571 documents showing 541–571
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters GMCR
GMCR's $9 EPS bull case ignores a smaller TAM, falling K-cup attachment rates, a September 2012 patent cliff, and accounting shenanigans at fulfillment agent MBlock — realistic EPS is ~$3.50.
N5
V2
C2
⌂
◫
”
⇌
⚑
Yahoo! Inc. YHOO
Yahoo's Asian assets and cash alone cover its $14 price; with a new board and unlocked 40% Alibaba stake, intrinsic value is $20-32 per share — 40-122% upside.
N4
V3
C3
⌂
◫
⚑
The St. Joe Company JOE
St. Joe's Florida real estate empire is a value trap: developments are ghost towns, the airport catalyst is a bust, and the land is worth $7-10/share, not $24.54.
N5
V3
C3
◫
”
⇌
⚑
US/Japan Sovereign Debt & Fiat Currencies (Macro)
Bernanke and Geithner's short-termism has institutionalized too-big-to-fail and will debase fiat currencies — hedge with gold and long-dated options on higher US and Japanese rates.
N5
V1
C1
”
⚑
Date
Fund
Target
Thesis
Scores
Nov 21, 2011
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding Ltd.
FMCN
Focus Media is the Olympus of China: it inflates its LCD screen count by 50%, systematically overpays for acquisitions it writes off, and enriches insiders at shareholders' expense.
N5
V2
Oct 17, 2011
Greenlight Capital
Green Mountain Coffee Roasters
GMCR
GMCR's $9 EPS bull case ignores a smaller TAM, falling K-cup attachment rates, a September 2012 patent cliff, and accounting shenanigans at fulfillment agent MBlock — realistic EPS is ~$3.50.
N5
V2
Sep 14, 2011
Third Point
Yahoo! Inc.
YHOO
Yahoo's Asian assets and cash alone cover its $14 price; with a new board and unlocked 40% Alibaba stake, intrinsic value is $20-32 per share — 40-122% upside.
N4
V3
Jun 28, 2011
Muddy Waters
Spreadtrum Communications
SPRD
Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.
N4
V1
Jun 20, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
Sino-Forest claims Huaihua Yuda is unrelated, but Muddy Waters shows Sonic Jita was once owned by TRE executives and still shares a key executive — undisclosed related-party transactions contradicting CEO Allen Chan's guarantees.
N4
V1
Jun 13, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
TRE management's evasive Q1 call answers — unfinished E&Y review, undisclosed related parties, an unnecessary AI model, and dropped analyst questions — reinforce Muddy Waters' fraud thesis on Sino-Forest.
N3
V1
Jun 02, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
Sino-Forest is a fraud: its Authorized Intermediary structure fabricates timber revenue, its Yunnan holdings are overstated by ~$900M, and equity is worth less than $1 vs. $18.21.
N5
V2
Apr 04, 2011
Muddy Waters
Duoyuan Global Water Inc.
DGW
DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.
N5
V2
Mar 09, 2011
Elliott Management
Iron Mountain Incorporated
IRM
Iron Mountain's 44%-margin NOAM storage cash cow is being squandered on low-ROIC Digital and Int'l bets; capital discipline plus a REIT conversion can lift the stock from $25 to $52-$77.
N4
V3
Mar 02, 2011
Muddy Waters
China MediaExpress Holdings
CCME
CCME is a fraud: a recorded salesperson admits doubling the bus count for SEC filings, and Chairman Cheng's rebuttal cited fabricated license plates — fair value $3.54 vs $12.27.
N4
V2
Nov 10, 2010
Muddy Waters
RINO International Corp.
RINO
RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.
N5
V2
Oct 13, 2010
Greenlight Capital
The St. Joe Company
JOE
St. Joe's Florida real estate empire is a value trap: developments are ghost towns, the airport catalyst is a bust, and the land is worth $7-10/share, not $24.54.
N5
V3
Jul 22, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
AMEX-listed Orient Paper is a Chinese reverse-merger fraud: tax records, shell-company suppliers, and customer interviews show revenues and profits are fabricated by orders of magnitude.
N4
V1
Jul 06, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.
N4
V1
Jul 02, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper Inc.
ONP
Muddy Waters stands by its ONP fraud thesis: the Baoding factory is incapable of producing reported output, and the 'rejected $300K research fee' vendetta narrative is fabricated.
N4
V1
Jul 01, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
Muddy Waters reaffirms ONP is a fraud: SAIC-filed PRC financials, impossible equipment claims, and bogus acquisitions contradict ONP's SEC filings; Strong Sell.
N4
V1
Jun 28, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper Inc.
ONP
Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.
N5
V2
Oct 19, 2009
Greenlight Capital
US/Japan Sovereign Debt & Fiat Currencies (Macro)
Bernanke and Geithner's short-termism has institutionalized too-big-to-fail and will debase fiat currencies — hedge with gold and long-dated options on higher US and Japanese rates.
N5
V1
Oct 06, 2009
Pershing Square
Realty Income Corporation
O
Realty Income trades at a 7.3% cap rate — a ~40% premium to 10-11% private-market rates for the same junk-credit retail properties; downside to ~$14 (-46%).
N5
V3
May 11, 2009
Pershing Square
Target Corporation
TGT
Target's insular board lacks CEO-level retail, credit-card, and real-estate expertise — replace four incumbents with Pershing's slate to close the 62-point performance gap versus Wal-Mart.
N4
V3
May 21, 2008
Greenlight Capital
Lehman Brothers
LEH
Lehman's $489M 1Q08 profit is accounting ingenuity — hidden CDOs, an unexplained $1.1bn Level 3 swing, and a fabricated KSK mark-up; it must recapitalize now.
N5
V2
May 21, 2008
Greenlight Capital
Lehman Brothers
LEH
Lehman is using fair-value accounting tricks to hide CDO losses and inflate Level 3 marks; the firm is over-levered, opaque, and needs to recapitalize before the Fed has to step in.
N5
V2
Feb 01, 2006
Carl Icahn
Time Warner Inc.
TWX
Time Warner has underperformed its peer index by 51% under Parsons; splitting into four SpinCos (AOL, Content, Publishing, Cable) plus a $20bn buyback unlocks $30-45bn — a 35-54% premium.
N5
V4
Jun 17, 2002
Greenlight Capital
Allied Capital
ALD
Greenlight argues Allied Capital overstates NAV by mismarking illiquid BDC loans and funds its dividend with non-cash PIK income and fees from Enron-Raptor-style controlled subsidiaries.
N5
V1
—
White Diamond Research
GreenPower Motor Company
GP
GreenPower imports Chinese Eurise minibuses, re-decals them as 'EV Stars,' and survives only on California subsidies — fair value ~$1.54/share vs. declining revenues and 92% customer concentration.
N3
V1
—
White Diamond Research
ADOMANI
ADOM
ADOMANI is an electric-drivetrain reseller founded by convicted felons with zero 2017 revenues against a $69M forecast, yet trading at a $500M cap — White Diamond sees 90%+ downside.
N4
V1
—
Viceroy Research
Quintis Limited
QIN
Quintis is a Ponzi-like Australian sandalwood MIS where bogus sales channels, CEO cash-skimming via Arwon Finance, and conflicted experts mask fraud — equity worth $0.00.
N4
V2
—
Engine Capital
Parkland Corporation
PKI
Parkland's board is running a sham strategic review to entrench itself; Engine demands a shareholder-driven board reconstitution before the 2025 Annual Meeting to unlock real value.
N3
V1
—
Engine Capital
Lyft
LYFT
Lyft's entrenched, inexperienced board tolerates a dual-class structure, staggered seats and unoptimized balance sheet; replacing two directors unlocks governance reform and a $750mm ASR.
N3
V1
—
Oasis Management
Kao Corporation
4452.JP
Kao, a 'sleeping giant' of premium FMCG brands hamstrung by a management allergic to growth, should refocus globally and rebuild the board, unlocking 76-97% upside.
N5
V4
—
Trian Partners
The Walt Disney Company
DIS
Disney has lost its way and underperformed peers; replacing two long-tenured directors with Nelson Peltz and former Disney CFO Jay Rasulo will restore accountability and shareholder returns.
N3
V3