Callouts & quotes from 220+ activist slides

"BlackRock is a textbook example of bad corporate governance due to an oversized Board (16 directors vs. the S&P500 average of 10.8), low women representation (31% vs. the S&P500 average of 33%), long tenure of directors as a symptom of lack of independence (10 yrs vs. the S&P500 average of 7.8 yrs), low presence of independent directors (81% vs. the S&P500 average of 85%), and above all, a Chairman who is also the CEO (Mr. Fink)."

"Mr. Prittie’s alleged shortcomings were tied to his perceived failure to come to grips with Tyler and OneMove’s concerns over the Company’s financial status, share price performance, leadership, strategic vision and strategy, corporate governance, CEO compensation, excessive M&A activity, debt leverage to cash flow ratios and the lack of guardrails around senior management decision making."

"MSCI's Director Catherine Kinney has been involved with SolarWinds (NYSE: SWI) since its IPO. She served as the Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee which was responsible for firm-wide risk management and was also a member of the Audit Committee. Spruce Point finds it alarming that the SEC recently charged SolarWinds with fraud for internal control failures."

"Lead Independent Director and Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Chair Sean Aggarwal and Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee member Betsey Stevenson have overseen negative total returns during their tenures, lack financial sophistication based on their track records at Lyft, and support the dual-class share structure."

"We have selected candidates who have directly relevant experience and skill sets in areas that we believe would be of substantial value to the Board, including expertise in dollar store and broader retail operations, integration and restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, strategic transformation, and public company governance."

"We believe Prestige is overvalued on both a revenue and EBITDA basis. Given Prestige's poor organic growth prospects, lack of competitive advantage, eroding market share, declining financial transparency, low quality management and governance practices, it is well justified for the Company to trade at a discount to its peers."

"Our proposal is not rooted in a mere abstract preference for the separation of the Chair (to be independent) and CEO, disregarding other viable governance structures. Rather, it stems from our specific assessment of the unequivocal failure of BlackRock's governance to provide independent oversight on the company's management"

"We believe the Company’s stock price underperformance versus both peers and the broader market indices is due to consistently poor financial performance, a lack of credibility from repeatedly failing to deliver on commitments to shareholders, and a history of problematic governance that fails to demand accountability."

"As we discussed in our investor presentation, we believe this poor capital allocation was the direct result of poor corporate governance at the Board level, including shareholder-unfriendly compensation practices that incentivized management to pursue growth at the expense of returns on capital and shareholder value."

"It is time for shareholders' voices to be heard, for accountability to be introduced in the Taubman Centers boardroom, and for a clear message to be sent to the Taubman family that shareholders will no longer tolerate abysmal corporate governance, misguided operations, lavish developments and inferior total returns."

"Taubman's total shareholder return has lagged its Class A Mall Peers since the 2017 Annual Meeting by 22%, due primarily to three factors: (i) the same underlying resistance to truly embrace good corporate governance; (ii) the same operational deficiencies; and (iii) the same stubborn approach to capital allocation"

"We believe that Ms. Welty’s extensive global industrial experience, including her C-suite executive leadership roles in the chemical, natural resource and energy industries, will allow Ms. Welty to provide strategic, financial and corporate governance insight, making her a valuable addition to the Board."

"Norfolk Southern shareholders will benefit from electing Mr. Clyburn to the Board because his various experiences will add a unique perspective, one that is unavailable from any other board candidate, that prioritizes safety, compliance, good governance, and maximizing long-term value for shareholders."

"There are still several current directors and members of management who oversaw and approved some of Disney’s worst corporate governance and strategic failures, including overpaying for the Fox acquisition, the expanding streaming losses, and “over-the-top” compensation packages granted to Bob Iger"

"Starboard believes these seemingly self-serving actions demonstrate a complete disregard for proper corporate governance and fiscal discipline by members of management and the Board and suggest that these transactions were not entered into with the best interest of the common stockholders in mind."

"We believe directors sit on a board to represent the interests of shareholders. In our view, the corporate governance and nominating committee should heed the voice of shareholders and act to remove directors not supported by shareholders or correct the issues that raised shareholder concern."

"Mr. Terino’s depth of experience serving as CEO, CFO, COO, and a director of public and private companies in the technology and eCommerce industries, together with his substantial expertise in finance, restructuring, and corporate governance, makes him well qualified to serve on the Board."

"However, the unwinding of the current circular shareholding by itself is not enough for the Group to declare the restructuring a corporate governance improvement, especially as the transaction is not supported by sound business rationale and lacks clear benefits to minority shareholders."

"Instead of embracing responsible governance and a spirit of collaboration, Mr. Kelly and Mr. Jordan have resorted to entrenchment tactics – so-called “poison pills,” one-off announcements of long-overdue changes, and a rushed, unilateral Board refreshment process that lacks legitimacy."

"We believe that Mr. Smith’s extensive knowledge of the capital markets, corporate finance, and public company governance practices as a result of his investment experience, together with his significant public company board experience, would make him a valuable addition to the Board."

"We believe that Mr. Smith’s extensive knowledge of the capital markets, corporate finance, and public company governance practices as a result of his investment experience, together with his significant public company board experience, would make him a valuable addition to the Board."

"Now that Darden's egregious corporate governance practices have directly resulted in a substantial and easily avoidable destruction of shareholder value, in clear defiance of a strong shareholder directive, it is apparent that the majority of Darden's current Board must be replaced."

"We believe that Mr. Feld’s extensive knowledge of the capital markets, corporate finance, and public company governance practices as a result of his investment experience, together with his significant public company board experience, would make him a valuable asset to the Board."

"We do not believe the current Board’s proposed slate, which includes 4 incumbent directors who have overseen massive shareholder value destruction and appalling corporate governance practices, has the operating record or shareholder-friendly mindset required to turn around Darden"

"We do not believe the current Board’s proposed slate, which includes 4 incumbent directors who have overseen massive shareholder value destruction and appalling corporate governance practices, has the operating record or shareholder-friendly mindset required to turn around Darden"

"We believe that Mr. Feld’s extensive knowledge of the capital markets, corporate finance, and public company governance practices as a result of his investment experience, together with his significant public company board experience, would make him a valuable asset to the Board."

"Starboard believes that Mr. Feld's experience as an active stockholder, board member, and expert in capital markets and corporate governance practices, as well as his knowledge of intellectual property licensing, will enable him to provide invaluable oversight to the Board."

"Despite a recent Board overhaul, we believe the fundamental dynamic remains unchanged: there is no effective counterweight to the Greenbergs, who have consistently demonstrated a disregard for adhering to best practices in public company and corporate governance practices."

"Keisei's Board is swollen by an excessive number of inside directors resulting in misalignment with peers and falling short of acceptable governance standards – at least 4 of Keisei's current inside directors offer little to the Board and should not stand for re-election"

"Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX) shareholders, it's time to vote for a brighter future and better corporate governance. Vote the GOLD card FOR Elliott's board nominees Brian Coffman, Sigmund Cornelius, Michael Heim and Stacy Nieuwoudt, and FOR corporate governance enhancements."

"Further, appointing Bob Iger as Executive Chairman for 2 years as an outgoing CEO in our view was a very risky corporate governance decision as it set up his successor to fail with the prior CEO constantly watching over their shoulders - this is exactly what transpired"

"Believes Company Announcement to De-Stagger Board Two Days Before Annual Meeting and 10 Years after More than 85 percent of Common Shareholders Voted for this Measure is Too Little Too Late and Fails to Address Deeply Imbedded Issues with Taubman Governance Structure."

"For over three years Bluebell Capital Partners (“BCP”) sought a constructive dialogue with BlackRock’s (“BLK”) Board. As the Board refused to engage, we were left with no alternative but to directly address BlackRock's shareholders to request governance changes."

"For over three years Bluebell Capital Partners (“BCP”) sought a constructive dialogue with BlackRock’s (“BLK”) Board. As the Board refused to engage, we were left with no alternative but to directly address BlackRock’s shareholders to request governance changes."

"We take issue with numerous governance decisions currently in effect at Zillow. One of our biggest concerns is that Zillow has not established a formal incentive program that outlines financial targets or thresholds that play a role in management’s compensation."

"Independent proxy advisor Glass Lewis, citing Phillips 66’s (NYSE: PSX) underperformance and poor governance, recommends that shareholders support Elliott’s case for urgent change by voting for board nominees Brian Coffman, Sigmund Cornelius and Michael Heim."

"Over the past 11 months, we have attempted to engage privately, many times, with the Board to improve the Company's strategy, governance and capital allocation – but our efforts to work collaboratively have been met with obstruction and threats of litigation"

"Despite Dell's and its investment bankers' assumption that DVMT would trade within 5-10% of VMW, since its first trading day, DVMT has traded on average 35% below VMW due to an atrocious governance structure put in place by Michael Dell and Silver Lake."

"We see this as a tremendous opportunity to deliver real shareholder value, corporate governance and transparency improvements, to help Samsung Electronics achieve an equity market valuation that properly reflects its first-class portfolio of businesses"

"Help Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX) realize its potential for best-in-class operating performance and corporate governance by voting the GOLD card FOR Elliott’s highly qualified board nominees and its proposal to move to annual elections for all board seats."

"Mr. Feld's experience as an active stockholder, board member, and expert in capital markets and corporate governance practices, as well as his knowledge of intellectual property licensing, will enable him to provide invaluable oversight to the Board."

"Consistent with a pattern of delusion that includes pretending that TSR and operating performance have been excellent, Arconic’s board claims to “value” good governance practices. Reality: the Company has been a corporate governance house of horrors"

"Removing the OLC Accounting Distortion will allow a clearer focus on areas for improvement, which drive a low PBR: Inefficient balance sheet / inadequate returns, Insufficient IR / communication efforts, General governance / structural shortcomings"

"We strongly believe that additional change is necessary at the Company given its poor operating performance, long-term destruction of shareholder value, serious corporate governance concerns and failure to honor the spirit of our 2012 settlement."

"A CEO of the target [Xerox], facing likely ouster, serves as the loyal agent of the acquirer, designing a deal that is too good to be true: a cheap price, little governance protections, no market check, and a process that ignores other bidders."

"We believe Skechers deserves to trade a substantial discount to comparable apparel companies, particularly in light of its deteriorating financial performance and governance issues. We see 30% to 50% downside risk to Skechers’ share price."

"The companies with which we engage benefit from Elliott's diverse team of specialized experts in public relations, shareholder engagement, corporate governance, private equity, capital markets, credit, real estate and government relations"

"We can only conclude two things from this fact pattern. Either: 1) By February 2011... the CEO search committee... had already determined that Mr. Austrian would become the permanent CEO... 2) The Board's governance is seriously lacking."

"This stark and recent case study brings up several questions: How can a $2bn revenue segment of ADP have margins which are >80% below optimal levels? What does this say about ADP's corporate operating efficiency, culture, and governance?"

"To be clear, this election contest is not simply a matter of disagreement over strategy. Rather, it is largely about extremely poor execution, lack of accountability, unacceptable governance, severe destruction of shareholder value."

"Phillips 66's Annual Meeting is scheduled to be held virtually on May 21, 2025. We strongly urge you to vote the GOLD card FOR Elliott's outstanding slate of director nominees, and FOR our proposed corporate governance enhancements."

"The long-term nature of CalSTRS’ liabilities, and its responsibilities as a fiduciary to its members, makes the fund keenly interested in governance issues and ensuring that the businesses are optimally presented to the marketplace"

"Preventing shareholders who do not support the Company's failed leadership and oversight from purchasing additional stock reflects exceptionally poor governance and underscores the immediate need for accountability at Southwest."

"We believe that DOX should not trade at a material premium to midcap technology and business process outsourcing (BPO) peers as a result of its opaque and complex structure, below avg growth, accounting and governance concerns."

"We did so principally because we believe that the incumbent Target board has: Suboptimal composition, Made significant strategic mistakes that have destroyed shareholder value, Performed key corporate governance duties poorly."

"There is no way to justify Weis' current valuation in the context of its struggling financial performance, aggressive accounting changes inflating recent performance, declining disclosures, and terrible governance practices."

"This does not look to us like a Board that is trying to do everything it can to get votes in, and exploring all options to implement annual director elections in line with good governance and the clear will of shareholders."

"This does not look to us like a Board that is trying to do everything it can to get votes in, and exploring all options to implement annual director elections in line with good governance and the clear will of shareholders."

"The policy is a practical approach to enhance Board accountability to shareholders, align with governance best practices and respond to the recurring strong support from Phillips stockholders for annual director elections."

"We will generally vote for proposals looking to separate the CEO and Chairman roles unless the company has governance structures in place that can satisfactorily counterbalance a combined chairman and CEO/ president post."