06, 2010

Muddy Waters

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.

N4 V1

Jun 28, 2010

Muddy Waters

Orient Paper Inc. ONP

Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.

N5 V2

May 26, 2010

Pershing Square

General Growth Properties GGP

At $14, GGP implicitly prices spinco GGO at negative $1; PF GGP alone merits ~$15 on Simon's 6.6% peer cap rate, pointing to ~$20 combined intrinsic and ~43% upside by year-end emergence.

N5 V3

Dec 07, 2009

Pershing Square

Mall REIT sector (long General Growth Properties) GGP

Market-feared mall-REIT collapse never arrived: leverage fell, $18bn equity was raised, cap rates compressed, and tenants now generate cash — making mall REITs still cheap versus Treasuries.

N4 V3

Oct 20, 2009

Pershing Square

Corrections Corporation of America CXW

CXW is a misunderstood real estate business — 90% of EBITDA is owned prisons leased to governments; rerating to healthcare-REIT cap rates unlocks $40-$54 vs. $24.50.

N4 V3

Oct 06, 2009

Pershing Square

Realty Income Corporation O

Realty Income trades at a 7.3% cap rate — a ~40% premium to 10-11% private-market rates for the same junk-credit retail properties; downside to ~$14 (-46%).

N5 V3

May 27, 2009

Pershing Square

General Growth Properties GGWPQ

GGP filed for liquidity, not insolvency; with assets materially exceeding liabilities, a seven-year debt extension would deliver 10x–25x upside on equity trading at $1.19.

N5 V3

May 11, 2009

Pershing Square

Target Corporation TGT

Target's insular board lacks CEO-level retail, credit-card, and real-estate expertise — replace four incumbents with Pershing's slate to close the 62-point performance gap versus Wal-Mart.

N4 V3

Oct 29, 2008

Pershing Square

Target Corporation TGT

Target's owned real estate is a $39bn hidden asset; a tax-free land-only REIT spin (TIP REIT) with a 75-year master lease unlocks ~$30/share and 74% upside.

N5 V3