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Callouts & quotes from 2,037+ activist slides

Every emphasised callout and every pulled quote, extracted slide-by-slide. Search by keyword, filter by slide type or by source.

Showing 601–660 of 2,037 matching "board"
callout demand list

"By supporting the Nominees for ADP’s Transformation you will: Elect a major shareholder to the Board, Add two new independent directors with fresh perspectives and relevant expertise, Send a message to ADP’s management and Board that the status quo is unacceptable"

callout nominee bio

"We believe that Ms. Giesselman’s significant leadership experience as a specialty chemicals industry and her expertise in growth strategies and innovation, as well as her service on a number of public company boards would make her a valuable addition to the Board."

GCP Applied Technologies · GCP Starboard Value · p. 114
callout demand list

"We look to management and BHP’s Board to work positively and constructively towards achieving unification, and as a result greatly enhanced future capital returns, as an important part of its self-professed commitment to BHP’s “value-driven simplification journey”"

BHP Billiton · BHP Elliott Management · p. 34
quote ceo quote

"The founders will be staying and growing that business with us, and we're just super excited to work with them....So we have board-certified pathologists on the Lacuna team, and they're really the heart and soul of the business. — JPMorgan Conference, January 2021"

Heska Corporation · HSKA Spruce Point Capital · p. 78
callout demand list

"To maximize the value of Dye & Durham, the Board needs to incentivize management to optimize its return on invested capital, focus on organic growth and consider acquisitions in a measured and disciplined way – instead of trying to hit an arbitrary EBITDA target."

Dye & Durham Limited · DND Engine Capital · p. 2
callout ceo quote

"We believe the Red Lobster Sale, combined with management and the Board’s poor capital allocation, excessive corporate spending, and lack of focus on restaurant operations, has already threatened the sustainability of Darden’s investment grade rating and dividend"

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 273
callout ceo quote

"We believe the Red Lobster Sale, combined with management and the Board’s poor capital allocation, excessive corporate spending, and lack of focus on restaurant operations, has already threatened the sustainability of Darden’s investment grade rating and dividend"

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 273
quote villain critique

"“Bristol-Myers management was “aware that this class patent could be a roadblock to ozanimod commercialization,” yet has continued to promote the product’s blockbuster potential to shareholders, even going as far as to call ozanimod “de-risked”” — Starboard Value"

Bristol-Myers Squibb · BMY Starboard Value · p. 110
quote nominee bio

"I am honored to have been selected and am looking forward to working with Invesco’s Board of Directors and leadership team. I believe there is great opportunity to build on the momentum Invesco has created and am excited to help continue that success. — Mr. Finke"

Invesco Ltd. · IVZ Trian Partners · p. 2
callout process diagram

"Although operationally we believe SRG could be spun off in approximately 6 months, as discussed in Section XI, we would recommend a more conservative approach, with management and the Board focusing first on the operational turnaround and real estate separation."

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 235
callout process diagram

"Although operationally we believe SRG could be spun off in approximately 6 months, as discussed in Section XI, we would recommend a more conservative approach, with management and the Board focusing first on the operational turnaround and real estate separation."

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 235
callout timeline

"For over three years Bluebell Capital Partners (“BCP”) sought a constructive dialogue with BlackRock’s (“BLK”) Board. As the Board refused to engage, we were left with no alternative but to directly address BlackRock's shareholders to request governance changes."

BlackRock, Inc. · BLK Bluebell Capital · p. 7
callout executive summary

"Trian Consumer Investments where Nelson Peltz served on the Board have: 1) Grown earnings per share (“EPS”) +780 basis points (“bps”) faster than the S&P 500 annually; and 2) Achieved total shareholder returns (“TSR”) of +880bps greater than the S&P 500 annually"

callout timeline

"Disney’s Board decided to spend an estimated $40 million of shareholder money engaging in a proxy contest, while 11 out of 12 Directors have not even met Nelson Peltz or Jay Rasulo in-person during Trian’s engagement with the Company in the past year and a half."

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 76
callout timeline

"For over three years Bluebell Capital Partners (“BCP”) sought a constructive dialogue with BlackRock’s (“BLK”) Board. As the Board refused to engage, we were left with no alternative but to directly address BlackRock’s shareholders to request governance changes."

BlackRock · BLK Bluebell Capital · p. 7
callout ceo quote

"Spruce Point believes investors should be outraged that management is receiving “off cycle” RSU grants to “retain” management. Is something going wrong at Stryker that the Board is helping to conceal from investors such that management needs inducements to stay?"

Stryker Corp. · SYK Spruce Point Capital · p. 171
quote villain critique

"The evidence we have seen raises concerns regarding the manner in which costs were allocated between those two entities, and the consistency of that allocation with public disclosures. — SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC."

Xylem Inc. · XYL Spruce Point Capital · p. 72
callout villain critique

"These charts represent the aggregate results of a pattern that has been formed over more than a decade – a period during which the current management team and Board consistently and repeatedly sold stock, often at prices well below where the stock trades today."

callout before after

"We believe that a key role of an independent board is to bring an outside perspective to challenge strategies that might have worked in the past but will likely need to evolve over time – contrary to Target’s board’s apparent instinct to maintain the status quo"

Target Corporation · TGT Pershing Square · p. 30
callout demand list

"We firmly believe that a comprehensive reconstitution of the Board, including the appointment of shareholder representatives and qualified independent directors, is necessary to ensure a thorough evaluation of all paths to delivering enhanced shareholder value."

Parkland Corporation · PKI Engine Capital · p. 3
callout demand list

"a vote for Trian’s nominees is a vote for four highly qualified individuals who will seek to work collaboratively with the Board to: Assess the corporate structure and determine whether management is capable of achieving best-in-class revenue growth and margins"

callout other

"If the (2) Preliminary Alternative Plan was “prepared to illustrate to the Forescout board the degree of variability” in Forescout’s sales pipeline and future expenses, why was it not provided to prospective buyers alongside the more optimistic (1) Target Plan?"

Forescout Technologies · FSCT Spruce Point Capital · p. 30
callout timeline

"Disney’s Board decided to spend an estimated $40 million of shareholder money engaging in a proxy contest, while 11 out of 12 Directors have not even met Nelson Peltz or Jay Rasulo in-person during Trian’s engagement with the Company in the past year and a half"

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 76
quote nominee bio

"There needs to be real tight connection between the commercial organization and the refining organization...that's something that Phillips 66 seems to have taken their eye off the ball on. — Brian Coffman, Former CEO of Motiva Enterprises, Elliott Board Nominee"

Phillips 66 · PSX Elliott Management · p. 5
quote villain critique

"It is unacceptable that the current Board was not made aware of the contract termination when it took place. We are taking immediate and appropriate measures to ensure that this type of communication breakdown is not repeated. — Dalton Gooding, Quintis Chairman"

Quintis Limited · QIN Viceroy Research · p. 29
callout villain critique

"Vivendi opportunistically used the 19 member cap in TIM's by-laws to allow its executives onto the Board, although a majority of other investors voted against this as well as objecting to using TIM's funds to pay for compensation for these additional directors"

Telecom Italia SpA (TIM) · TIT.MI Elliott Management · p. 19
callout ceo quote

"Rather than recommending a premium sale to Private Equity, allowing all shareholders to benefit, Schoen and the Board (7 of whom are currently members of the 8 independent directors today), recommended a defensive tactic in the form of a $10 per share dividend"

callout ceo quote

"The independent directors of DuPont, who own very little stock (collectively ~$20mm in shares(1)), have repeatedly failed to hold management accountable for missing its publicly stated financial targets; it is time for an "ownership mentality" in the Boardroom"

quote demand list

"I have very fond memories of Phillips 66. You know, that's where a lot of my growth and development has occurred. Had tremendous mentors...a lot of excellent employees. — Brian Coffman, former CEO, Motiva, Elliott nominee for Phillips 66's board, April 8, 2025"

Phillips 66 · PSX Elliott Management · p. 19
callout other

"Independent proxy advisor Glass Lewis, citing Phillips 66’s (NYSE: PSX) underperformance and poor governance, recommends that shareholders support Elliott’s case for urgent change by voting for board nominees Brian Coffman, Sigmund Cornelius and Michael Heim."

Phillips 66 · PSX Carl Icahn · p. 25
callout timeline

"Over the past 11 months, we have attempted to engage privately, many times, with the Board to improve the Company's strategy, governance and capital allocation – but our efforts to work collaboratively have been met with obstruction and threats of litigation"

Dye & Durham Limited · DND Engine Capital · p. 7
callout executive summary

"In the decade ending 2012, HMA, under the direction and guidance of substantially all of the sitting Board, delivered <1% total shareholder value while investors in the Hospital Group and the S&P garnered an 39% and 99% total shareholder return, respectively"

quote ceo quote

""The success of a currency board arrangement, and its acceptability to local people and businesses, depend to a considerable extent on the anchor currency being reasonably stable." — Tony Latter, Former HKMA deputy chief executive and co-architect of the peg"

quote villain critique

"My decision to resign follows a protracted campaign by a majority of the Board, controlled by and acting under the direction of Oracle Partners (Oracle) (BIOLASE's largest stockholder) and Larry N. Feinberg (Oracle's Managing Partner) — Former CEO of Biolase"

Accelerate Diagnostics · AXDX White Diamond Research · p. 37
callout executive summary

"Campbell's incumbent Board of Directors ("Board") has overseen a series of strategic and operational blunders over many years that have driven extreme underperformance in Campbell shares (19% total shareholder return vs. 306% for S&P 500 over last 20 years)"

Campbell Soup Company · CPB Third Point · p. 6
callout villain critique

"The TICO Board and SC ultimately capitulated by recommending a Revised TOB price of ¥18,800 per share - only ¥200 / +1% more than the price that, just days before, they considered wholly insufficient and had "significantly deviate[d]" from their expectation"

Toyota Industries Corporation · 6201 Elliott Management · p. 22
callout villain critique

"Disney has a much better “hand to play” than its peers to weather any disruption... but Disney's response to a changing landscape was ill-conceived and reactive... in large part because the Board disincentivized management to act – paid execs $1bn since ‘13"

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 14
callout ceo quote

"The fact that Bob Chapek was abruptly fired five months after the Board unanimously agreed to extend his contract by three years suggests the Board lacks a robust CEO succession process and completely misread the state of Disney’s & Bob Chapek’s performance"

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 27
callout villain critique

"The Board's actions to freeze-out and isolate the two independent and highly respected industry executives elected last year is highly concerning and demonstrates a Board that is entrenched and not interested in hearing or considering independent viewpoints"

DSP Group, Inc. · DSPG Starboard Value · p. 25
quote ceo quote

"“Hess has an interesting set of assets that have not yielded competitive shareholder returns over time. And they ought to. Working with the Board to refocus Hess in order to deliver returns to shareholders represents an exciting opportunity.” — Harvey Golub"

Hess Corporation · HES Elliott Management · p. 119
quote villain critique

""This is a decade-long drama that the board has let unfold," said George F. Colony, chief executive of Forrester Research. "They have shown some dysfunction in the past, and had difficulty coming to consensus." — Ouster of Hewlett-Packard C.E.O. Is Expected"

Arconic Inc. · ARNC Elliott Management · p. 104
quote villain critique

"“Iger has systematically eliminated any executive who could become a successor. To me it’s a real black mark on Iger’s record.” — Gary Wilson, Former CFO of Disney and Director (on Board for 21 years, up to and including the first hiring of Mr. Iger as CEO)"

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 63
quote villain critique

""Iger has systematically eliminated any executive who could become a successor. To me it’s a real black mark on Iger’s record." – Gary Wilson, Former CFO of Disney and Director (on Board for 21 years, up to and including the first hiring of Mr. Iger as CEO)"

The Walt Disney Company · DIS Trian Partners · p. 63
callout demand list

"The cumulative damage to shareholders’ interests must now be stopped and the BEA board needs to finally focus on delivering proper value for BEA shareholders, by conducting an auction process to explore the scope for a sale of BEA at an appropriate premium"

Bank of East Asia, Limited · 0023.HK Elliott Management · p. 4
callout demand list

"The Board of Directors shall establish and publish a capital allocation plan (hereinafter, the “Plan”) by 31st December 2024 to facilitate a growth-oriented investment strategy and a balanced return to shareholders to enhance the Company’s corporate value."

quote appendix disclosure

"“Starboard's average return on a 13D filing is 26.4% (versus an average of 9.7% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 34.5% versus 14.8% for the S&P500.” — 13D Monitor"

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 4
quote villain critique

"“...we and our subsidiary bank received a proposed consent order from the Federal Reserve Board relating principally to various aspects of compliance risk management, including consumer compliance and compliance with AML regulations.” — Green Dot 2023 10-K"

Intuit Inc. · INTU Spruce Point Capital · p. 21
callout demand list

"Given an expanded board it is necessary to raise the cap to accommodate the salaries for new external directors on a proportional basis, Oasis is therefore seeking to expand the current pay structure in line with an expanded board on a proportional basis."

Kao Corporation · 4452.JP Oasis Management · p. 107
callout nominee bio

"Ms. Lin’s significant leadership experience as a senior executive in both the hybrid chemicals and broader industrials industries, coupled with her considerable experience serving on public company boards, would make her a valuable addition to the Board."

Huntsman Corporation · HUN Starboard Value · p. 74
callout nominee bio

"Ms. Lin’s significant leadership experience as a senior executive in both the hybrid chemicals and broader industrials industries, coupled with her considerable experience serving on public company boards, would make her a valuable addition to the Board."

Huntsman Corporation · HUN Starboard Value · p. 166
callout cover

"Even more concerning, it appears that the Board chose to withhold material information from shareholders ahead of the nomination deadline in order to preserve the status quo and insulate the incumbent directors from a potential challenge by shareholders."

Autodesk, Inc. · ADSK Starboard Value · p. 1
callout villain critique

"While we were satisfied that FMCN was double-counting the LCD 2.0 Digital Picture Screens to make its reported LCD network screen count, we had not caught FMCN's admission that it needed to count over 30,500 cardboard posters in order to make its number."

Focus Media Holding · FMCN Muddy Waters · p. 8
quote other

"Starboard's average return on a 13D filing is 26.4% (versus an average of 9.7% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 34.5% versus 14.8% for the S&P500. — 13D Monitor"

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 4
quote other

"Starboard's average return on a 13D filing is 28.9% (versus an average of 8.8% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 34.3% versus 13.1% for the S&P500. — 13D Monitor"

Darden Restaurants, Inc. · DRI Starboard Value · p. 4
callout villain critique

"This level of Board change without meaningful improvement for shareholders means something deeper is wrong. Shareholders should not be fooled into believing that additional Board refreshment under Mr. Proud's watch will result in a corporate turnaround."

Dye & Durham Limited · DND Engine Capital · p. 33
callout demand list

"It is time for shareholder voices to be heard that the status quo is no longer tolerable by electing two highly – qualified directors – Charles Elson and Jonathan Litt – to the Taubman Board at the Company's upcoming 2017 Annual Meeting of Shareholders."

Taubman Centers, Inc. · TCO Land & Buildings · p. 2
callout peer gap

"Prior to Starboard's first public letter to the Company on December 21, 2011, AOL's stock price had materially underperformed both the broader equity markets and its Peer Groups over almost any measurement period since its spin-off from Time Warner Inc."

AOL, Inc. · AOL Starboard Value · p. 7
quote other

"Starboard’s average return on a 13D filing is 22.2% (versus an average of 5.0% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 27.8% versus 8.4% for the S&P500. — 13D Monitor"

Office Depot, Inc. · ODP Starboard Value · p. 2
quote other

"Starboard's average return on a 13D filing is 22.2% (versus an average of 5.0% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 27.8% versus 8.4% for the S&P500. — 13D Monitor"

Tessera Technologies Inc. · TSRA Starboard Value · p. 2
quote appendix disclosure

"Starboard’s average return on a 13D filing is 22.3% (versus an average of 2.9% for the S&P500 during the same time periods). However, when they have received a board seat, their average 13D return has been 31.6% versus 1.5% for the S&P500. — 13D Monitor"

AOL, Inc. · AOL Starboard Value · p. 2