48 documents showing 1–48

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI booked a $312M JPMorgan borrowing as a loan sale, inflating ~$1B of EBITDA and enriching management while shareholders absorb ~15% annual dilution.

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI's silence on 11 specific accounting questions confirms Muddy Waters' view that 2025 Adjusted EBITDA is inflated ~90% via mislabeled financings, hidden debt, and misstated risk retention.

SoFi Technologies, Inc. SOFI

SoFi's $1,054M reported 2025 EBITDA is ~90% inflated via manipulated charge-off rates, off-balance-sheet VIEs and subsidized seller-financed sales that feed CEO Noto's comp — real EBITDA is ~$103M.

Credit Acceptance Corporation CACC

Citron reverses course on CACC: with CFPB/NYAG overhang resolved Feb 13 2026, 61% of float retired, and an Amazon-bred CEO, fair value is $714 (16x 2026E EPS of $44.62).

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Treasury's warrants and residual stake could generate ~$300bn for taxpayers over time

Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (GSEs) FNMA / FMCC

Releasing GSEs from conservatorship could generate ~$300bn for taxpayers via Treasury warrants

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock preaches stewardship to others while combining Chair and CEO under Larry Fink; shareholders should vote FOR Bluebell's Item 6 to require an independent Chair from 2025.

BlackRock, Inc. BLK

BlackRock's governance trails the S&P 500 on every metric, its stewardship team is overwhelmed, and TSR has merely tracked the market since 2009 — separate Chair and CEO to restore independent oversight.

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined Chair/CEO and below-peer governance have delivered only market-matching TSR since 2009 and fuel greenwashing risk; shareholders should vote FOR an Independent Chair at the 2024 AGM.

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined CEO/Chair role and entrenched Lead Independent Director leave the board without true oversight; bylaws should mandate an Independent Chair from AGM 2025.

BlackRock, Inc. BLK

Bluebell demands BlackRock separate the combined Chair/CEO role via a binding bylaw amendment at the 2024 AGM, offering to withdraw only if the Board irrevocably commits to an independent Chair from 2025.

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters poses five forensic questions to Fairfax management that, if answered honestly, would expose return-of-capital dividends, off-balance-sheet debt via NCIs, and fair-value gain engineering.

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters is short Fairfax Financial, arguing it is 'the GE of Canada' — a serial accounting manipulator whose book value is overstated by ~$4.5bn (~18%) through value-destructive transactions.

Freedom Holding Corp FRHC

FRHC funnels 85% of revenue through a CEO-owned Belize affiliate (FFIN) sourcing Russian flows — an FTX/Alameda structure that should trigger restatement, sanctions violations, and Nasdaq delisting.

Digital Garage Inc. 4819 JT

Digital Garage is missing Japan's cashless-payments wave; spinning off DG Financial Technology, divesting Kakaku, and refocusing management would nearly double the stock and lift profit before tax from JPY4.5bn to JPY11.4bn.

DLocal Ltd. DLO

Muddy Waters is short DLO: contradictory TPV disclosures, implausibly high FX-driven take rates, governance failures and ~$1bn of insider selling point to likely fraud at the Uruguay-based payments processor.

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is 'dumb money' in renewables JVs — sponsors cash out while HASI books non-cash HLBV income on investments unlikely to ever pay out, inflating reported earnings over real economics.

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is a short: its GAAP and non-GAAP 'Distributable Earnings' are inflated by three non-cash accounting tricks and roundtripped SunStrong loans, masking a cash-losing, capital-raise-dependent business.

Lemonade, Inc. LMND

Muddy Waters is short Lemonade after discovering a critical session-fixation flaw that exposed customer PII to Google's index — a negligence that shatters Lemonade's 'trustworthy' digital-native brand.

Sampo Oyj SAMPO

Sampo core insurance has de-rated ~8x P/E vs Nordic peers since 2018

Invesco Ltd. IVZ

Trian is now Invesco's second-largest shareholder with ~9.9% of common stock

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's 2019 financials rely on reclassifications and definition changes to mask an -11.8% drop in cash receipts, -35.5% drop in deployments, and $20.6m of unexplained fair-value gains.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's dismal H2 2019 — 85% YoY collapse in realized gains, Petersen sold to its own fund, vanishing cash, and a lost Perry Ellis ruling — validates Muddy Waters' short thesis on aggressive marks and a flawed model.

S&P Global SPGI

TCI, a ~1% holder, urges S&P Global to lead on climate disclosure: report fully to CDP, adopt a Paris-aligned transition plan, and push mandatory GHG disclosure across the companies it rates.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford cherry-picks which investments count as 'concluded' to avoid truing up marks; the 110% vs 19% gap between unconcluded and concluded returns exposes systematic fair-value manipulation.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal on Napo is a dodge: a 2013 Glenmark arbitration MW surfaces proves Napo was a failed investment BUR disguised as a winner.

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR

Muddy Waters hires ex-CIA behavioral analysts Qverity to show Burford management's rebuttal is riddled with evasion, aggression and persuasion — corroborating the original fraud thesis.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal confirms it: aggressive mark-to-model fair-value gains, manipulated ROIC/IRR, and a CEO-CFO marriage make BUR an Enron-style stock promotion the FCA should investigate.

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR LN

Burford is a poor litigation-finance business masquerading as a great one through Enron-like fair value accounting, four-case concentration, and a CEO-wife CFO — and is arguably insolvent.

FleetCor Technologies FLT

FleetCor's Clean Advantage carbon-offset program is a $100M+ green fraud — 97% of fees stay with FLT, demanding CEO Clarke's resignation and implying ~57% downside.

Legg Mason LM

Trian owns ~4.5% and returns as a significant shareholder

Manulife Financial Corporation MFC

Muddy Waters is short Manulife because a Saskatchewan verdict due by year-end could force MFC to accept unlimited deposits at a guaranteed 4%+ rate — an unhedgeable bleed its own expert admits could cause insolvency.

Assured Guaranty AGO

Assured Guaranty is a melting-ice-cube bond insurer aggressively returning capital it hasn't earned; Puerto Rico losses alone (2-4x reserves) will force a capital raise or strip the AA rating it needs to write new business.

China Internet Nationwide Financial Services Inc. CIFS

CIFS is an old-style China reverse-merger fraud dressed up as a Reg A+ IPO; SAIC filings show 5x revenue overstatement, every disclosed borrower is a sham, and the equity is worthless.

Bank of East Asia, Limited 0023.HK

BEA delivered 2.7% annualised return since 1997 vs 12.8% for family-run HK bank peers

American Capital Ltd. ACAS

ACAS trades at 71% of NAV vs 115% peer median — chronic discount since 2008

The Bank of New York Mellon BK

BNY Mellon has squandered the 2007 Mellon merger under CEO Hassell; cutting ~10,000 excess FTEs and installing new leadership closes the State Street gap for 114% upside.

Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Reformed GSEs worth $23-$47/share vs $3.98 today — 6x to 12x upside

BofI Holding BOFI

Lazard Ltd LAZ

Lazard's premier advisory and asset-management franchise trades at a discount; executing the April 2012 plan to 25%+ margins, disciplined capital return, and stronger governance can nearly double the stock to ~$51.

State Street Corporation STT

State Street subsidized growth at the expense of profitability; committing to 35% EBT margins, capital return, and a possible SSgA spin can lift shares from $34 to ~$99 by 2014.

Hong Kong Monetary Authority / HKD-USD Peg

HKD peg forces Hong Kong to import ultra-loose U.S. monetary policy despite a vastly stronger economy

NRSRO Rating Agencies (Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

Rating agencies caused trillions in losses by rubber-stamping structured finance and bond insurers

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman is using fair-value accounting tricks to hide CDO losses and inflate Level 3 marks; the firm is over-levered, opaque, and needs to recapitalize before the Fed has to step in.

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman quietly disclosed $6.5bn of previously hidden CDO exposure but took only a $200m write-down

Allied Capital ALD

Allied appears to flout SEC fair value rules by using SBA-style accounting to overstate NAV