Contrarian Corpus
activist letter initial thesis
2025-01-17 · 7 pages

Smiths Group plc SMIN

Smiths' four-segment conglomerate structure masks a ~50-60% SOTP discount; the Board should launch a strategic review to sell the company or spin John Crane into a U.S. listing.

N 4 Narrative
V 2 Visual
C 2 Craft
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Thesis

Engine Capital, holding ~2% of Smiths Group, argues the U.K.-listed industrial conglomerate is structurally unable to close its valuation gap despite strong operating execution — organic growth, EPS, ROCE and margins all tracking to or above 2022 Capital Markets Day targets. Smiths trades at ~9.5x 2025E EBITDA versus 12-16x for divisional peers (Flowserve, ITT, Dover, TE Connectivity, OSI Systems, Omega Flex) and recent transactions (SPX Flow at 16.8x, kSARIA at ~13x). Goldman's SOTP analysis implies 2,596p per share, ~50% upside, rising to ~60% after corporate cost elimination. Engine demands the Board announce a strategic alternatives process: either sell the company in whole or parts, or spin John Crane — the crown jewel with 71% aftermarket mix — via a U.S. listing (à la Ferguson, CRH) while divesting Detection, Interconnect and Flex-Tek.

SCQA

Situation

Smiths Group is a UK-listed four-segment industrial conglomerate (John Crane, Flex-Tek, Smiths Detection, Smiths Interconnect) with capital-light, cash-generative businesses and strong operating execution under new CEO Roland Carter.

Complication

Despite hitting 2022 Capital Markets targets on growth, EPS, ROCE and margins, Smiths trades at ~9.5x EBITDA — near 10-year lows — because its four segments lack pure-play peers, span different cycles, and sit behind a UK listing discount.

Resolution

The Board must announce a strategic alternatives process: sell the company in whole or in pieces, or spin John Crane into a U.S. listing while divesting Detection, Interconnect and Flex-Tek — and halt any medium or large acquisitions.

Reward

Goldman's SOTP values Smiths at 2,596 pence (~50% premium to the current 1,556p); eliminating corporate costs adds another ~200p for ~60% total upside, plus a U.S. re-rating premium on John Crane at 13-14x EBITDA.

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Smiths trades at ~9.5x EBITDA vs. 12-16x for divisional peers — a persistent conglomerate discount

  2. 2

    Goldman SOTP values Smiths at 2,596p (~50% premium); ~60% with corporate cost elimination

  3. 3

    Operating gains haven't closed the gap; TSR lags peers by 46-104% over 5 years

Primary demands

  • Announce a strategic alternatives process to maximize shareholder value
  • Sell the company in whole or in pieces (Option 1)
  • Alternatively, spin off John Crane with a U.S. listing and sell the three other businesses (Option 2)
  • Avoid medium or large acquisitions at 12-14x EBITDA multiples given Smiths trades sub-10x
  • Prioritize share repurchases using balance sheet capacity over M&A

KPIs cited

Economic ownership
Engine holds close to 2% of Smiths' outstanding shares
EV / 2025E EBITDA (Smiths)
~9.5x, well below divisional peers
EV / NTM EBITDA (John Crane peers)
~13.7x median (Rotork, Flowserve, ITT, Dover)
EV / NTM EBITDA (Smiths Interconnect peers)
~12.2x median (TE Connectivity, CTS)
EV / 2025 EBITDA (OSI Systems, Detection peer)
~11.8x
EV / LTM EBITDA (Omega Flex, Flex-Tek peer)
~15x
EV / 2025 EBITDA (Flowserve)
~12x, premium to Smiths despite inferior business mix
Organic sales growth
1% (2018-2021 ex-2020) → 9% (2023-2024) vs. 5% mid-term target
EPS growth
3% → 23% vs. 9% mid-term target
ROCE
14% → 16%, in line with 16% target
Operating profit margin
16% → 17%, progressing toward 19% target
Operating cash conversion
104% → 92% vs. 100% target
2025 organic revenue growth target
Raised to 6-8%
SOTP value per share (Goldman)
2,596 pence vs. 1,556p last close — 67% upside per Goldman bridge
Corporate cost elimination value
~200 pence additional per share at 14.3x EBIT
John Crane aftermarket revenue mix
71% vs. 52% for Flowserve
John Crane U.S.-listed multiple estimate
13-14x forward EBITDA
TSR vs. Engine peer set (5Y)
Smiths +14% vs. peers +61% → -46% relative
TSR vs. Smiths Annual Report peers (5Y)
Smiths +14% vs. peers +119% → -104% relative
TSR vs. STOXX Europe 600 Industrial G&S (5Y)
-43% relative
Engine track record
42+ directors placed on 26 public company boards since inception

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Precedents cited

  • General Electric breakup
  • DowDuPont breakup
  • United Technologies breakup
  • Honeywell aerospace separation consideration (2024)
  • SPX Flow sale to Lone Star (April 2022, 16.8x EBITDA)
  • kSARIA acquired by ITT (~13x EBITDA)
  • CIT acquired by Amphenol
  • Ferguson U.S. relisting (March 2021, +64% TSR)
  • CRH plc U.S. relisting (September 2023, +71% TSR)

Notable slides (4)

Notes

Standard institutional activist letter — Word/Arial body text with embedded charts and tables (no slide-deck production). Co-signed by Arnaud Ajdler (Managing Partner) and Brad Favreau (Partner); Ajdler is the primary named author. Engine explicitly positions this as 'constructive engagement' (cites placing 42 directors on 26 boards) rather than a proxy-fight opener, hence analytical/collaborative tone. The letter quotes former CEO Paul Keel's 2021 Analyst Day claim that better performance would erase the conglomerate discount, then uses subsequent outperformance to refute it — classic CEO-quote-contradiction setup. Peer-gap evidence appears as a TSR table (p.3) rather than a chart. Goldman SOTP table on p.5 is reproduced directly (not Engine-authored visualization). Minor typo in the letter dates 13 November 2025 (should be 2024). Campaign phase marked initial_thesis as this is the first public letter to the Board.