Callouts & quotes from 1,061+ activist slides

""Given the trends that we're exhibiting, the reversal in those trends, I'm just trying to understand what confidence that we can put in a reasonable timeframe, long term is a fairly vague definition, a reasonable time frame for evolution toward a 55% OR." — RBC; "One of the pushbacks we get in sort of recommending your stock is that there is a perception out there that maybe management is a little bit taking their time on the margin side. There isn't as much of a sense of urgency." — Bernstein; "Lance, I wonder if you could just give your investors a little bit of confidence... you guys have had some pretty significant OR targets out there for some time now." — Barclays; "Our analysis shows a significant efficiency gap between Union Pacific and its peers... This structural opportunity is execution-dependent but we sense the productivity improvement momentum currently occurring in the U.S. railroads, in part due to the management changes at CSX, provides significant incentive for management to attack this opportunity with more vigor." — BMO; "...we expect that management will begin to act with a sense of urgency to restore investor confidence (or will face increasing pressure to do so)." — Bernstein; "[on relative underperformance vs. peers] "...this is a tough question. But Lance, is there a sense of urgency that's been elevated?" — Deutsche Bank; "Ultimately, management needs to deliver better cost performance and under constant questioning they remained steadfast in their outlook to do so... we believe pressure will build on management to execute well." — Citi; "...I just want to understand what's embedded in the back-half guidance or the revised full year guidance? Because this is now the second time in, I don't know, 40-45 days that we're revising the full year outlook. ...there are a few people out there that have many decades of PSR experience that have been PSR implemented... Those guys seem to be available on a consultancy basis. I don't know if there is scope to bring in somebody on a short-term basis to accelerate some of the progress... Is that something that you're considering or looking at doing?" — Deutsche Bank; "I want to ask just a bigger picture question. I think some people are questioning the success or maybe the sustainability of PSR. ... We were supposed to do at 55% this year on our way to a lower low to mid-50s OR in a couple of years. Are those just the wrong numbers to be thinking about now for the OR over time?" — Wolfe; "And then for next year, I heard the word confident a lot. ...but not confident enough to give the OR guide for next year of 55%. ...is 55% achievable for next year?" — RBC; "...you laid out a multiyear productivity improvement for the network. ...are you confident that you can eventually obtain the aggregate plan over time? ...reset at a lower level going forward?" — Evercore ISI; "...can you talk a little bit to the longer-term transition plans? What skill sets do you think the Board really is focused on for the next leader of the business." — Susquehanna; "After a period pre-pandemic where significant improvement in operating efficiency resulted in the mgmt. team at the time boasting a forecast for an 'industry leading O/R,' mgmt. has now backed off that objective... Looking back to the period late 2016 to early 2019, that time was characterized by guidance that lacked conviction, a dearth of PSR expertise at the mgmt. level and (ultimately) sub-par operating results. Fundamentally, we are concerned that we are entering a new period characterized by the very same challenges." — RBC"

""Despite Juniper's strong fundamental performance this year that has driven the Street's EPS estimates higher versus a year ago, Juniper's stock (up 10% YTD) has underperformed relative to the S&P 500 Index (up 26%) in 2013. As such, we discussed the opportunity for an accelerated stock repurchase program with Juniper. ... We believe a $3 billion stock repurchase program could be 15-20% accretive to EPS" — Cantor Fitzgerald (12/11/13); "With respect to uses of cash, is there an argument for giving a committed level of cash return to shareholders out of free cash flow, given the healthy cash balance you have, given that it feels like cash flow, as a trend, should be rising going forward?" — Credit Suisse, CS Tech Conference (12/4/13); "Over the past three years, free cash flow generation at Juniper has averaged over $550 million per year. Further, the company has a relatively strong balance sheet with $2.8 billion of net cash at the end of the June quarter or 26% of the current market cap. ... we believe Juniper could and should institute a more formal capital return strategy" — Credit Suisse (9/18/13); "We believe there is scope for increased cash distribution" — Credit Suisse (9/18/13); "Healthy cash flow, no dividend. A quarterly dividend of $0.08/share would be very reasonable (potential yield 1.6%), but nothing's planned as yet" — RBC (8/12/13); "Juniper is a member of a club that most investors would like to see it resign from: Out of the 35 largest Hardware & Equip companies globally, JNPR is one of only four that is not expected to pay a dividend over the NTM. We believe it is time for JNPR to quit this club. ... we think a dividend would be viewed as a much-needed sign of mgmt's longer-term confidence. ... The knock-on positive effect of paying a dividend is bringing a whole new class of shareholders into the ownership base" — Citi (6/7/13); "We think it is time that Juniper quits the non-dividend payers and joins the overwhelming majority of global peers that directly return cash to shareholders" — Citi (6/7/13); "Risks to our Sell rating include a stronger carrier spending environment, improved competitive positioning, or a more aggressive capital allocation strategy, including the introduction of a dividend or a large buyback" — Goldman Sachs (4/24/13); "What would make us more positive? More aggressive capital allocation and/or activist shareholder involvement. Juniper's strong balance sheet ... and cash flow generation (estimated 7% FCF yield in CY13) make it a strong candidate for a significant buy-back or initiation of a dividend" — Goldman Sachs (3/19/13); "Juniper's share repurchases are typically used to offset stock option dilution resulting from the company's employee stock plans rather than being opportunistic buybacks based on price" — Goldman Sachs (6/13/12)"

""Hess's near-term strategic outlook is fairly clear-cut: the company must improve. [Hess] will need to regain project management credibility after disappointing results..." — Bank of America (January 6, 2004); "Having lagged the recent rebound in the sector—adding to what has been long-term secular underperformance..." — Goldman Sachs (December 9, 2003); "We believe Hess had four issues it needed to overcome: Top management was not as strong as at its competitors; E&P asset base was very mature and short-lived; Balance sheet was weak; Capital discipline was expressed in words, but not practiced in actions." — Goldman Sachs (December 9, 2003); "Will perpetual restructuring mode ever end?" — Goldman Sachs (October 14, 2003); "Hess released another quarter of disappointing earnings...While offshore development delays are not uncommon for large oil and gas projects, Hess has consistently disappointed the market with operational performance over the past several quarters." — Bank of America (July 29, 2003); "[Hess] a company that we consider the most fundamentally flawed E&P or integrated in our investment grade universe... Unfortunately, these days a lack of astoundingly bad news is cause for celebration!" — Morgan Stanley Credit Research (May 1, 2003); "With below cost of capital ROACE, high upstream costs, and strategic impediments due to recurring high debt levels, we believe the Hess shares should continue to trade at a material discount vs. the integrated peer group. Moreover...we remain unconvinced that the company's planned upstream growth will lead to improved profitability and returns." — UBS Warburg (April 30, 2003); "The burden of high debt levels and low returns, with abandoned targets and a weak near-term production profile, leaves the management in need of reestablishing credibility and share price performance." — Deutsche Bank (April 8, 2003); "The material erosion of shareholder equity so soon after the completion of these two acquisitions is a clear disappointment... [It] also must raise questions as to the acquisition due diligence process within Hess...We believe investors' confidence in the company has been materially undermined..." — UBS Warburg (February 3, 2003)"

""...with Starboard now nominating a slate of directors it has formally challenged HUN's board structure. These nominees are quite qualified in our view, and we think could be quite effective at aiding and improving the upstream, downstream, and financial footprint at the company...productivity should be a perpetual process, and additional oversight and guidance through its evolution could be helpful for a company that does not have a longstanding productivity culture." — BofA Securities, January 2022; "Mr. Gallogly carries high esteem for making money for Chemicals investors over the past 10+ years – As CEO of LyondellBasell (LYB), shares outperformed the S&P 500 by 382% and outperformed peer Dow Chemical by 357% from emerging out of bankruptcy in 2010 until Mr. Gallogly announced his retirement in late September 2014...We think he carries four main attributes that investors would welcome to the board of Huntsman (or any Chemical company for that matter): 1) operating acumen and focus on safety + cost, 2) a track record of prudent and shareholder-friendly capital discipline, 3) a reputation of being forthright and outspoken in his views, and 4) a track record of delivering on results." — Barclays, January 2022; "Importantly, we believe that Jim Gallogly stands out among the proposed Starboard nominees and the newly added board members with the potential to be especially impactful on investor confidence, and on the contribution that the refreshed board could make to the Company's bottom line and valuation. In our experience covering LyondellBasell when Mr. Gallogly was its CEO, his leadership was both evident in the Company's results and was rewarded by the equity market. We believe that a candidacy of Mr. Gallogly's caliber could greatly enhance the board, in particular in the areas of operational efficiency and cost control." — KeyBanc Capital Markets, January 2022"

""...with Starboard now nominating a slate of directors it has formally challenged HUN's board structure. These nominees are quite qualified in our view, and we think could be quite effective at aiding and improving the upstream, downstream, and financial footprint at the company...productivity should be a perpetual process, and additional oversight and guidance through its evolution could be helpful for a company that does not have a longstanding productivity culture." — BofA Securities, January 2022; "Mr. Gallogly carries high esteem for making money for Chemicals investors over the past 10+ years – As CEO of LyondellBasell (LYB), shares outperformed the S&P 500 by 382% and outperformed peer Dow Chemical by 357% from emerging out of bankruptcy in 2010 until Mr. Gallogly announced his retirement in late September 2014...We think he carries four main attributes that investors would welcome to the board of Huntsman (or any Chemical company for that matter): 1) operating acumen and focus on safety + cost, 2) a track record of prudent and shareholder-friendly capital discipline, 3) a reputation of being forthright and outspoken in his views, and 4) a track record of delivering on results." — Barclays, January 2022; "Importantly, we believe that Jim Gallogly stands out among the proposed Starboard nominees and the newly added board members with the potential to be especially impactful on investor confidence, and on the contribution that the refreshed board could make to the Company's bottom line and valuation. In our experience covering LyondellBasell when Mr. Gallogly was its CEO, his leadership was both evident in the Company's results and was rewarded by the equity market. We believe that a candidacy of Mr. Gallogly's caliber could greatly enhance the board, in particular in the areas of operational efficiency and cost control." — KeyBanc Capital Markets, January 2022"

""We agree with Elliott's assessment that there is more upside potential in the refining business, on both capture and opex, and we think Elliott's presence itself could refocus management towards this business." — J.P. Morgan, April 8, 2025; "Where we agree with Elliott that PSX is undervalued - at current levels we see no value for refining in the share price at current levels, under our integrated DCF analysis." — Wolfe Research, April 25, 2025; "We prefer a spin, or large selldown of non synergistic assets as we believe the volatility in Refining EBITDA swamps growth in more stable premium segments, keeping stability seeking midstream investors away." — Bank of America, April 25, 2025; "Despite the noise, expect that Elliott's pressure to execute on these targets will be a strong positive for the stock." — Piper Sandler, November 29, 2023; "We think PSX's 1Q25 results will have a mixed impact on near-term share price performance... the market may interpret the bad news as good news because it will give more support to Elliott's case and thus provide a potential catalyst to the shares." — Scotiabank, April 25, 2025; "We suspect Elliott's updated position will result in PSX having to find additional ways to close the refining performance gap vs large cap peers... A M/S spin seems like easiest to execute...A sale could be a more beneficial outcome, though requires a willing suitor." — T.D. Cowen, February 12, 2025; "Here Elliott sees Midstream assets as potentially worth ~$50B, assuming a ~10x multiple on synergized '26E EBITDA... We agree with Elliott on valuation disparity." — Citi Research, February 13, 2025"

"Quite frankly, I think [regaining the high ground] is going to require evolution. We’ve been concerned about Southwest for some time, that it has mostly, not entirely, but mostly sat out the industry’s evolution... They have a product and price points that skew more toward discount airlines but a cost structure overall that skews a bit more toward the Big 3. It’s a bit of an identity crisis. — J.P. Morgan Webcast, May 2023; Everything [they're] doing is incremental. [They] need to make radical changes. — Wolfe Research Weekly Webcast, October 2023; ...What might you consider strategically or put on the table that hasn't been on the table before? So if we think about things like seat assignments, basic economy, bags fly free, historically, those have been sacrosanct... If you have lagging margins, it may require a harder look. — Evercore Analyst on Q3 2023 Earnings Call, October 2023; There is a lot of debate about the airline's lack of a premium product vs. peers and ancillary revenue opportunities beyond boarding... The drum beat on closing the margin gap with the network airlines will continue to beat louder... — Cowen, January 2024; Time to pull the RASM lever?... The main – and perhaps only – lever they have now to overcome cost inflation is to boost RASM... LUV still remains at a relative disadvantage to all their major competitors in the pursuit of premiumization. — Morgan Stanley, January 2024; We have long made the case that the Company's inability to monetize its cabin and participate in various high-margin revenue streams was a drag on relative margin performance. — Deutsche Bank, April 2024"

"Quite frankly, I think [regaining the high ground] is going to require evolution. We’ve been concerned about Southwest for some time, that it has mostly, not entirely, but mostly sat out the industry’s evolution... They have a product and price points that skew more toward discount airlines but a cost structure overall that skews a bit more toward the Big 3. It’s a bit of an identity crisis. — J.P. Morgan Webcast, May 2023; Everything [they’re] doing is incremental. [They] need to make radical changes. — Wolfe Research Weekly Webcast, October 2023; ...What might you consider strategically or put on the table that hasn’t been on the table before? So if we think about things like seat assignments, basic economy, bags fly free, historically, those have been sacrosanct... If you have lagging margins, it may require a harder look. — Evercore Analyst on Q3 2023 Earnings Call, October 2023; There is a lot of debate about the airline’s lack of a premium product vs. peers and ancillary revenue opportunities beyond boarding... The drum beat on closing the margin gap with the network airlines will continue to beat louder... — Cowen, January 2024; Time to pull the RASM lever?... The main – and perhaps only – lever they have now to overcome cost inflation is to boost RASM... LUV still remains at a relative disadvantage to all their major competitors in the pursuit of premiumization. — Morgan Stanley, January 2024; We have long made the case that the Company’s inability to monetize its cabin and participate in various high-margin revenue streams was a drag on relative margin performance. — Deutsche Bank, April 2024"

"Quite frankly, I think [regaining the high ground] is going to require evolution. We’ve been concerned about Southwest for some time, that it has mostly, not entirely, but mostly sat out the industry’s evolution... They have a product and price points that skew more toward discount airlines but a cost structure overall that skews a bit more toward the Big 3. It’s a bit of an identity crisis. — J.P. Morgan Webcast, May 2023; Everything [they’re] doing is incremental. [They] need to make radical changes. — Wolfe Research Weekly Webcast, October 2023; ...What might you consider strategically or put on the table that hasn't been on the table before? So if we think about things like seat assignments, basic economy, bags fly free, historically, those have been sacrosanct... If you have lagging margins, it may require a harder look. — Evercore Analyst on Q3 2023 Earnings Call, October 2023; There is a lot of debate about the airline’s lack of a premium product vs. peers and ancillary revenue opportunities beyond boarding... The drum beat on closing the margin gap with the network airlines will continue to beat louder... — Cowen, January 2024; Time to pull the RASM lever?... The main – and perhaps only – lever they have now to overcome cost inflation is to boost RASM... LUV still remains at a relative disadvantage to all their major competitors in the pursuit of premiumization. — Morgan Stanley, January 2024; We have long made the case that the Company’s inability to monetize its cabin and participate in various high-margin revenue streams was a drag on relative margin performance. — Deutsche Bank, April 2024"

"Quite frankly, I think [regaining the high ground] is going to require evolution. We’ve been concerned about Southwest for some time, that it has mostly, not entirely, but mostly sat out the industry’s evolution... They have a product and price points that skew more toward discount airlines but a cost structure overall that skews a bit more toward the Big 3. It’s a bit of an identity crisis. — J.P. Morgan Webcast, May 2023; Everything [they’re] doing is incremental. [They] need to make radical changes. — Wolfe Research Weekly Webcast, October 2023; ...What might you consider strategically or put on the table that hasn't been on the table before? So if we think about things like seat assignments, basic economy, bags fly free, historically, those have been sacrosanct... If you have lagging margins, it may require a harder look. — Evercore Analyst on Q3 2023 Earnings Call, October 2023; There is a lot of debate about the airline's lack of a premium product vs. peers and ancillary revenue opportunities beyond boarding... The drum beat on closing the margin gap with the network airlines will continue to beat louder... — Cowen, January 2024; Time to pull the RASM lever?... The main – and perhaps only – lever they have now to overcome cost inflation is to boost RASM... LUV still remains at a relative disadvantage to all their major competitors in the pursuit of premiumization. — Morgan Stanley, January 2024; We have long made the case that the Company's inability to monetize its cabin and participate in various high-margin revenue streams was a drag on relative margin performance. — Deutsche Bank, April 2024"

"“...[Huntsman] trades at a relatively discounted valuation vs. peers as shares have lagged the group YTD. While we see these characteristics as favorable, in the context of HUN’s margins and FCF generation that we view as low relative to peers, we see this underperformance as fair...” — Wolfe Research, June 2021; “Huntsman is unlikely to trade at hybrid/diversified chemical multiples. We attribute this primarily to differences in margins and thus the market's perception of the degree of specialization of the company's products. From a segment or portfolio mix perspective it is not self evident that Huntsman meaningfully differs from diversified chemical peers Celanese or Eastman...Not withstanding our view that Huntsman has meaningfully improved its earnings stability and margin structure over the last few years, the company's margin remains well below that of hybrid/diversified peers such as Celanese and Eastman...” — Morgan Stanley, September 2020; “We feel part of the issue is that HUN’s cost structure has not changed as dynamically as its revenue...the elevated cost structure is dampening margins and impeding free cash flow conversion.” — BofA Securities, June 2020; “On cash conversion, we remain skeptical. Free cash flow conversion from Adj. EBITDA for Huntsman has historically lagged, as sizeable restructuring efforts and capital investments have hindered cash flow...We believe the market needs to see a longer track record of solid cash generation before fully underwriting a structural change in the company's cash flow profile...” — Barclays, October 2018"

""According to a 2019 contract obtained by the German language paper, California-based Nevro...offered Swiss doctors CHF10,000 ($10,181) for each Nevro spinal cord stimulator implanted in a patient...The kickback scheme, which has now been terminated, has been running since 2017 under the auspices of the “Nevro Partnership Program.”" — Swiss Broadcasting Corporation; "Nevro keeps explant rates very well hidden from the field reps...The explant rate was a hell of a lot higher than [the stated] 2%. I don't know that people asked for it, because ignorance is bliss. I didn't want to know. Don't ask questions you don't want to know the answer to. My peers in the field felt the same way." — Former Nevro regional sales director; "If you put doctors into boxes, Money Mike couldn't care less if there's a high explant rate. It's just about the price you give him for the device. He could care less about whether it works or not. Yes, there are unethical, corrupt doctors. In that population, Nevro is the best thing since sliced bread." — Physician #4; "A lot of doctors in Germany are saying that Nevro's device only works for 2 to 2 ½ years and then the patient comes back with more pain...People have become nervous and become afraid to use Nevro." — Physician #5; "We went to Nevro's headquarters to discuss the explants...I realized this shit doesn't work...His take on Nevro is slimy people, falsification of data...I don't understand how Nevro can continue to keep the smoke and mirrors going, I really don't. I mean, it's crazy." — Physician #3"

""The company’s ‘string of pearls’ acquisition and partnering strategy are part of what has gained it a more favourable valuation than most of its peers." — Jefferies, January 2012; "We view BMY as the leader in immuno-oncology..." — Goldman Sachs, February 2014; "We believe BMY’s investments in therapeutic areas with significant unmet need position it to become a leader in these areas and to deliver strong growth." — Deutsche Bank, August 2014; "Our DCF-based PO of $58 indicates BMY can trade at roughly 34x our 2015E EPS of $1.73, higher than BMY’s current 2014 multiple and at a significant premium to the US major pharma group average on 2014E, which we believe is warranted due to the potentially higher quality of BMY’s R&D pipeline relative to its peers." — Bank of America, October 2014; "Overall, we continue to see Bristol as a leader in the PD-1 and broader I-O space both in terms of time-to-market and breadth of clinical program." — JP Morgan, December 2014; "We remain bullish on BMY ahead of these upcoming data releases as we see the overall opportunity for immuno-oncology (I-O) in general still being underappreciated by investors while the depth and breadth of BMY’s I-O portfolio leaves them as the clear leader in the space." — Credit Suisse, October 2014; "The portfolio could give upside to another solid growth outlook for BMY and generate much news flow. A management team that has a solid track record of reshaping the business provides additional appeal to this powerful product story." — Cowen, December 2014"

""The Elliott plan makes perfect sense for Hess shareholders. In fact, it is state-of-the-art and ought to be more broadly adopted. Tying director compensation directly to outperformance against peers perfectly aligns the directors with the interests of shareholders. The payments are legal obligations, not discretionary, and they bear no relationship whatsoever with any recommendations put forward by Elliott. I think it is a great plan that serves Hess shareholders well." — Yair Listoken, Professor, Yale Law School; "Hess shareholders should not find this approach objectionable, but should in fact be happy that Elliott is willing to pay its own money to compensate director nominees based directly on Hess's stock price performance relative to its peer group. This approach is transparent and clear, and it aligns the interests of independent nominees with those of Hess shareholders." — M. Todd Henderson, Professor, University of Chicago Law School; "The Elliott nominee compensation plan closely aligns the interests of those nominees with the medium and long term interests of Hess shareholders and has no impact on a director's independence or ability to fulfill his duties to stockholders. The payout criteria are objective, not discretionary, and they tie only to market price performance over a fairly long period, regardless of whether the Board adopts Elliott's proposals." — Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Professor, Widener Institute of Delaware Corporate Law"

"[We] continue to view U.S. fiber assets as inherently less attractive due to the expensive availability of competitive fiber supply in the U.S. and the resulting less attractive growth and return characteristics of domestic U.S. fiber. — Former CEO James Taiclet, May 2019; With respect to outdoor small cells and fiber in the U.S., we've been a little bit less aggressive than some of our peers, in large part because when we run the numbers and input all of the modeling assumptions into our 10-year DCF, which we use for all of our investment evaluation, we arrive at overall returns that don't quite hit where we need them to hit. And for that reason, we've chosen to deploy our capital elsewhere. — Senior Director of Investor Relations, March 2019; To be big in fiber, by necessity, you probably have to have an enterprise business, which is a very, very different business. It’s just different. And we tend to stick with the stuff we know. — CEO Jeffrey Stoops, August 2019; We continue to be focused on macro sites...I mean, you used the word small cells, but really what small cells is, is fiber. And our shareholders want us to be a tower company, so we are very much focused on that. We will continue to look at exclusive pieces of real property where we might have some advantages that could lead to small cells, but to move into the fiber business is not something that we're pursuing today. — CEO Jeffrey Stoops, May 2017"

""High marks for management. CEO Mark Donegan has a manufacturing background and graduated from the GE manufacturing management program in 1979, two years prior to Jack Welch becoming CEO. His chief success prior to taking the reins at [PCC] was at the helm of Wyman-Gordon, a [PCC] subsidiary where he led the business to historically high operating margins and growth. We think the most notable aspect of Mark Donegan’s career was his ability to manage a manufacturing concern profitably through the aerospace decline in the 1990’s." — Goldman Sachs, October 10, 2007; "From there, we want to take that baseline cost structure and we want to go back into the market where we want to drive for market share. We'll also take and add to that the ability we have on vertical integration... So market share is key and then we take that and drive that back across the assets that we created more capacity... We're not looking for just sales growth. We're looking for key assets that give us an expanding portfolio, attack our costs, long-term market share gain and growth." — Mark Donegan, December 3, 2014; "[PCC] generally leverages superb execution for market share gains through pricing strategies and long-term contracts. We believe [PCC] is one of the best operators in our space, as operating margins are generally above peer companies." — Bank of America, June 4, 2014"

""PFE best positioned for top-line growth among large cap pharma with the pipeline capable of replenishing 41% of the FY17 revenue base by FY25 (vs. peers 7%), well in excess of the 16% of sales exposed to generic/biosimilar headwinds (vs. peers 42%). While near-term growth will be depressed by the loss of Lyrica, we believe investors will look through this to a period of renewed growth. Post-Lyrica LOE, we model revenue CAGR rising to 7.7% (FY20-25) from 2.7% (FY17-20)." — Atlantic Equities, November 27, 2018; "Perhaps the greatest legacy of outgoing CEO Ian Read is a reinvigorated R&D pipeline that should sustain top-line growth beyond key patent expirations. We expect new CEO Bourla to leverage this significant boost in late-stage R&D assets to a level that could preclude the need for M&A or financial engineering" — Oppenheimer, December 11, 2018; "Pfizer has had pipeline success in 2018 with surprisingly good data from Tafamidis, Tanezumab meeting efficacy endpoints in smaller duration phase-3 trials but with questions on safety remaining, early encouraging data from next-gen JAK's for Inflammation and advancement of 20-valent pneumococcal vaccine into phase-3. We believe these events have a played a key role in changing the narrative on Pfizer from an M&A/Split story to a pipeline/growth story." — UBS, January 22, 2019"

""PFE best positioned for top-line growth among large cap pharma with the pipeline capable of replenishing 41% of the FY17 revenue base by FY25 (vs. peers 7%), well in excess of the 16% of sales exposed to generic/biosimilar headwinds (vs. peers 42%). While near-term growth will be depressed by the loss of Lyrica, we believe investors will look through this to a period of renewed growth. Post-Lyrica LOE, we model revenue CAGR rising to 7.7% (FY20-25) from 2.7% (FY17-20)." — Atlantic Equities, November 27, 2018; "Perhaps the greatest legacy of outgoing CEO Ian Read is a reinvigorated R&D pipeline that should sustain top-line growth beyond key patent expirations. We expect new CEO Bourla to leverage this significant boost in late-stage R&D assets to a level that could preclude the need for M&A or financial engineering" — Oppenheimer, December 11, 2018; "Pfizer has had pipeline success in 2018 with surprisingly good data from Tafamidis, Tanezumab meeting efficacy endpoints in smaller duration phase-3 trials but with questions on safety remaining, early encouraging data from next-gen JAK's for Inflammation and advancement of 20-valent pneumococcal vaccine into phase-3. We believe these events have a played a key role in changing the narrative on Pfizer from an M&A/Split story to a pipeline/growth story." — UBS, January 22, 2019"

""In 2003, Hess's ROACE of 7.6% is the lowest in its peer group and is well below Hess's cost of capital of 10%-12%." — UBS Warburg (September 22, 2000); "Hess announced a broad-based restructuring program involving reductions in overhead and capital expenditures...Regarding the stock, we maintain our longstanding Neutral rating. Investor interest is not expected to become material in this company until returns resemble the cost of capital on a sustainable basis." — Morgan Stanley (December 14, 1998); "Exploration expense is significantly above average...Hess, with a market capitalization of $4.5 billion, had 1997 exploration expense of $373 million; in comparison, Exxon, with a market capitalization of $175 billion, had exploration expense of $753 million. (In other words, Exxon's exploration expense is only twice as high as Hess's, while its market capitalization is almost 40 times as high)." — Goldman Sachs (September 4, 1998); "While Hess has not been an earnings story for many years now, the absence of profits is getting stale." — UBS (January 23, 1998); "Given the continued inconsistency in Hess results...we would not add to positions at these levels" — Smith Barney (October 23, 1997); "Hess continues to be the perennial turnaround story." — Paine Webber (May 7, 1997)."

"We ended up selling our entire position in DND. I simply couldn’t stomach the risk that management wouldn’t try to pull something in the midst of your activist campaign. — Former shareholder (Sept 2024); Matt keeps saying he wants to delever the balance sheet to 4x but in the meantime, he keeps making acquisitions and increasing the leverage. We have told the Board for years they need to pay down debt, but they just don’t get it. — Top 10 shareholder (June 2024); As long as Matt is involved, I am not touching this stock. — Former shareholder (June 2024); The Board is a joke. Colleen seems like a nice person, but she is in over her head and can’t manage someone like Matt. Matt controls this Board and unless we have a clean fresh reset, nothing will ever change. This is why this stock trades at such a discount to the peers. — Top 20 shareholder (June 2024); I asked Matt in December 2023 if he would issue equity to delever the balance sheet. Stock was around $14 per share. Matt replied – at this price, no way, it’s way too cheap. Barely a month later, company announced a bought deal at $12.10 per share. — Top 10 shareholder (May 2024); Matt says one thing and does just the opposite. It’s so frustrating. The stock is uninvestable. — Former shareholder (May 2024)"

"PBI has not provided shareholders with a convincing, substantive reason to conclude that future performance will depart from the disappointment of the past decade. [...] In summary, shareholders have endured a decade of underperformance and disappointment, there are unanswered questions and serious concerns about the path forward, and power on the board is concentrated in the hands of those directors who objectively have the most potential for a conflict of interest by virtue of their past experience and tenure. — Institutional Shareholder Services (Hestia/Pitney Bowes ISS report, Apr. 26, 2023). The company's TSR has varied when compared with peers, but over all time periods, it has substantially underperformed that of the Nasdaq Biotech Index. [...] The most immediate need for Progenics is sufficient board change to a) get a second opinion on the merger, and b) establish the possibility of a compelling alternative path, which the current board and management has failed to articulate. The most effective way to accomplish this may be by removing CEO Baker and adding dissident nominees Ende, Ber, and Mims to the board. — Institutional Shareholder Services (Velan Capital/Progenics ISS report, Nov. 8, 2019)."

"“...So, the leadership team met without me. And they came up with 50% to 70% of the $1.2 billion. I would -- and I would tell you that's average performance. And this is not an average team. In the time-honored tradition of under promising and over delivering, we set ourselves up well today is my view. I would take the over on 70% to 90%. You think about the $1.2 billion, a couple of hundred of capital savings.” — Phillips 66's then-Chairman & CEO Greg Garland, November 2019 PSX Investor Day. “...Despite the cost-cutting initiative, we estimate that since 2019, refining & SGA costs (ex turnarounds and energy) have increased from $5/bbl to $6.5/bbl. Absolute costs are up 12%, or $500MM, more than large cap peers.” — T.D. Cowen, November 7, 2022. “There is nothing that destroys a management's team credibility faster than setting targets, missing them and attempting to avoid accountability or obfuscate the true outcome. This is the quickest way that I lose conviction in a management team's ability to deliver long-term value. I find it quite remarkable that the Board has not played a stronger role in holding Phillips 66 management accountable.” — Shareholder Nominee: Stacy Nieuwoudt."

""...So, the leadership team met without me. And they came up with 50% to 70% of the $1.2 billion. I would -- and I would tell you that's average performance. And this is not an average team. In the time-honored tradition of under promising and over delivering, we set ourselves up well today is my view. I would take the over on 70% to 90%. You think about the $1.2 billion, a couple of hundred of capital savings." — Phillips 66's then-Chairman & CEO Greg Garland, November 2019 PSX Investor Day. "...Despite the cost-cutting initiative, we estimate that since 2019, refining & SGA costs (ex turnarounds and energy) have increased from $5/bbl to $6.5/bbl. Absolute costs are up 12%, or 500M M, more than large cap peers." — T.D. Cowen, November 7, 2022. "There is nothing that destroys a management's team credibility faster than setting targets, missing them and attempting to avoid accountability or obfuscate the true outcome. This is the quickest way that I lose conviction in a management team's ability to deliver long-term value. I find it quite remarkable that the Board has not played a stronger role in holding Phillips 66 management accountable." — Shareholder Nominee: Stacy Nieuwoudt"

""Some have stopped implanting stimulators because it's such a pain in the ass. 50% are initially denied and I get 70% covered. It's a lot of hassle to go through." — KOL, high volume implanter; "Reimbursement is horrible. It's financially not worth it. There's not much money in it. There's not much at all. And the equipment now has to be bought by a surgery center and there's hardly any profit in that. There's just no profit anymore. They took it all away, which is fine, I don't blame them. I really don't blame them. People abuse it" — KOL, high volume implanter; "The reimbursement sucks. Insurer rejections are the bane of my existence. Every year I spend more and more time on peer and peers. As we do more expensive stuff like stim, the insurers are raising the ante. Yes, I'm spending more energy on it. It's getting worse year over year. It's an expensive technology. Reimbursement pressure has gradually increased and slowly trailed the proliferation of stimulators. Right around the time that Nevro appeared. The stim market grew and insurers pushed back. Blue Cross, any of the blues, are all bad. They're the worst." — KOL, high volume implanter"

"“On valuation, despite an earnings profile (25% commodity / 75% specialty) in-line with differentiated peers Celanese (8.3x '22E EBITDA) and Eastman (9.2x '22E EBITDA), Huntsman (6.1x '22E EBITDA) continues to trade more like a commodity chemical company (Lyondell: 5.4x '22E EBITDA)” — Deutsche Bank, February 2022; “We view multiple expansion to more closely in line with diversified chemical peers Celanese (CE) and Eastman (EMN) as still more reflective of a blue sky scenario. Although both of those companies have similar mix of commodity/specialty businesses, they trade at higher multiples (currently ~9x EV/EBITDA NTM) as a result of their higher margin structures (mid to low 20s EBITDA margins vs. Huntsman's mid-teens levels).” — Morgan Stanley, November 2021; “HUN's Nov. 9 investor day will be first deep-dive since May 2018. Since then HUN divested the bulk of its commodity chems (~8x EV/EBITDA) & consumer adhesives (~15x) exposure & acquired bolt-on specialty polyurethanes & epoxies (~8x post synergies)... Specialties vs. basics mix is most often compared to EMN & CE (i.e. integrated acetyls v integrated MDI at HUN).” — UBS, August 2021"

"“On valuation, despite an earnings profile (25% commodity / 75% specialty) in-line with differentiated peers Celanese (8.3x '22E EBITDA) and Eastman (9.2x '22E EBITDA), Huntsman (6.1x '22E EBITDA) continues to trade more like a commodity chemical company (Lyondell: 5.4x '22E EBITDA)” — Deutsche Bank, February 2022; “We view multiple expansion to more closely in line with diversified chemical peers Celanese (CE) and Eastman (EMN) as still more reflective of a blue sky scenario. Although both of those companies have similar mix of commodity/specialty businesses, they trade at higher multiples (currently ~9x EV/EBITDA NTM) as a result of their higher margin structures (mid to low 20s EBITDA margins vs. Huntsman's mid-teens levels).” — Morgan Stanley, November 2021; “HUN's Nov. 9 investor day will be first deep-dive since May 2018. Since then HUN divested the bulk of its commodity chems (~8x EV/EBITDA) & consumer adhesives (~15x) exposure & acquired bolt-on specialty polyurethanes & epoxies (~8x post synergies)... Specialties vs. basics mix is most often compared to EMN & CE (i.e. integrated acetyls v integrated MDI at HUN).” — UBS, August 2021"

""Well, listen, I think you're going to see our valuations and a rerating of our multiple move up without this volatility. I think actually, in a funny way, you're going to see rerating of multiples for TiO2. We're concentrating at 1 or 2 turns higher than Huntsman is. And Huntsman pure play comps like Celanese, Eastman, Dow are 1.5 turns higher than we are. I think you're going to see multiple expansion on both sides." — Kimo Esplin, Former CFO, May 2017; "We think we look at it and awful lot like a Dow and Eastman and the Celanese and I'd encourage you to look at the quality of the business as you heard today relative to their portfolio." — Kimo Esplin, Former CFO, March 2016; "I think if anything, perhaps we've been looked at as a large TiO2 company with a bunch of other chemicals off to the side. I think that when you look at the quality of our business, particularly in those non-TiO2, we believe that we deserve a multiple that would be akin to a Celanese, an Eastman, a Dow Chemical, some of our traditional peers." — Peter Huntsman, President & CEO, December 2013"

""Well, listen, I think you're going to see our valuations and a rerating of our multiple move up without this volatility. I think actually, in a funny way, you're going to see rerating of multiples for TiO2. We're concentrating at 1 or 2 turns higher than Huntsman is. And Huntsman pure play comps like Celanese, Eastman, Dow are 1.5 turns higher than we are. I think you're going to see multiple expansion on both sides." — Kimo Esplin, Former CFO, May 2017; "We think we look at it and awful lot like a Dow and Eastman and the Celanese and I'd encourage you to look at the quality of the business as you heard today relative to their portfolio." — Kimo Esplin, Former CFO, March 2016; "I think if anything, perhaps we've been looked at as a large TiO2 company with a bunch of other chemicals off to the side. I think that when you look at the quality of our business, particularly in those non-TiO2, we believe that we deserve a multiple that would be akin to a Celanese, an Eastman, a Dow Chemical, some of our traditional peers." — Peter Huntsman, President & CEO, December 2013"

""Strategically, the combination of PEP's SnackCo and MDLZ would create a global snack giant with leading market share positions across several sub-snack categories, with limited portfolio overlap." — Judy Hong, Goldman Sachs 3.25.13; "Assuming ~$3+ billion in 2016 synergies, a 25% deal premium... we determine that a PEP acquisition of MDLZ could be accretive by ~15%-20% in the first full year." — Alexia Howard, Ali Dibadj, Steve Powers, Bernstein 4.22.13; "The potential for revenue synergies could reach ~$3 billion, based on the benchmark set by Mondelez / Cadbury." — Kevin Grundy, Dara Mohsenian and Matthew Grainger, Morgan Stanley 3.25.13; "The cost synergy opportunity is real. In our work published a few weeks ago, we embedded 9% of Mondelez revenues as synergies (or $3.4B)." — Bill Pecoriello, Consumer Edge 3.17.13; "A Merger Could Yield Significant Cost Savings: ...MDLZ's overall margins are well below those of its scaled global Food peers... leaving significant runway for cost savings, in our view." — Andrew Lazar, Barclays 3.22.13"

""We are not surprised to see the involvement of an activist...An activist investor presents Box with an opportunity to improve sales execution...We note that Box has one of the lowest sales efficiencies across our entire coverage universe." — D.A. Davidson, September 2019; "...we’re not at all surprised that value-oriented investors have taken a significant stake...with Box spending ~41% of revenue on sales and marketing (higher than most SaaS peers in the ~30% range), we think a shift towards margin expansion could provide an avenue for unlocking shareholder value." — Raymond James, September 2019; "Although we have maintained a positive view on Box’s positioning and product portfolio, the company’s go-to-market execution has been consistently disappointing...if the solution selling strategy under COO Stephanie Carullo fails to materialize in a meaningful reacceleration in growth, we would expect Starboard to increasingly pressure Box’s management team to reevaluate its growth vs. margin framework." — Wells Fargo, September 2019"

""Crown Castle’s stock has meaningfully underperformed that of American Tower and SBA over the last several years, and this divergence merits attention. Crown Castle’s organic domestic tower growth has lagged its peers. It bought into fiber in a big way just as the sheen on that business model was wearing off and fiber solution solutions growth has come in shy of investor expectations." — MoffettNathanson, January 2020; "We believe CCI shares could underperform near-term as the surprising pull-back in fiber leasing combined with unchanged capital investments may raise new questions as to whether or not fiber assets should trade at a discounted multiple to Towers, despite the positive long-term demand narrative for fiber infrastructure & small cells." — Citi, July 2019; "The Tower stocks have enjoyed a strong run so far in 2017,though CCI has lagged with a ~16% gain compared to over 30% for both AMT and SBAC." — BAML, October 2017"

"We sold our holding in Kao as the company continues to underperform its peers — AVA Investment Managers. Killer Strengths, Just Needs a Killer Growth Strategy — SMBC. We believe Kao can do much more to raise the profile of its successful brands outside of Japan and expand overseas consumer product sales, especially given population demographics in Japan provide a headwind to future domestic growth. Historically Kao’s dominant position in its domestic market may have given it a ready source of stable cashflows, but the company needs to look abroad for its growth in the future. — LINDSELL TRAIN. Kao has great technology and many interesting products, but management has yet to translate this expertise into strong revenue-generating products — CLSA. the operating margin now looks likely to stop falling. However, we see no signs of next-generation growth businesses or other growth drivers — J.P.Morgan."

""APA's stock performance has significantly lagged its peer average and the S&P 500 since the Egyptian revolution. We are more pessimistic about Egypt's future than in any time in the last two years and are reducing our PT to $95 from $105. We think APA would be better off exiting Egypt by selling its operations and using the proceeds to buy back shares, reduce debt and boost investments elsewhere." — Oppenheimer (February 28, 2013); "Since early-2011, Egypt has been a persistent overhang for APA. While in simple terms the region accounts for...23% of our NAV, this understates the importance of the asset for the portfolio.... While a complete lifting of the Egypt overhang is unlikely, the market is discounting a very bearish outcome for an asset that has suffered no visible economic impact from the deteriorating political & fiscal situation over the past 2 years." — Deutsche Bank (March 7, 2013)"

""We view CTB's asset quality to be of a higher risk than its peer group...CTB's credit card franchise is more narrowly linked to the Canadian Tire brand; supporting its Triangle Rewards loyalty program." — Moody's, June 11, 2019; "We believe CTB's class of credit card customer is higher risk than peers and during an economic stress, the bank will experience higher than-peer credit losses... This reflects its chosen market niche of focusing on customers who primarily use a credit card as a source of financing (revolving balances), rather than payment." — Moody's, June 11, 2019; "CTFS continues to expand its financial services business... While CTC has a long history of prudently managing risk with smaller, tightly focused financial services operation, continuous growth could lead to the possibility of evolving customer profiles, which may result in additional risk." — DBRS Report, April 8, 2019"

""The comparison to companies is good. And obviously, we are a commodity company. And in the commodity space, I mean, we like it to be dependent on aluminum. We love aluminum. But unfortunately, aluminum is not gold. But fortunately, aluminum also isn't plastic, right? So we are at a good spot here. But if you want to compare our performance, we believe you've really got it compared against the peers. And the peers that you see here are really our competitors. Those are the aluminum and alumina companies that exist around the world. So when you look at that, you actually do see that Alcoa has gained 9.6% on the total shareholder returns. Whereas our peers, the real peers have lost 7.5%. That I think is an important way to look at it, and I think it's the only way to look at it in a fair, fair fashion." — Dr. Klaus Kleinfeld, May 6, 2011"

""It is time for shareholders' voices to be heard, for accountability to be introduced in the Taubman Centers boardroom, and for a clear message to be sent to the Taubman family that shareholders will no longer tolerate abysmal corporate governance, misguided operations, lavish developments and inferior total returns," said Land and Buildings Founder and Chief Investment Officer, Jonathan Litt. "Taubman continues to deliver suboptimal value for shareholders with 57% stock underperformance versus Class A Mall Peers over the last five years. We believe our two independent and highly-qualified director nominees, Charles Elson and myself, will bring the fresh perspectives and objectivity that we believe is currently lacking on the Board and can help reverse this trend of value destruction." — Jonathan Litt, Land and Buildings"

""Invesco's size, scale and global focus results in few natural peers on the London Stock Exchange. A US listing will improve visibility and direct comparability with a more appropriate peer group of large, global investment management companies." — Invesco CEO; "The Proposal will align the place of listing with the majority of the Group's business activities. Currently over 70% of the Group's sales, operating profit and net assets are in the US. The Board considers there to be a potentially larger pool of investors in the US than in the UK who are more familiar with the Group's business model....In addition, the Board expects that the new parent company would benefit from its primary listing being amongst a more appropriate public company peer group." — Signet Group Press Release (July 10, 2008)"

"“These eight CEOs were not charismatic visionaries, nor were they drawn to grandiose strategic pronouncements. They were practical and agnostic in temperament, and they systematically tuned out the noise of conventional wisdom by fostering a certain simplicity of focus, a certain asperity in their cultures and their communications. Each ran a highly decentralized organization; made at least one very large acquisition; developed unusual, cash flow-based metrics; and bought back a significant amount of stock. None paid meaningful dividends... All received the same combination of derision, wonder, and skepticism from their peers and the business press. All also enjoyed eye-popping, credulity-straining performance over very long tenures...” — William N. Thorndike, Jr., The Outsiders"

"“There was no one in the battery R&D community that did not think that Sakti 3 was a fraud and was not angered by it. Everyone knew. GM invested, and I think, thanks to Khosla, found a greater fool in Dyson to dump it on. They had very, very small cells. They never really showed any performance data. It seemed to be a manufacturing process that would be expensive or impossible to scale up, and it never scaled.” — Solid-state expert; “Sastry’s peers in the battery industry were intensely skeptical...Among their questions: How many battery layers had Sakti3 stacked? (If it was a single layer, the claim was hardly worth reporting because it would lack a crucial feature known as specific energy density.)” — Quartz article 8/21/2015"

"I don't get it because Nevro's device is a piece of crap. I think people are picking up on it... The company couldn't care less about explant rates. They know. It's obvious. They don't want to hear from doctors because they already know this stuff. They've made a conscious decision. They don't give a shit. They just want to sell the company. — High volume implanter and KOL; Nevro keeps explant rates very well hidden from the field reps... The explant rate was a hell of a lot higher than [the stated] 2%. I don't know that people asked for it, because ignorance is bliss. I didn't want to know. Don't ask questions you don't want to know the answer to. My peers in the field felt the same way. — Former Nevro regional sales director"

""[Henry] Singleton [the CEO of Teledyne] believed in an extreme form of organizational decentralization with a wafer-thin corporate staff at headquarters and operational responsibility and authority concentrated in the general managers of the business units. This was very different from the approach of his peers, who typically had elaborate headquarters staffs replete with vice presidents and MBAs." "Singleton was an iconoclast and the idiosyncratic path he chose to follow caused much comment and consternation on Wall Street and in the business press. It turned out that he was right to ignore the skeptics." — William N. Thorndike, Jr., The Outsiders"

""There IS a large margin gap between Arconic's engineered product business... Kleinfeld SHOULD face questions about why he got 2016 guidance so wrong for Arconic." — Bloomberg, February 7, 2017; "I think there is a legitimate question that's being raised by Elliott which is how long before Klaus really delivers versus his peers...I think it would be a better company if the Elliott guys got on this board than this current board." — Jim Cramer, February 1, 2017; "We see as much as 20% downside if Kleinfeld continues as CEO." — Gordon Haskett, February 13, 2017; "It is hard to see him [Dr. Kleinfeld] surviving." — The New York Times, February 28, 2017"

""...we’re not at all surprised that value-oriented investors have taken a significant stake... with Box spending ~41% of revenue on sales and marketing (higher than most SaaS peers in the ~30% range), we think a shift towards margin expansion could provide an avenue for unlocking shareholder value." — Raymond James, September 2019; "Margin profile is unfit for BOX’s current growth rate. With S&M at north of 40% of revenue, we should be seeing a greater impact in revenue and billings acceleration. Gross margin also continues to decline, coming in at 71.3% this quarter, in comparison to 72.3% last quarter." — Craig-Hallum, August 2019"

"“…we’re not at all surprised that value-oriented investors have taken a significant stake…with Box spending ~41% of revenue on sales and marketing (higher than most SaaS peers in the ~30% range), we think a shift towards margin expansion could provide an avenue for unlocking shareholder value.” — Raymond James, September 2019; “Margin profile is unfit for BOX’s current growth rate. With S&M at north of 40% of revenue, we should be seeing a greater impact in revenue and billings acceleration. Gross margin also continues to decline, coming in at 71.3% this quarter, in comparison to 72.3% last quarter.” — Craig-Hallum, August 2019"

""No incremental debt incurred in acquisition" — TROX presentation – slide 15, 10/6/11; "Future cash flow from operations expected to be sufficient to pay cash portion of merger consideration ($12.50 per share or ~$190 million in aggregate)" — TROX presentation – slide 15, 10/6/11; "We've announced that we intend to issue dividends that are consistent with the industry peers. But with this level of free cash flow generation, there will also be opportunities for return of additional cash above and beyond the dividend to shareholders, and we will be exploring those alternatives." — TROX conference call – 10/10/11"

""Norfolk Southern was the worst-performing stock last year of all the so-called Class 1 railroads that include Union Pacific, CSX and Canadian National Railway." — WSJ; "[I]f the company just hit the high end [of guidance] every year for the next three years, NSC’s OR would still be below where its East Coast peer was in 2023. We do not view new financial guidance as closing the gap with competitors as management suggested..." — TD Cowen; "Norfolk has long been an underperforming self-help story that simply can’t figure out how to help themselves, and this quarter that trend looks to be continuing." — Stifel"

"For purposes of establishing 2008 compensation, the peer group consisted of the following companies: Acme Packet, Inc., Amerigon, Inc., Blue Coat Systems, Inc., Cephaid, Inc., Concur Technologies, Inc., Falconstor Software, Inc., Globarstar, Inc., J2 Global Communications, Inc., NuVasiv, Inc., Omniture, Inc., Riverbed Technology, Inc., Sigma Designs, Inc., Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation, Smith Micro Software, Inc., Spectranetics Corporation, Ultimate Software Group, Inc., VASCO Data Security International, Inc., and Zoltek Companies, Inc. — Axon 2008 proxy statement"

""At current valuation levels, by simply marking to market the value of non-refining businesses, we estimate one can create the MPC refining business for effectively free before even incorporating the upside from IMO 2020." — Goldman Sachs, March 19, 2019; "We see discounted value in MPC with the stock trading in line with many of its peers on 2020 EBITDA despite its corporate structure with retail and midstream deserving a premium. However, debate has centered on investors' confidence in MPC's earnings achievability." — Morgan Stanley, May 9, 2019"

""We also believe the rationale for consolidation in coatings remains strong (US peers commented on the need for large scale M&A at GS Basic Materials Conference earlier in May)." — Goldman Sachs research, 6/4/18; "...[we] continue to note that with the coatings industry at the cusp of another round of global consolidation, Akzo is the key strategic asset." — Deutsche Bank research, 4/24/18; "The global coatings sector is consolidating and AXTA could be an acquisition candidate, which could be an upside risk to the shares." — Citi research, 4/19/18"

"“I’ve consulted at length for Boston Scientific, Abbott, Nuvectra, and of course Nevro over the course of my career. I have been doing implants for 20 years. I’ve put in probably several thousand over the years and probably do about 5 or more per month. I actually am [role redacted] at [medical journal name redacted] which is kind of the bible for neuromodulation. I would review papers on stimulation every month as a peer-reviewer so I’m quite versed with the field.” — Ex-Nevro consultant/speaker and one of the most prominent KOL’s in the space"

"“Elliott renewed its call, first made in November 2023, for PSX to close its EBITDA/bbl gap vs. peers including VLO and MPC on a like-for-like basis.” — Citi Research, February 13, 2025; “An activist shareholder, Elliott, can be a positive catalyst for shareholders.” — Wells Fargo, November 29, 2023; “We agree that PSX’s midstream does not reflect full value...selling some midstream assets could unlock value.” — Bank of America, February 14, 2025; “Most investors we talked to welcomed Elliott's involvement in PSX.” — UBS, December 1, 2023"

"Even if the market simply applies its existing 15.4x EV/EBITDA multiple to our more realistic view of Adj. EBITDA and adopts our calculation of net debt, the stock could have 30% downside. However, with Verint not growing organically, we value VRNT on the basis of a forward-year EV/EBITDA multiple, but on trailing Adj. EBITDA. With faster-growing and higher-quality industry peers trading at 10-11x forward-year EBITDA multiple, we believe that VRNT should trade at 8-10x forward EBITDA, implying a share price of $17-25 for 60-70% downside."

"American Capital Ltd.'s executive compensation received an F grade in our proprietary pay-for-performance model. The Company paid more compensation to its named executive officers than the median compensation for a group of companies selected using Equilar's market based peer algorithm. The CEO was paid more than the median CEO compensation of these peer companies. Overall, the Company paid more than its peers, but performed moderately worse than its peers. — Glass Lewis, April 8, 2015 Annual Meeting "Pay for Performance" Commentary"

"“…new competitors are coming in with more or less the same offering, but with lower prices…You invested millions of dollars in generating [peer-reviewed articles]…Because any of these new guys, like Beat2Phone, CAM patch from Bardy, Bittium, can easily beat you by putting the same thing, data on filing, and reducing the price by 30%…I’m not saying that Philips is in this, but the smaller ones are definitely very aggressive, let’s put it like this, or the newcomers.” — Tegus Interview with Director at Philips Healthcare, 6/27/24"

"“Our group is actually one of the primary groups that publish on this, and we have a really hard time getting our publications through peer review because people are skeptical, and rightfully so, of the work that we do on Beacon because it is unusual, it is a foreign environment, and it is a very different approach to things. So, we have to do a lot of extra validation, a lot of really convincing reviewers that what we're showing is actually real. I think that's a big challenge.” — Leading academic institution/ex-BLI scientist"

"The manner in which Dr. Kleinfeld chose to bolster Alcoa’s balance sheet, selling equity at the bottom, amounted to a bailout of existing shareholders – one ironically done at a significant opportunity cost to those investors with the misfortune of having participated. Had those participating investors invested in the Company’s self-selected proxy peers instead of placing their capital under the stewardship of Dr. Kleinfeld, they would have generated a return approximately 4x that realized on their investment in Alcoa."

"“Had it been free from P&G's lumbering management structure, Gillette might have been more aggressive about fighting its new rivals, says Ali Dibadj, a consumer products analyst at the research and brokerage firm Bernstein. ‘Frankly, Gillette should have taken out Dollar Shave [Club] in year one,’ Dibadj says. To hear analysts tell it, Gillette's response to Dollar Shave Club and its low-cost peers — Harry's, Bevel, ShaveMob, and a litany of others — was a dismissive institutional smirk.” — Ali Dibadj, Bernstein"

"“The gray line is something every lab can produce, and I would say it’s the real data because you can clearly see the data points. The blue line, I think, is wishful. It’s not real. There's no variation in the data. I cannot see any data points. It’s just a randomly drawn line. It's not actual data. That's my interpretation for slide 17. If they were going to peer review like in science journals or publications, a reviewer like me would definitely ask for the original data set.” — Leading solid-state expert"

"“The gray line is something every lab can produce, and I would say it’s the real data because you can clearly see the data points. The blue line, I think, is wishful. It’s not real. There’s no variation in the data. I cannot see any data points. It’s just a randomly drawn line. It’s not actual data. That’s my interpretation for slide 17. If they were going to peer review like in science journals or publications, a reviewer like me would definitely ask for the original data set.” — Leading solid-state expert"

"The Company paid: MORE compensation to its top officers than the median compensation for 28 similarly sized companies with a median enterprise value of $1 billion; MORE than a sector group of 23 large consumer discretionary companies with a median enterprise value of $1.2 billion; and MORE than a sub-industry group of 9 specialty stores companies. The CEO was paid above the median CEO in these peer groups. Overall, the Company PAID MORE than its peers, BUT PERFORMED WORSE than its peers. — Glass Lewis"