Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (GSEs) FNMA / FMCC
The three reasons
- 1
Releasing GSEs from conservatorship could generate ~$300bn for taxpayers via Treasury warrants
- 2
Treasury's Senior Preferred has already been repaid with $25bn excess at 11.6% cash IRR
- 3
Fannie needs only ~$5bn IPO to exit by year-end 2026; Freddie ~$15bn one year later
Primary demands
- Release Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from FHFA conservatorship
- Deem Treasury's Senior Preferred Stock fully repaid (already returned 11.6% IRR plus $25bn excess)
- Recapitalize via sequenced IPOs: Fannie ~$5bn by year-end 2026, Freddie ~$15bn by year-end 2027
- Treasury exercise its 79.9% common warrants and monetize over time for ~$300bn taxpayer profit
- Set capital requirements appropriate to credit-insurance business (not bank standards)
- Reject any conversion of Senior Preferred Stock into common equity
KPIs cited
Pattern membership
Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.
Notable slides (8)
Notes
Long-running Ackman/Pershing Square thesis on Fannie & Freddie (he has been long FNMA/FMCC since 2013); this 2025 deck is timed to the second Trump administration and explicitly frames the call-to-action around Trump (cover title 'The Art of the Deal'; closing slide quotes 'Deals are my art form'; full-page reproduction of Trump's Nov 2021 letter to Sen. Rand Paul). Tone is analytical/persuasive rather than adversarial — there is no corporate villain since the GSEs are in government conservatorship; the implicit antagonist is the status quo (and prior administrations who maintained conservatorship). Uses third-party authority quotes heavily for credibility (Greenspan, Buffett, Mortgage Bankers Association, Cato Institute, Craig Phillips, amicus briefs). Two targets in one deck (Fannie + Freddie) modeled separately. Capital bridge waterfalls (pp. 78, 80) and the $311bn warrant-monetization schedule (p. 96) are the analytical centerpieces. The peer-gap visualization for capital requirements (Banks vs. Reformed GSEs p. 51; PMIs vs. GSEs p. 53) is the clearest contrarian reframing — argues GSEs are over-capitalized under FHFA's rule. Document is watermarked '10XEBITDA.com' (a third-party redistribution site) but is unambiguously authored by Pershing Square.