59 documents showing 1–59

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI booked a $312M JPMorgan borrowing as a loan sale, inflating ~$1B of EBITDA and enriching management while shareholders absorb ~15% annual dilution.

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI's silence on 11 specific accounting questions confirms Muddy Waters' view that 2025 Adjusted EBITDA is inflated ~90% via mislabeled financings, hidden debt, and misstated risk retention.

SoFi Technologies, Inc. SOFI

SoFi's $1,054M reported 2025 EBITDA is ~90% inflated via manipulated charge-off rates, off-balance-sheet VIEs and subsidized seller-financed sales that feed CEO Noto's comp — real EBITDA is ~$103M.

Credit Acceptance Corporation CACC

Citron reverses course on CACC: with CFPB/NYAG overhang resolved Feb 13 2026, 61% of float retired, and an Amazon-bred CEO, fair value is $714 (16x 2026E EPS of $44.62).

Remitly Global, Inc. RELY

Remitly sells 'trust' but relies on stock-photo testimonials and doctored reviews; forensic review reveals margin compression and governance red flags implying 40-55% downside to ~$10.

Mercury General Corporation MCY

Mercury General faces >$2bn in LA wildfire losses uncovered by its $1.3bn reinsurance tower, eroding subsidiary capital and risking dividend cuts, capital raises, and regulatory review.

Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Release Fannie and Freddie from conservatorship at a 2.5% capital standard and IPO them at ~$30+/share; Treasury's warrants generate ~$300bn while shares re-rate 5-6x from ~$6 today.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Fannie and Freddie have already repaid Treasury at an 11.6% IRR; releasing them from conservatorship via modest IPOs unlocks ~$300bn of warrant value for taxpayers within two years.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Aegon Ltd. AEG

Aegon's distribution engine WFG is an aggressive MLM run amok with IUL churn, ex-WFG competitor GFI poaching top producers, and sum-of-parts pointing to 25-50% downside.

AGBA Group AGBA

The AGBA/Triller $4B merger is a sham to pump AGBA's stock — both firms are near-bankrupt, the valuation is fiction, and regulators will reject the deal.

Erie Indemnity Company ERIE

ERIE's 25% management fee on its sole client — the loss-making Erie Insurance Exchange — looks unsustainable; a 2003-style cut plus peer-level multiple would drive 35-55% downside to $211-$317.

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock preaches stewardship to others while combining Chair and CEO under Larry Fink; shareholders should vote FOR Bluebell's Item 6 to require an independent Chair from 2025.

BlackRock, Inc. BLK

BlackRock's governance trails the S&P 500 on every metric, its stewardship team is overwhelmed, and TSR has merely tracked the market since 2009 — separate Chair and CEO to restore independent oversight.

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined Chair/CEO and below-peer governance have delivered only market-matching TSR since 2009 and fuel greenwashing risk; shareholders should vote FOR an Independent Chair at the 2024 AGM.

BlackRock BLK

BlackRock's combined CEO/Chair role and entrenched Lead Independent Director leave the board without true oversight; bylaws should mandate an Independent Chair from AGM 2025.

BlackRock, Inc. BLK

Bluebell demands BlackRock separate the combined Chair/CEO role via a binding bylaw amendment at the 2024 AGM, offering to withdraw only if the Board irrevocably commits to an independent Chair from 2025.

B. Riley Financial RILY

B. Riley is a web of self-dealing related-party loans to alleged Ponzi co-conspirator Brian Kahn; expect qualified audit, unfiled 10-K, fire sales, and Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters poses five forensic questions to Fairfax management that, if answered honestly, would expose return-of-capital dividends, off-balance-sheet debt via NCIs, and fair-value gain engineering.

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters is short Fairfax Financial, arguing it is 'the GE of Canada' — a serial accounting manipulator whose book value is overstated by ~$4.5bn (~18%) through value-destructive transactions.

MSCI Inc. MSCI

Spruce Point rates MSCI a Strong Sell: accounting red flags, nepotism-like M&A, eroding ESG lead and a CAO resignation expose 55-65% ($190-$244) downside to MSCI's premium multiple.

Freedom Holding Corp FRHC

FRHC funnels 85% of revenue through a CEO-owned Belize affiliate (FFIN) sourcing Russian flows — an FTX/Alameda structure that should trigger restatement, sanctions violations, and Nasdaq delisting.

Goosehead Insurance, Inc. GSHD

Goosehead's top-tier growth story is collapsing: 67% first-year franchisee failure, 85-95% reliance on a frozen housing market, and $900M extracted by the CEO's family while shareholders netted $23M.

B. Riley Financial, Inc. RILY

RILY tacitly admitted it breached covenants on $455M of credit lines while a deteriorating loan book and an undisclosed insider — Daniel Asher — quietly props up its share register and dividend.

B. Riley Financial, Inc. RILY

RILY is a bottom-feeder investment bank whose loans to zombies and imploding equity book will drive ~$700M of 2023 losses, breach a Nomura NAV covenant, and threaten collapse.

Digital Garage Inc. 4819 JT

Digital Garage is missing Japan's cashless-payments wave; spinning off DG Financial Technology, divesting Kakaku, and refocusing management would nearly double the stock and lift profit before tax from JPY4.5bn to JPY11.4bn.

DLocal Ltd. DLO

Muddy Waters is short DLO: contradictory TPV disclosures, implausibly high FX-driven take rates, governance failures and ~$1bn of insider selling point to likely fraud at the Uruguay-based payments processor.

Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. BR

Spruce Point argues Broadridge is a low-tech BPO masquerading as SaaS, with a failing $1B+ UBS buildout, accounting red flags, and likely SEC scrutiny — 65-75% downside to $37-52.

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is 'dumb money' in renewables JVs — sponsors cash out while HASI books non-cash HLBV income on investments unlikely to ever pay out, inflating reported earnings over real economics.

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is a short: its GAAP and non-GAAP 'Distributable Earnings' are inflated by three non-cash accounting tricks and roundtripped SunStrong loans, masking a cash-losing, capital-raise-dependent business.

Lemonade, Inc. LMND

Muddy Waters is short Lemonade after discovering a critical session-fixation flaw that exposed customer PII to Google's index — a negligence that shatters Lemonade's 'trustworthy' digital-native brand.

Sampo Oyj SAMPO

Sampo's crown-jewel IF P&C is mispriced because the Nordea bank stake and PE holdings have contaminated the equity story; separating them unlocks EUR 7bn+ / 35%+ upside.

Invesco Ltd. IVZ

Trian is now Invesco's second-largest shareholder with ~9.9% of common stock

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's 2019 financials rely on reclassifications and definition changes to mask an -11.8% drop in cash receipts, -35.5% drop in deployments, and $20.6m of unexplained fair-value gains.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's dismal H2 2019 — 85% YoY collapse in realized gains, Petersen sold to its own fund, vanishing cash, and a lost Perry Ellis ruling — validates Muddy Waters' short thesis on aggressive marks and a flawed model.

S&P Global SPGI

TCI, a ~1% holder, urges S&P Global to lead on climate disclosure: report fully to CDP, adopt a Paris-aligned transition plan, and push mandatory GHG disclosure across the companies it rates.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford cherry-picks which investments count as 'concluded' to avoid truing up marks; the 110% vs 19% gap between unconcluded and concluded returns exposes systematic fair-value manipulation.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal on Napo is a dodge: a 2013 Glenmark arbitration MW surfaces proves Napo was a failed investment BUR disguised as a winner.

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR

Muddy Waters hires ex-CIA behavioral analysts Qverity to show Burford management's rebuttal is riddled with evasion, aggression and persuasion — corroborating the original fraud thesis.

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal confirms it: aggressive mark-to-model fair-value gains, manipulated ROIC/IRR, and a CEO-CFO marriage make BUR an Enron-style stock promotion the FCA should investigate.

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR LN

Burford is a poor litigation-finance business masquerading as a great one through Enron-like fair value accounting, four-case concentration, and a CEO-wife CFO — and is arguably insolvent.

FleetCor Technologies FLT

FleetCor's Clean Advantage carbon-offset program is a $100M+ green fraud — 97% of fees stay with FLT, demanding CEO Clarke's resignation and implying ~57% downside.

Legg Mason LM

Trian owns ~4.5% and returns as a significant shareholder

Manulife Financial Corporation MFC

Muddy Waters is short Manulife because a Saskatchewan verdict due by year-end could force MFC to accept unlimited deposits at a guaranteed 4%+ rate — an unhedgeable bleed its own expert admits could cause insolvency.

Assured Guaranty AGO

Assured Guaranty is a melting-ice-cube bond insurer aggressively returning capital it hasn't earned; Puerto Rico losses alone (2-4x reserves) will force a capital raise or strip the AA rating it needs to write new business.

China Internet Nationwide Financial Services Inc. CIFS

CIFS is an old-style China reverse-merger fraud dressed up as a Reg A+ IPO; SAIC filings show 5x revenue overstatement, every disclosed borrower is a sham, and the equity is worthless.

Bank of East Asia, Limited 0023.HK

BEA's 2.7% TAR since 1997 reflects chronic mismanagement; with CaixaBank's lock-in lifted, the board should auction the bank at ~2.0x book (~HK$60/share, 185% upside).

American Capital, Ltd. ACAS

American Capital trades at 71% of NAV under a long-tenured board; Elliott urges shareholders to reject management's self-entrenching spin-out and force a strategic review for 24-63% upside.

The Bank of New York Mellon BK

BNY Mellon has squandered the 2007 Mellon merger under CEO Hassell; cutting ~10,000 excess FTEs and installing new leadership closes the State Street gap for 114% upside.

Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Fannie and Freddie — not liquidated — should be reformed into higher-capitalized mortgage guarantors; at 60–100bps g-fees the GSEs are worth $23–$47/share versus $3.98 today.

BofI Holding BOFI

Lazard Ltd LAZ

Lazard's premier advisory and asset-management franchise trades at a discount; executing the April 2012 plan to 25%+ margins, disciplined capital return, and stronger governance can nearly double the stock to ~$51.

State Street Corporation STT

State Street subsidized growth at the expense of profitability; committing to 35% EBT margins, capital return, and a possible SSgA spin can lift shares from $34 to ~$99 by 2014.

Hong Kong Dollar / Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) HKD

Hong Kong's USD peg forces the booming HKD to import US ultra-accommodative monetary policy, fueling inflation and property bubbles; a 30% revaluation to 6:1 offers ~44x upside via cheap call options.

NRSRO Rating Agencies (Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

Rating agencies caused the credit crisis through conflicted 'success fee' incentives; a 60-day new-issue moratorium plus pay-over-time fee structure would restore ratings integrity and market discipline.

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman's $489M 1Q08 profit is accounting ingenuity — hidden CDOs, an unexplained $1.1bn Level 3 swing, and a fabricated KSK mark-up; it must recapitalize now.

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman is using fair-value accounting tricks to hide CDO losses and inflate Level 3 marks; the firm is over-levered, opaque, and needs to recapitalize before the Fed has to step in.

Allied Capital ALD

Greenlight argues Allied Capital overstates NAV by mismarking illiquid BDC loans and funds its dividend with non-cash PIK income and fees from Enron-Raptor-style controlled subsidiaries.