Callouts & quotes from 398+ activist slides

"In 2019, CPIPG issued bonds in Hong Kong Dollars and US Dollars totaling €362 million equivalent via our EMTN programme, and completed schuldschein loans for €170 million. Proceeds were used to refinance debt including a bridge loan related to our UK acquisition and drawings under our revolving credit facility; some of the proceeds will also be held in cash. — CPI PG 2018 Management Report"

"The Board believes that the business can conservatively support a debt to EBITDA ratio of 1x, while also providing significant flexibility to support Deckers' growth initiatives and seasonal working capital needs. — 10/26/17 press release; No, it's not an ongoing target... That doesn't necessarily mean we'll always maintain that 1x EBITDA. — Thomas George (CFO), 10/26/17 earnings call"

"In February 2019, the Company opened bank accounts and incurred fees totaling $34. There has been no other activity in the accounts in the period resulting in bank overdrafts in the amount of the fees. As such, the overdrafts have been recorded within Short-term debt and the corresponding expenses have been recorded within General and administrative expenses. — 10-Q 3/31/19"

"There's already evidence that Porch is failing to meet its financial objectives. The Company claimed it would complete the transaction with $205m of cash and no debt. Yet, it ended up with more cash than projected, but its debt balance is still claimed to be $40m in Porch's investor presentations. This figure is actually contradicted by Porch's 2020 10-K to be $50.8m(1)"

""In closing, I wanted to emphasize that our business model and philosophy regardless of short-term volatility, we'll remain laser-focused on operational excellence, capital discipline, long-term shareholder value creation, and returning that value to shareholders while fortifying our balance sheet by continuing debt reduction." — Former CEO Mark Little, July 29, 2021"

"“Against Engine’s ‘advice’ to not attempt a debt refinancing, and its hyperbolic posturing, the Company refinanced its debt on more favourable terms that materially reduced its debt service cashflows, staggered and extended its maturities, and saved the Company approximately CAD $20 million annualized in net interest costs.” — Dye & Durham Board (September 25, 2024)"

"In closing, I wanted to emphasize that our business model and philosophy regardless of short-term volatility, we'll remain laser-focused on operational excellence, capital discipline, long-term shareholder value creation, and returning that value to shareholders while fortifying our balance sheet by continuing debt reduction. — Former CEO Mark Little, July 29, 2021"

"As one media consultant said, “It’s rather sad that AOL Time Warner couldn’t keep one of its most valuable brands in television like Comedy Central” — Media Consultant. “Companies like AOL are having to sell their best and most profitable assets in order to make a dent on the debt on their balance sheets. Nobody’s focusing on shareholder value.” — Bond Investor."

"One important area in which fiscal '19 will differ from fiscal '18 is in capital allocation. With $600 million of acquisition debt repaid and our leverage target achieved, we returned to our historical priorities for deployment of cash, which our CapEx, acquisitions, dividend payments and share repurchases. — Cintas CFO Q4 2018 Earnings Call July 19, 2018"

""I've only come up with five meaningful ways we can use our cash. First, we can invest in our current businesses. Second, we can use our cash to pay down debt and we have. However, we intend to maintain our investment grade credit rating, which we're already good shape on, and our debt is in great shape as well." — Stephen Wetmore, CEO, 2014 Investor Day"

"Spruce Point believes Broadridge should have ceased capitalization of additional costs with the UBS project last year given delays and cost overruns. As a result, had the latest capitalized conversion and start-up costs been expensed, Broadridge would have been in violation of its “Leverage Ratio” covenant, which limits it to 3.5x Total Debt to EBITDA."

"The proxy statement depicts Xylem’s ability to retire Evoqua’s debt and pay transaction costs entirely with cash and equivalents from the balance sheet. However, the balance sheet below also assumes that Xylem has frictionless and unfettered access to all of its cash even though 86% of cash is in foreign markets and may not be freely convertible."

"Assuming Mettler made the $242m of permanent capital injection into the HK entity, our working theory is that it would have experienced a capital shortfall and needed to raise more debt. However, the fact that it did not suggests it maybe shuffling the money around internally, potentially to show auditors in China evidence of accumulated profits."

"Spruce Point believes AMR is an ESG nightmare. Environmentalists and the public should be outraged to think AMR believes shareholders deserve rewards at this point. Spruce Point finds hidden liabilities, debts due to mine reclamation costs, pensions costs and compensating workers for black lung disease amounting to approximately $740 million."

"As of the publication date of a Muddy Waters report, Muddy Waters Related Persons (defined below) are SHORT the securities of or derivatives linked to Eurofins Scientific SE (the “Covered Issuer”), and therefore will likely realize significant gains in the event that the prices of either equity or debt securities of a Covered Issuer decline."

"Xylem portrayed its ability to retire Evoqua’s debt and pay transaction costs with available cash from Evoqua and existing cash on its balance sheet. Total debt was illustrated to be $2.0 billion. However, in reality Xylem’s current debt rose over $500 million and it quickly filed a shelf registration the day after its Q2 2023 earnings call."

"HASI’s claims should be subordinated to the tax equity partners and project debt holders. With significant debt on a project that has generated substantial losses since inception, color us skeptical that HASI will be able to hit its hurdle rate (let alone avoid a loss) over the remaining ~12 years of the project’s 13-year contract life."

"I was once previously an agent with WFG. I left and terminated my advisor code with them june or july 2023... I have acquired $600 worth of debt with them because of it. I was also never contacted by WFG to tell me i have debt, I found out 8 months later and it has ruined my credit score. — Excerpt Of FTC Complaint Submitted 4/23/2024"

"AMR uses a discount rate for certain pension obligations near 2.6%, its weighted average financing lease expense is 9.6%, and its Term-Loan interest cost is 10%. Using these range of assumptions for its incremental borrowing cost, we estimate that AMR’s “Hidden” Interest-Bearing debt obligations are $138 to $690 million."

"And I would just add, John, that with a really strong balance sheet, no debt, every comp store in the chain is contributing positive EBITDA. We're in a really nice situation, particularly compared to 8 years ago when that wasn't the case and maybe we did have to slow that a little bit or chose to slow that? — CFO Watkins"

"It appears CTC is more inclined to sell properties than it was in the past. In 2018 and during the first half of 2019, CTC drastically increased the value of sales. This is concerning given that CTC’s debt load has grown substantially over this time. We believe this is a sign the company is strapped for cash."

"Based on our research and conversations, we believe recent acquisitions executed under Farrell and Dierker have been poorly planned and executed, and more aggressively structured (notably with earnouts) – insult to injury given the large multiples paid for these deals and rising debt load to fund the deals."

"Looking carefully, we see the UK subsidiary added a new "key source of estimation uncertainty" related to trade receivables. The Company disclosed a bad debt provision amounting to 5.5% of gross receivables. We observe this is materially higher than Generac's consolidated bad debts provision of just 1.5%."

"Ares Capital marked Soil Safe's equity at zero and booked a $13m “net realized gain”. This suggests the deal was close to the value of the debt's fair value. The double digit interest rates paid by Soil Safe at a time of ultra low borrowing costs illustrate that Soil Safe was a deeply distressed company."

"MAXR appears “cheap” on its inflated Non-IFRS metrics. However, Spruce Point’s forensic analysis unravels its aggressive accounting methods used to inflate EBITDA and EPS. Furthermore, when its debt is adjusted for standard credit agency adjustments, we find leverage to be in excess of its 5.8x covenant"

"“We believe that the presentation of Adjusted Free Cash Flow is relevant and useful to investors because it provides a measure of cash available to pay the principal on our debt and pursue acquisitions of businesses or other strategic investments or uses of capital.” — GTT Q1 2019 SEC Form 10-Q, p. 40"

"Hill-Rom Holdings, Inc.'s ("Hill-Rom") Ba2 rating reflects the company's moderate financial leverage. The rating also reflects the risks associated with a growth strategy that is expected to rely on acquisitions, which could be debt financed and result in integration risks. — Moody's Credit Rating"

"Without taking on any debt or implementing any additional operational improvements, Bristol-Myers will have the ability to use ~$37 billion of cumulative unlevered free cash flow over the next five years to execute a “String of Pearls” strategy (i.e. in-licenses, partnerships, small acquisitions)"

"Without taking on any debt or implementing any additional operational improvements, Bristol-Myers will have the ability to use ~$37 billion of cumulative unlevered free cash flow over the next five years to execute a “String of Pearls” strategy (i.e. in-licenses, partnerships, small acquisitions)"

"Without taking on any debt or implementing any additional operational improvements, Bristol-Myers will have the ability to use ~$37 billion of cumulative unlevered free cash flow over the next five years to execute a “String of Pearls” strategy (i.e. in-licenses, partnerships, small acquisitions)"

"Net "funded" debt is calculated under our Revolving Credit Facility by starting with the long-term indebtedness shown on our most recent balance sheet plus lease obligations that are set forth separately from our long-term indebtedness on our balance sheet minus cash on hand. — GFL IPO Prospectus"

"The central element in the scheme which is now proposed is that Certificates of Indebtedness, which are issued by the Exchange Fund to the note-issuing banks to be held as cover for their note issues, should henceforth be issued and redeemed against foreign currency (US dollars) at a fixed rate."

"We believe that PSX' debt levels are already appropriate for their mix of businesses (using 3.5x for midstream, 2.5x for chems, and 1.0x for refining based on peers, we would expect a 2.5x debt/EBITDA target is appropriate which they are already below). — Bank of America, February 7, 2025"

"We believe that PSX' debt levels are already appropriate for their mix of businesses (using 3.5x for midstream, 2.5x for chems, and 1.0x for refining based on peers, we would expect a 2.5x debt/EBITDA target is appropriate which they are already below). — Bank of America, February 7, 2025"

"We believe that PSX' debt levels are already appropriate for their mix of businesses (using 3.5x for midstream, 2.5x for chems, and 1.0x for refining based on peers, we would expect a 2.5x debt/EBITDA target is appropriate which they are already below). — Bank of America, February 7, 2025"

"We provide evidence that since 1999, the Company has generated a cash flow deficit of -$1.6bn after capital expenditures, business investment, and asset-shuffling and repositioning, while making +$4.7bn and +$3.9bn of dividends and share repurchases effectively through debt-financing."

"Spruce Point believes that PLUG cannot issue equity or raise debt fast enough to support its current restricted cash build - and, therefore, cannot continue to support customer leases through operating-type leasebacks, the source of the Company's recent "inflection" to profitability."

"From Greenlight's point of view, regardless of whether the scope of the audit has changed, whoever approved the Velocita debt and warrant valuations at cost at the end of 2001 and the other criticized investments and valuation methods did not provide appropriate critical scrutiny."

"Using our most conservative assumptions, and assuming the conversion of all unsecured debt into equity at the cap rate implied by GGP equity's current fair market value of $380mm, equity need only retain 5.5% of the post-reorganization company to break even at today's stock price"

"We estimate Casino's LTM leverage ratio is 8.9x. Ideally, a company consolidating results of proportionally-owned companies has the debt spread out among the consolidated companies. That is not the case with Casino - there is a massive gap between what is owned, and what is owed."

"MDA has consistently produced poor free cash flow. From 2012-2017 average free cash flow was C$33m (US$30m). Leading up to the DigitalGlobe deal, it even reported bank overdrafts of cash. YTD 2018 overdrafts have continued, and debt is rising through credit facility borrowing."

"AMR acts as if its approaching being "debt-free" and now it’s time to reward shareholders with stock buybacks and a dividend policy. But wait a second, is the Company really debt-free, or has it forgotten about its obligations to other stakeholders beyond financial creditors?"

"Although the resulting leverage exceeds the level appropriate for a ‘BBB-’ rating on an ongoing basis, the ratings incorporate S&P's expectations that Cox has the capacity and commitment to reduce consolidated debt to EBITDA within two years to the low-to-mid 4x area. — S&P"

"LSPD has a focus on SMBs but its DSOs at 15 are significantly lower than comparable sized peers at 70+ and actually improved during peak COVID-19 whereas peer DSOs worsened. How is this possible? On the next slide, we show that allowance for bad debts was even increasing."

"We believe the optics and appearance of these events is an off-balance sheet engineering structure: DGC's losses and debt were kept off SGHC's financials through the 2021–2022 SPAC marketing period and first year of trading, even as SGHC guaranteed DGC's loan facilities."

"SMCI working capital stress is near all-time highs, some of which can be explained by the pandemic, supply chain challenges and having to carry more inventory. SMCI stopped highlighting its working capital measure (which includes cash and short-term debt) post pandemic."

"Members are asked to advise whether the proposal with effect from 15 October to issue and redeem Certificates of Indebtedness only against US dollars at a fixed rate sould be implemented, and whether such a step should be accompanied by the zero-rating of interest tax."

"Specifically the debt would have to be "in the ordinary course of business consistent with past practices". However, Forescout has never had to draw on its credit facility before as a public company, so the practice does not appear to be consistent with past practices."

"Avery is more expensive and levered than it appears. We believe Avery inflates Adjusted EBITDA and EPS with dubious restructuring add-backs. In addition, it obscures reporting of operating leases, which are also debt, and ignores pension and environmental liabilities."

"Versus the current outstanding offshore debt of $1.893 Billion, the “real” best case net asset value is around $92 million. Divided by the current number of shares outstanding – 245 million - that leaves a share value of approximately C$0.38 at current exchange rates."

"Improved the Company’s financial health by driving companywide efforts to improve profit margins, reduce debt, secure credit rating, and increase return on capital, positioning the Company to take advantage of future growth opportunities — DuPont 2014 proxy statement"

"Generac stopped providing quarterly disclosure of its allowance for bad debts. We find it suspicious that there was no increase in the allowance throughout 2021, even after it made various small and speculative acquisitions exposing it to more residential customers."

"Potential obstacles to executing the restructuring plan might include: (1) tax-related constraints, (2) restrictions in existing bank or other debt agreements prohibiting the separation of the assets, or (3) restrictions in certain contractual agreements of TWX."

"According to Bloomberg, only 25.52% of these bonds are owned by institutional investors, implying the remaining 74.48% of this debt is owned by retail investors who are highly unlikely to understand the risk they are taking when investing in these securities."

"Because the JV transaction can generate such large cash proceeds, which significantly decreases Macy's current debt burden, the pro forma Macy's OpCo alone is worth more than Macy's current stock price, while Macy still owns 85% of the JV and its cash flows."

"It is this strategy, coupled with expanded trading, that has driven what we believe is essentially a modestly profitable (at a smaller scale) trading business to take on crushing debt levels and, in our opinion, destroy substantial amounts of investor funds."

"According to Moody's, a credit rating agency which was privy to Itiviti's management and insights about its business given its public debt rating, contracts were shorter than BR management's claims, and the recurring revenue mix was less than 100%. — Moody's"

""I have consistently communicated my belief in the importance of deleveraging. I've been transparent about our attention to take the debt down to 0... I'm excited for the day when we can announce that our debt has been paid off." — CEO Stetson, May 5, 2022"

"In this illustration, we assume the JV takes on initial leverage of 5.8x net debt / EBITDA, or $6.9 billion(1), which enables Macy’s to repay debt at the parent-level in order to achieve a target leverage ratio of 3.5x Adjusted Debt / EBITDAR at the OpCo."

"Allied recorded its $20 million debt investment in Startec Global Communications at cost throughout 2001 and even increased its investment in the company in June 2001 by an additional $15 million despite significant evidence that Startec was failing."