Callouts & quotes from 338+ activist slides

"Earthworx also connects GFL, Mr. Dovigi and Director Dino Chiesa, to Gordon Churchill of Port Perry. Mr Churchill, in addition to Mr. Villa, were both referenced as directors/owners of Earthworx. Gordon pleaded guilty in June 2007 to charges of production of a controlled substance, unauthorized possession of a firearm and misconduct by peace officer. Gordon’s son Nick Churchill follows Villa’s Campus Auto on Instagram. Nick Churchill was also sentenced to prison."

"BlackRock is a textbook example of bad corporate governance due to an oversized Board (16 directors vs. the S&P500 average of 10.8), low women representation (31% vs. the S&P500 average of 33%), long tenure of directors as a symptom of lack of independence (10 yrs vs. the S&P500 average of 7.8 yrs), low presence of independent directors (81% vs. the S&P500 average of 85%), and above all, a Chairman who is also the CEO (Mr. Fink)."

"Starboard believes that Mr. Lacey’s experience in the senior management of public companies, including service as chairman, president, chief executive officer and corporate vice president, his experience on the boards of directors of public companies, his financial expertise and his direct knowledge of the component manufacturing and camera module business, will enable him to provide invaluable oversight to the Board."

"We are conducting this election contest now during the pendency of the OfficeMax Merger because we strongly believe it is in all shareholders’ best interests to reconstitute the Board with new, highly qualified directors that have the requisite skill-sets and experience to dramatically improve the operations of the business and transform the Company for the future, whether as a stand-alone or merged company."

"In the prospectus, ANTA states that both Mr. Su Weiqing and Ms. Wang Shuying were “Independent Third Parties” and that “save for being the shareholders of our current and past distributors, ... Mr. Su Weiqing [and] Ms. Wang Shuying have no relationship with our Group, our Directors or senior management, our shareholders or their respective associates”. This statement is another lie."

"Elliott Associates, L.P. and Elliott International, L.P. (collectively, “Elliott”) request that the Board of Directors of the Company (the “Board”) grant an exemption under the Rights Agreement (the “Exemption”) from the Ownership Limit allowing for the acquisition or ownership of outstanding Common Shares by Elliott of up to 14.9% the outstanding Common Shares (the “Exemption”)."

"The other three members of Intuit's Audit Committee also raise eyebrows. While we don't question the accomplishments of Directors Burton, Dalzell, and Yuan in their respective fields (legal, technology, and engineering), we do believe Intuit's Audit Committee could be strengthened by the addition of executives with more extensive auditing and financial management expertise."

"The original statement made in the prospectus that “save for their role as distributors… Mr. Su Weiqing or Ms. Wang Shuying having no relationship with our Group, our Directors or senior management, our shareholders or their respective associates aside from being a distributor” is clearly contradicted by representations to the media and the information in the SAIC files."

"Avery talks up its stock ownership policy that requires Directors and management to own minimum amounts of stock. However, what it doesn't say is that AVY insiders own just 1.1% of the total shares, and their overall ownership has declined materially in the past few years as we believe the business has become less competitive and under greater financial pressures."

"Warning: From the earliest time of inception in 1986, the entity described as a "Joint Venture / Partnership Manufacturing" has listed as its Officers and Directors all of CHD’s key executives at the time including its CEO, CFO, Treasurer, and General Counsel. If this is truly a 50/50 joint venture as CHD describes, why is Occidental not represented here."

"Once again, we urge Glencore’s Board of Directors to take all the necessary steps to (1) separate the thermal coal business, in order to accelerate Glencore’s repositioning as a leading pure player in metals, which are at the very core of the green economy transition, and (2) undertake a review of the strategic options for Glencore’s holding in Viterra."

"Notwithstanding that Vivendi nominees Anna Jones and Camilla Antonini declared their independence in the candidacy papers, it is our opinion that such independence is doubtful, since they both resigned from their former position in the board — together with other directors — to accomplish what Elliott believes to be a pro-Vivendi oriented outcome."

"We believe the Board's actions and preference for the status quo make it clear that the Board needs direct representation for common stockholders and new independent directors who will bring fresh perspectives, true independence, and a renewed sense of accountability to the Company, while putting the interests of common stockholders first."

"The mere existence of this Committee: threatens to represent an unwelcome influence on the Board of Director committees; threatens to diminish the role of the Board of Directors; threatens to diminish the role of the Lead Independent Director; raises serious questions about the true independency of the “Independent Directors”."

"The mere existence of this Committee: threatens to represent an unwelcome influence on the Board of Director committees; threatens to diminish the role of the Board of Directors; threatens to diminish the role of the Lead Independent Director; raises serious questions about the true independency of the "Independent Directors"."

"Oasis's proposals are additive only and are not calling for shareholders to oppose any incumbent directors; we believe there is benefit in having a larger board, like sector peers, allowing for the addition of specialized expertise while retaining existing directors to ensure continuity and stability for shareholders."

"Kao’s external directors are under-skilled with the relevant expertise to oversee a turnaround and overseas growth rollout in the Company’s core consumer products division. However, three of them suddenly developed new skills in the past twelve months to fill out the board skills matrix – including Global expertise."

"The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors concluded that the Company has a material weakness in its internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2019 and December 31, 2019 related to a design deficiency in the Company's review controls over unusual or non-recurring and significant transactions."

"A vote for Trian’s nominees is a vote for a minority slate of four directors with extensive operating, strategic, and financial experience and a history of generating long-term shareholder value – individuals committed to working collaboratively with the continuing directors to achieve the great potential of DuPont"

"The Board of Directors concluded that none of these candidates possess the relevant board and management experience, expertise and engagement expected of the Company's Outside Directors, and that these candidates would not contribute to the effectiveness of the Board and the enhancement of the corporate value."

"At DuPont’s 2013 Investor Day, management was not transparent about reducing margin targets, suggesting that reduced margin targets were correlated to the accounting change. Were DuPont’s independent directors aware of this? Trian’s nominees will seek to ensure that the board holds management accountable."

"At DuPont's 2013 Investor Day, management was not transparent about reducing margin targets, suggesting that reduced margin targets were correlated to the accounting change. Were DuPont's independent directors aware of this? Trian's nominees will seek to ensure that the board holds management accountable."

"At DuPont’s 2013 Investor Day, management was not transparent about reducing margin targets, suggesting that reduced margin targets were correlated to the accounting change. Were DuPont’s independent directors aware of this? Trian’s nominees will seek to ensure that the board holds management accountable."

"Disney's non-management Directors comprise current and former CEOs of some of the largest companies in the world, but they collectively own only ~$15 million of Disney stock – representing just 0.008% of Disney's shares outstanding and much of which was received as Director's fees paid in Disney shares"

"Disney’s non-management Directors comprise current and former CEOs of some of the largest companies in the world, but they collectively own only ~$15 million of Disney stock - representing just 0.008% of Disney’s shares outstanding and much of which was received as Director’s fees paid in Disney shares"

"We seek to safeguard shareholder value by giving shareholders an opportunity to vote on resolutions (the “Resolutions”) which, if passed in their entirety, will immediately: (i) remove seven directors from the Capricorn board... (ii) appoint as directors six highly qualified, independent candidates."

"There are still several current directors and members of management who oversaw and approved some of Disney’s worst corporate governance and strategic failures, including overpaying for the Fox acquisition, the expanding streaming losses, and “over-the-top” compensation packages granted to Bob Iger"

"With the resignation of the Fortress Directors, the tone of management regarding real estate has changed FROM openly supportive of unlocking value for shareholders TO expressing a desire to own it - this is despite a substantial increase in healthcare real estate values over the past two years"

"We believe directors sit on a board to represent the interests of shareholders. In our view, the corporate governance and nominating committee should heed the voice of shareholders and act to remove directors not supported by shareholders or correct the issues that raised shareholder concern."

"In the end, it is admittedly difficult to propose a deal that satisfies both the shareholders of the target company and those of the buyer and it is equally difficult to propose a deal that will displease them all: Glencore's Board of directors seems to have succeeded in this remarkable task."

"According to BlackRock, it is in the best interest of their clients (and the market) to have one Board seat instead of three, in a Board composed of seventeen directors, sixteen of which appointed by a controlling shareholder via multiple voting shares (1:10) with only a 10% economic interest"

"According to BlackRock, it is in the best interest of their clients (and the market) to have one Board seat instead of three, in a Board composed of seventeen directors, sixteen of which appointed by a controlling shareholder via multiple voting shares (1:10) with only a 10% economic interest"

"In situations where a company has generated long-term outperformance, such a long-tenured Board might be accepted by the investor community, but given the sustained share price underperformance at Cognizant, we believe directors with new experiences, skills and perspectives would be welcome."

"Spruce Point has concerns about financial relationships and flows of payments between C3, its CEO's foundation, two directors and its sales partners. Spruce Point asks C3 to clarify the nature of the relationships and economic value proposition to C3 shareholders with enhanced disclosures."

"Without limiting our ability to propose different agenda items, we currently intend to propose resolutions at the AGM removing Bertrand Kan (Chairman), Peter Shore and Alexandra Reich as directors and appoint Jonathan Amouyal (of TCI) as a director and potentially additional directors."

"It seems to us as if the Compensation Committee (having no Fortress Directors) waited until after the resignation of the Fortress Directors to disclose that it did not use any of information the compensation consultant provided to benchmark Andy Smith’s compensation as incoming CEO"

"The board of directors are ultimately responsible for setting strategy, driving execution, and holding management accountable for performance. If the board is not aligned with peer standards, neither will be strategy and performance. Thus, "A Better Kao" starts with a better board."

"We have serious concerns with the Company's management of the formal review of strategic alternatives it announced on November 30, 2015, only a month after a consent solicitation was launched by a dissident seeking to remove and replace four of the incumbent directors on the Board"

"The Company's opposition to Proposal 6 indicates that its current Board does not truly wish to have all Phillips 66 directors elected annually, and that it would instead prefer to continue enjoying the protections that a staggered Board provides against shareholder accountability."

"We do not believe the Audit Committee is made up of truly independent directors. For instance, according to Chinese filings, the Chairman of QTT's Audit Committee, Li Feng (李峰), appears to be a 12% shareholder of one of QTT's most significant undisclosed related party advertisers."

"We do not believe the current Board’s proposed slate, which includes 4 incumbent directors who have overseen massive shareholder value destruction and appalling corporate governance practices, has the operating record or shareholder-friendly mindset required to turn around Darden"

"We do not believe the current Board’s proposed slate, which includes 4 incumbent directors who have overseen massive shareholder value destruction and appalling corporate governance practices, has the operating record or shareholder-friendly mindset required to turn around Darden"

"Tempus executives, directors, and shareholders have a history of working together to promote disruptive technology companies with large market potential. However, one common theme is that each company blind-sided investors with restated financial results and a material weakness."

"Starboard along with its independent directors stabilized a terribly mismanaged business and laid out a credible plan to improve financial performance, which ultimately resulted in a successful and value enhancing sale of the company to a highly complementary strategic acquiror."

"Most of the Company's independent Directors have been on the Board for at least 8 years (average/median tenure of approximately 9 years), and rather than being "agents of change," they have overseen the Company at a time during which it has significantly underperformed its peers"

"Asserting the contrary, from 2015 until now, demonstrates two things only: 1. BlackRock's Board of Directors lacks adequate independent oversight 2. Ms. Wagner herself has confirmed that she is not independent by relying on an assessment that she must know is plainly unfounded."

"Asserting the contrary, from 2015 until now, demonstrates two things only: 1. BlackRock's Board of Directors lacks adequate independent oversight 2. Ms. Wagner herself has confirmed that she is not independent by relying on an assessment that she must know is plainly unfounded."

"Legg Mason, Inc. (NYSE: LM) announced today that it has increased the size of its Board of Directors from 10 to 12 members and has appointed Nelson Peltz and Ed Garden of Trian Fund Management, L.P. ("Trian Partners") to the Company's Board of Directors, effective immediately."

"We are concerned that three of Parkland's directors have served on the Board for twelve years or more, including Chairman Jim Pantelidis who has served on the Board for 24 years, and Mr. Spencer and Mr. Bechtold who have been on the Board for 21 and 17 years, respectively."

"Limiting director tenure allows new directors to the board to bring fresh perspectives. An excessive tenure is considered to potentially compromise a director's independence...For the US, Canada, Hong Kong, and, Singapore, lengthy tenure is defined as nine or more years."

"Keisei's Board is swollen by an excessive number of inside directors resulting in misalignment with peers and falling short of acceptable governance standards – at least 4 of Keisei's current inside directors offer little to the Board and should not stand for re-election"

"Independence concerns over four out of the six outside directors (including direct links to OLC) raise serious doubts about their collective ability to fairly and objectively perform their duties – including fundamental checks and balances on management decision-making"

"Significant change is needed in DND’s boardroom today. The Engine Slate offers directors who possess superior skillsets and a plan to turn around the Company, effectively guide and oversee management, and restore trust with DND’s employees, customers and shareholders."

"We recommend the establishment of a Finance & Strategy Committee of the Board (that includes Nelson and/or Jay) to create a dedicated subset of Directors focused on long-term strategy and the key strategic questions facing Disney, including those we have highlighted"

"We recommend the establishment of a Finance & Strategy Committee of the Board (that includes Nelson and/or Jay) to create a dedicated subset of Directors focused on long-term strategy and the key strategic questions facing Disney, including those we have highlighted"

"By supporting the Nominees for ADP’s Transformation you will: Elect a major shareholder to the Board, Add two new independent directors with fresh perspectives and relevant expertise, Send a message to ADP’s management and Board that the status quo is unacceptable"

"Disney’s Board decided to spend an estimated $40 million of shareholder money engaging in a proxy contest, while 11 out of 12 Directors have not even met Nelson Peltz or Jay Rasulo in-person during Trian’s engagement with the Company in the past year and a half."

"We firmly believe that a comprehensive reconstitution of the Board, including the appointment of shareholder representatives and qualified independent directors, is necessary to ensure a thorough evaluation of all paths to delivering enhanced shareholder value."

"Disney’s Board decided to spend an estimated $40 million of shareholder money engaging in a proxy contest, while 11 out of 12 Directors have not even met Nelson Peltz or Jay Rasulo in-person during Trian’s engagement with the Company in the past year and a half"

"Vivendi opportunistically used the 19 member cap in TIM's by-laws to allow its executives onto the Board, although a majority of other investors voted against this as well as objecting to using TIM's funds to pay for compensation for these additional directors"