Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck follow up
2025-01-16 · 104 pages

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

N 5 Narrative
V 4 Visual
C 4 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Treasury's warrants and residual stake could generate ~$300bn for taxpayers over time

  2. 2

    Senior Preferred already repaid: Treasury has earned 11.6% IRR, $25bn above contractual 10%

  3. 3

    Ending conservatorship needs no Congress — only Treasury and FHFA approval

Primary demands

  • Release Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from conservatorship within two years (Fannie IPO YE2026, Freddie IPO YE2027)
  • Set post-conservatorship minimum capital requirement at 2.5% rather than the current 4% FHFA rule
  • Deem Treasury's Senior Preferred Stock already repaid (11.6% IRR earned) rather than convert to common
  • Exercise Treasury's 79.9% warrants and monetize over time (~$300bn estimated value)
  • Limit government-granted benefits (SEC exemption, UST line of credit, Volcker exemption) and clarify ongoing backstop
  • Execute re-IPO at NYSE listings; leave junior preferred outstanding or convert to common on negotiated basis

KPIs cited

Proposed capital ratio
2.5% vs current FHFA rule of 4%; pre-GFC was 0.45%
Single-family guarantee book
~$6.7 trillion combined; 2.5% implies ~$168bn equity requirement
Treasury IRR on Senior Preferred
11.6% cash IRR; $301bn dividends vs $191bn disbursements; $25bn excess
Government net profit vs bailouts
$110bn (57%) on GSEs — more than AIG, GM, Citi, BAC, JPM, WFC, Chrysler combined
Warrant ownership
Treasury holds warrants for 79.9% of common stock of each GSE
Net single-family g-fees 2024
$32bn annual; PV of future g-fees on existing book ~$101bn
FNMA illustrative share value
$34.99 per share at 12/31/26 vs current $6.21 (15.0x 2035E EPS)
FMCC illustrative share value
$38.84 per share at 12/31/27 vs current $5.66 (14.5x 2035E EPS)
Required capital raises
Fannie ~$5bn IPO (2026); Freddie ~$15bn IPO (2027)
Run-rate ROE
FNMA ~11.9–12.5%; FMCC ~10.4–10.6% — low-double-digit utility-like returns
Cumulative GFC credit losses
$27bn excluding subprime/Alt-A; proposed $168bn capital is 6.2x this
g-fee impact on homebuyer
4% capital would force g-fees to 83–95bps vs current 65bps, adding $17–29k interest over avg mortgage

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (11)

Notes

Not a typical activist campaign — this is a public-policy advocacy deck aimed at the incoming Trump/Bessent Treasury rather than a corporate board. Framing is built around Trump ('The Art of the Deal' title; closing Trump quote on p.103; Trump's 2021 letter on p.46 endorsing privatization). Pershing has argued this thesis since ~2014; this is a major follow-up catalyzed by Trump's election. Strong SCQA structure: Situation = GSEs in indefinite conservatorship; Complication = Treasury already repaid but stuck; Question = how to exit; Answer = 4-step framework + IPO plan. Uses Greenspan (p.33) and Buffett (p.34) as authority quotes against the old FIA business model rather than against current management. GGP case study (p.91) is Ackman's own successful precedent. Pershing owns common stock — disclosed in the disclaimer. Junior preferred handling described as negotiable (convert to common at IPO price assumed for modeling).