Callouts & quotes from 294+ activist slides

"Q3 2008 call: “What we keep seeing from operators is one, great interest; two discussing details of the projects; three, discussions between operators and OEMers about joint projects for the next year.” — DSP Group Management; Q4 2008 call: “This year's Consumer Electronic Show was an important event for DSP Group during which our XpandR product line received a clear vote of confidence and proof from the marketplace that the strategic decisions and investments we previously made were right.” — DSP Group Management; Q1 2009 call: “I can say that we shall begin deliveries and we shall begin to see revenues in the fourth quarter...we had increased tractions with customers and we are basically building on this momentum and working together with these customers in order to a) get these designs into production. But as Eli said, we will start seeing revenues coming in the fourth quarter and I would say most of these designs will -- can really mature into -- will mature into products into next year.” — DSP Group Management; Q2 2009 call: “we are still on track, so we do expect to see some revenues towards the end of the fourth quarter of this year. But as we said also in the previous call, most of these design wins will mature into revenues in 2010. But as we said, some production and revenues are expected in the fourth quarter.” — DSP Group Management; Q1 2010 call: “Now your second question was a more color on the new product line, meaning the XpandR multimedia. And as we said in the previous conference call following CS, we're seeing a lot of interest in the product...we believe that this products will gain traction in the second half and towards next year..” — DSP Group Management; Q4 2010 call: “What I can tell you is that we feel very good about the traction that we get for instance with the multimedia handsets that we showed that are several and new designs with new brands that will be launched from the beginning of 2011.” — DSP Group Management"

"“We find it odd management believes value can be created by separating the business into two mature companies... We think one of the most interesting statements in the Darden release was the following one: ‘A spin-off will also allow us to target our efforts and investments on value creation opportunities that may be material to a stand-alone Red Lobster but not to Darden overall.’ Management did not elaborate on this value-creation opportunity during the conference call, but we believe monetizing the real estate Red Lobster owns may be impactful for shareholders.” — KeyBanc, December 20, 2013; “On the day Darden’s strategic plan was announced, the stock closed down 4% to $51. This didn’t exactly strike us as a vote of confidence in management’s plan to create value. Two days later, Starboard Value announced a 5.5% position in the company and the stock rallied 6%. For the most part, the stock has traded sideways since then, until rallying 3% on the news that Starboard retained former Olive Garden president Brad Blum to serve as an advisor in its battle against Darden. The takeaway from stock action and, in our opinion, sentiment since 12/20/13 is the stock rallies when there is movement toward replacing management and sells off when management publicly digs their heels in.” — Hedgeye, February 24, 2014; “Moving forward with Red Lobster sale or spin. Unless the separation helps drive a significant improvement in operating results, we don’t envision this being very accretive to valuation. Mgmt has previously stated standalone RL will do mid-to high single-digit EBIT growth, a target that appears aggressive.” — Oppenheimer, March 3, 2014"

"Several new charter and bylaw provisions were implemented at the time of the company's IPO on Jan. 23, 2015, which fall short of what many investors would consider best governance practice. These provisions include a vote requirement of 80 percent of the outstanding shares to amend certain provisions of the charter and/or bylaws; a classified board structure; no special meeting right; and no right to act by written consent... In this case, the company first disclosed the amendments to the charter and bylaws it intended to put in place at the IPO in a draft registration/Form S-1A statement filed on Jan. 6, 2015 (less than one month before the IPO). — ISS 2016 Report; The Company's governance structure includes several provisions that significantly limit the rights of outside Class A shareholders... The combined effect of these provisions will be to severely limit the ability of shareholders to effect change at the Company or to realize a takeover premium....As the board has not provided its public shareholders with an ability to ratify any portion of this troubling governance structure, we recommend that the Class A holders signal their disapproval of these excessive restraints by abstaining from the lone member of the governance committee currently standing for election, Ms. Evan. — Glass Lewis 2015 Report"

""ISS recently adopted a policy regarding so-called "unilateral" bylaw or charter amendments -- provisions adopted without public stockholder approval. Under this policy, beginning in 2015, it will generally recommend withholding votes from or voting against directors who, without putting the provision to a stockholder vote, approved bylaw or charter provisions that have the effect of restricting stockholder rights." — "Governance Issues in Spin-Off Transactions" published by Gibson Dunn on 2/5/15; "Glass Lewis ordinarily gives new public companies a one-year grace period to allow them time to comply with applicable regulatory requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. However, if the company implements an anti-takeover measure such as a rights plan or a classified board before its initial public offering, without offering a sunset for the rights plan of three years or less or a ‘sound rationale,’ and the measure is not subsequently put to a stockholder vote, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against all members of the board who served at the time the measure was adopted." — "Governance Issues in Spin-Off Transactions" published by Gibson Dunn on 2/5/15"

"Vote AGAINST approval of dividend if PBR below 1x, ROE ranking in the bottom 50 percentile in TOPIX, and "dividend ratio below 30%" — SuMi TRUST Proxy Voting Policy. If a company's total shareholder return ratios were less than 30% and ROEs were below 8% for three consecutive years (excluding net loss-making companies), we would regard it as underpaying dividends. — Asset Management One Guidelines for Exercising Voting Rights (Japanese Equities). For Japanese issuers, we are generally supportive of dividend payouts that constitute 30 percent or more of net income — STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS Global Proxy Voting and Engagement Policy. We will object if the following criteria apply (...) Dividend payout ratio is less than 25% and return on capital is below the market average for a long period of time (ROE is below the median of listed companies for the last three consecutive fiscal years) — NISSAY ASSET MANAGEMENT 2025 Policy and Criteria for Exercising Voting Rights in Japan."

"My perception is that the general feeling is it's great when it works. You can really use it to generate some very unique data. It's essentially in our hands. We use it to generate data we can't generate any other way. But it might take us a year to get there, which is not something that other groups have the luxury of, certainly in pharma, they don't have the time or the money to be devoted to that kind of thing. So, this idea that it works great for very specific niche applications, I think, is very true. But, that level of frustration that people feel when they first get it, and it doesn't work in their hands—I think it's very real, and I can certainly understand why there would be customers who would send it back because can you imagine after three years, six months with this instrument that you've paid $2 million for, and you still can't get it to work? At that point, it's like, "What are we doing?" — Leading academic institution/ex-BLI scientist"

""Based on the preliminary report of Inspector of Elections, stockholders voted to adopt the merger agreement and voted to approve the compensation that will or may become payable to Forescout -- by Forescout to its named executive officers. The Inspector of Elections will execute a certificate as to the results of the voting, and that certificate will be filed with the minutes of this meeting. As we have sufficient votes to approve the adoption of the merger agreement, the proposal of the proxy to adjourn this meeting to a later date to solicit additional proxies is rendered moot, and will not be presented for a vote. The final tabulation of these votes will appear in the Form 8-K to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We currently expect the merger to be consummated on or around May 18, 2020, after buyer's remarketing period ends." — Darren Milliken, General Counsel – Forescout Technologies"

"Based on the preliminary report of Inspector of Elections, stockholders voted to adopt the merger agreement and voted to approve the compensation that will or may become payable to Forescout -- by Forescout to its named executive officers. The Inspector of Elections will execute a certificate as to the results of the voting, and that certificate will be filed with the minutes of this meeting. As we have sufficient votes to approve the adoption of the merger agreement, the proposal of the proxy to adjourn this meeting to a later date to solicit additional proxies is rendered moot, and will not be presented for a vote. The final tabulation of these votes will appear in the Form 8-K to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We currently expect the merger to be consummated on or around May 18, 2020, after buyer's remarketing period ends. — Darren Milliken, General Counsel – Forescout Technologies"

""The U.S. Federal Trade Commission voted to approve the transaction on November 3, 2020, and the UK Competition and Markets Authority approved the transaction earlier today. In connection with obtaining the required regulatory approvals for the transaction, as previously announced, Stryker has agreed to divest its STAR ankle replacement product and related assets and finger joint replacement products." — Stryker Press Release, Nov 4, 2020. "Page 12 introduces one of the acquisitions that we completed in the fourth quarter. We acquired the STAR ankle business from Stryker" — Colfax JPM Conf, Jan 14, 2021. "(FDA) is advising patients, caregivers, and health care providers about the higher than expected risk of the polyethylene (plastic) component of the device breaking (fracture), as early as three to four years after implantation in all Scandinavian Total Ankle Replacement devices" — FDA, March 15, 2021."

"“In 2002, The New York Times published an article about Matthew DiFrisco, an analyst who downgraded Darden's stock to ‘neutral’ from ‘outperform.’ Following the downgrade, Darden's investor relations officer Matthew Stroud canceled a marketing trip with DiFrisco's clients, telling him that he needed to have an ‘outperform’ rating to enjoy such a privilege.” — The New York Times. “Some investors are protesting that Darden's idea of ‘direct engagement’ amounts to returning the phone calls of analysts and investors who agree with its strategy while ignoring calls from dissenters. ‘They've got a history of only engaging with investors and analysts who are supportive of their views,’ said one Darden shareholder, who declined to give his name for fear of retribution from the company. ‘If the board is so convinced [a Red Lobster spinoff] is such a great idea, then put it to a vote.’” — New York Post"

""In 2002, The New York Times published an article about Matthew DiFrisco, an analyst who downgraded Darden's stock to 'neutral' from 'outperform.' Following the downgrade, Darden's investor relations officer Matthew Stroud canceled a marketing trip with DiFrisco's clients, telling him that he needed to have an 'outperform' rating to enjoy such a privilege." — The New York Times. "Some investors are protesting that Darden's idea of 'direct engagement' amounts to returning the phone calls of analysts and investors who agree with its strategy while ignoring calls from dissenters. 'They've got a history of only engaging with investors and analysts who are supportive of their views,' said one Darden shareholder, who declined to give his name for fear of retribution from the company. 'If the board is so convinced [a Red Lobster spinoff] is such a great idea, then put it to a vote.'" — New York Post"

"This transaction is troubling from a governance perspective, brings significant additional risks around the balance sheet, integration and channel conflict, and highlights the challenges in FWRD's core business model. — Stephens. [The approximately 40% share price] decline puts significant execution pressure on the company just to recoup such losses, never mind demonstrating that the deal was a risk worth taking in the first place. But it is the questionable governance of the transaction that stands to place FWRD squarely in the sights of activists. — ISS. [W]e believe the rejection of FWRD shares in recent days is more about the board's tactics of exhausting the company's considerable dry powder to bet its future on an asset-light diversification and customer acquisition play, while not offering existing shareholders a voice or vote on the matter before the deal closes. — Susquehanna (SIG)."

"“No. You can get it from other companies... There’s nothing we can’t do easily—it would be a similar process, a similar approach, similar synthesizing. DNA is like traditional chemistry, just typical DNA synthesis method using phosphoramidite. So, there is no advantage.” — Former Twist employee, director-level. “They’ve certainly positioned themselves as a commodity provider. They certainly have positioned themselves as maybe not quite McDonald’s. They’re like an In and Out Burger, maybe.” — IDT ex-regional sales manager, left recently. “Twist is for their very low-priority screening projects to where they don’t have the ability to devote their internal resources.” — IDT ex-regional sales manager, left recently."

""We believe board independence is essential to good corporate governance. In addition to having a board's majority made up of independent members, we generally prefer an independent board chair" — Capital Group. "Northern Trust generally leaves the choice of chairman to the board's discretion... However, Northern Trust will vote case by case on whether to support shareholder resolutions seeking the separation of chairman and CEO" — Northern Trust. "MFS believes boards should include some form of independent leadership responsible for amplifying the views of independent directors and setting meeting agendas, and this is often best positioned as an independent chair of the board" — MFS."

""It will be interesting over the six to nine months to see how the software responds to the scale that Meta wants and that Pure is talking about because it's never been run at a fraction of the scale they're talking about. Pure doesn't know what's gonna happen when it reaches that scale. [It] would concern me that I have this customer consuming my software at a scale that none of my other customers do...that I now need to devote significant engineering time to serve that. And I'm going to be coming up with code that is not relevant to 99% of my customer base. At what point do I become beholden to Meta for my engineering path because of this deal?" — CTO at storage system competitor"

""French billionaire Vincent Bolloré treats publicly listed Vivendi like a family hedge fund... The 30 billion-euro conglomerate has subpar corporate governance: Bolloré single-handedly calls the shots... Bolloré's Vivendi fortress would be almost impregnable if he has nearly two-fifths of the vote." — Liam Proud, Reuters, February 15, 2019; "Bolloré using VIV's balance sheet to increase his stake/share of UMG's upside. In our view, investors should reject the OPRA... We believe Bollore is effectively getting creeping control for a very small premium... Rather it is Bolloré exploiting Vivendi's discount to his (and our) fair value." — JP Morgan, February 15, 2019"

""We believe that having an independent chair is the preferred structure for board leadership. Having an independent chair avoids the inherent conflict of self-oversight and helps ensure robust debate and diversity of thought in the boardroom." — Wellington; "The roles of chair and CEO are substantially different, requiring distinctly different skills and experience. Therefore, LGIM expects the two roles to be separated." — Legal & General; "Harris has an existing guideline that states that we will normally vote in favor of proposals requiring the separation of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer positions" — Harris Associates."

""We believe that having an independent chair is the preferred structure for board leadership. Having an independent chair avoids the inherent conflict of self-oversight and helps ensure robust debate and diversity of thought in the boardroom." — Wellington; "The roles of chair and CEO are substantially different, requiring distinctly different skills and experience. Therefore, LGIM expects the two roles to be separated." — Legal & General; "Harris has an existing guideline that states that we will normally vote in favor of proposals requiring the separation of the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer positions" — Harris Associates"

"Rubicon: "Our advertising spend, revenue, cash flow from operations, Adjusted EBITDA, operating results, and other key operating and financial measures may vary from quarter to quarter due to the seasonal nature of buyer spending. For example, many buyers devote a disproportionate amount of their advertising budgets to the fourth quarter of the calendar year to coincide with increased holiday purchasing." — Rubicon 10-K, p.14; Telaria: "During the first quarter, advertisers generally devote less of their budgets to ad spending, with the fourth quarter generally representing the largest quarter of ad spending." — Telaria 10-K, p.21"

""We believe board independence is essential to good corporate governance. In addition to having a board's majority made up of independent members, we generally prefer an independent board chair" — Capital Group. "Northern Trust generally leaves the choice of chairman to the board's discretion... Northern Trust will vote case by case on whether to support shareholder resolutions seeking the separation of chairman and CEO" — Northern Trust. "MFS believes boards should include some form of independent leadership responsible for amplifying the views of independent directors and setting meeting agendas" — MFS."

"“CSIM believes that the board is typically best positioned to determine its leadership structure. Therefore, CSIM will typically not support proposals requiring the separation of these roles unless certain circumstances are in place.” — Charles Schwab Investment Management. “We will generally vote for proposals looking to separate the CEO and Chairman roles unless the company has governance structures in place that can satisfactorily counterbalance a combined chairman and CEO/ president post.” — JP Morgan Asset Management."

"“Some investors are protesting that Darden’s idea of ‘direct engagement’ amounts to returning the phone calls of analysts and investors who agree with its strategy while ignoring calls from dissenters. ‘They’ve got a history of only engaging with investors and analysts who are supportive of their views,’ said one Darden shareholder, who declined to give his name for fear of retribution from the company. ‘If the board is so convinced [a Red Lobster spinoff] is such a great idea, then put it to a vote.’” — New York Post"

"“The ‘strategic partnership,’ however, is a sham designed to lock up a significant portion of the vote in favor of the Board’s recommended slate of directors. Specifically, simultaneous with the announcement of the Investment Agreement, the Board announced plans to use the proceeds to launch a ‘Dutch Auction’ self-tender to purchase $500 million of common stock in the open market, indicating the Company had no operational need to raise capital.” — Building Trades Pension Fund of Western Pennsylvania (Complaint)"

"One company, NCR Corporation, made a distinct effort to ensure its declassification proposal surpassed the 80 percent of outstanding shares supermajority vote requirement. ... NCR took the extraordinary step to adjourn its meeting twice in order to solicit additional votes for the declassification proposal. When the annual meeting convened for a third time, the declassification proposal had received the requisite votes of outstanding shares for passage at 80.1 percent. — ISS Post Season Review, October 12, 2016"

"CSIM believes that the board is typically best positioned to determine its leadership structure. Therefore, CSIM will typically not support proposals requiring the separation of these roles unless certain circumstances are in place. — Charles Schwab; We will generally vote for proposals looking to separate the CEO and Chairman roles unless the company has governance structures in place that can satisfactorily counterbalance a combined chairman and CEO/ president post. — JP Morgan Asset Management"

"“...America’s riff on Australian barbecue has gained extraordinary cachet in Brazil — a love affair that is only deepening. For five years running, the chain has been voted Rio de Janeiro’s most popular restaurant.” — The Washington Post. “[T]he chain has become a cultural touchstone for many Brazilians, more experience than meal, where people can indulge decadence and celebrate life’s biggest milestones. A birthday. A job promotion. Even an engagement.” — The Washington Post"

"So long as the Apollo parties own a number of shares equal to 5% of the total outstanding shares of our common stock at closing, the Apollo parties are obligated to vote all of their shares as recommended by our board of directors with respect to routine matters (including contested or uncontested elections of directors, “say on pay” votes, approval of equity compensation plans and ratification of the selection of HGV’s auditors). — HGV Proxy Statement"

""Mr. Bolloré was so concerned about the [Florange Act] vote that he nearly tripled his stake in Vivendi this year, raising it in four increments to 14.5 percent from around 5 percent, a holding with a market value approaching €5 billion, or $5.4 billion." — The New York Times, April 17, 2015; "Instead, by supporting double voting, he casts himself as the wealthy insider trying to grasp greater control." — The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2015"

"General Recommendation: generally, vote FOR shareholder proposals requiring that the Board Chair position be filled by an Independent Director, taking into consideration the following: the scope and rationale of the proposal; the company's current Board leadership structure; the company's governance structure and practices; company performance; and any other relevant factors that may be applicable. — ISS United States - Proxy Voting Guidelines"

"General Recommendation: generally, vote FOR shareholder proposals requiring that the Board Chair position be filled by an Independent Director, taking into consideration the following: the scope and rationale of the proposal; the company's current Board leadership structure; the company's governance structure and practices; company performance; and any other relevant factors that may be applicable. — ISS United States - Proxy Voting Guidelines"

""I am a cardiac surgeon. Our program does about 60 heart transplants a year. We do not do lung transplants. We do Impeller liver transplants; I’m not involved in those. We use TransMedics in 10-12% of our cases a year. For disclosure, I was on the FDA panel that voted to approve TransMedics, so I’m very familiar with that product. We began to use it about two years ago." — Cardiac transplant surgeon at a major Midwest academic center"

"A full 87% of [Deutsche Bank conference] attendees believed that if the vote were to occur today, Dell’s existing bid would be voted down — Deutsche Bank Securities research October 21, 2018; In many ways, the IPO alternative seems suboptimal for both sides — Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., research note October 5, 2018; The Biggest Winner of Dell's Public-Market Return? Michael Dell — Bloomberg Deals, July 2, 2018"

"“Vote AGAINST the Compensation Committee members for approving executive employment agreements that contain egregious pay practices and problematic pay-for-failure risks.” — ISS 2009 Report on Motorola; “Motorola’s executive compensation received an F grade.... Overall, the Company paid significantly more than its peers but performed significantly worse than its peers.” — Glass Lewis 2009 Report on Motorola"

"“Those ad-free platforms are becoming more appealing as Viacom channels make up for the decline in ratings points by cutting back on programming minutes and packing in additional commercials. By one count, time devoted to ads on BET in primetime was up 15% in Q2 vs the period last year, while MTV and VH1 were up 11%. Nickelodeon’s ad time increased 6% from 7 AM to 7 PM.” — Source 1"

"Therefore, we strongly urge the Company to table all major divestiture decisions – unless the Company is absolutely certain of both the strategic rationale and value-creation, on an after-tax and risk-adjusted basis, and polls its shareholders in this regard – until after shareholders have the opportunity to vote on the composition of the Board at the upcoming 2018 Annual Meeting."

""The investment from KKR is a strong vote of confidence in our vision, strategy, and continued efforts to increase growth and profitability. KKR is one of the world's leading technology investors with a deep understanding of our market and a proven track record of partnering successfully with companies to create value and drive growth." — CEO Aaron Levie, April 2021"

"“potent inhibitor of CYP2D6 and hERG” — Raddatz et al. “our laboratory findings suggest that CYP2D6 inhibition...would likely be important hurdles for this novel compound” — Abbott scientists. “in vitro profiling in our laboratory (and others) suggests that BF2.639 [pitolisant] has both a CYP2D6 liability...and potent hERG channel K+ blockade.” — Evotec scientists."

"I am choosing to devote my time and energy to this effort because I believe Phillips 66 is not only a strong investment, but also a company where my support for Elliott's campaign can make a difference for employees and investors alike. I have been disappointed by what I see as a breakdown in effective corporate governance at Phillips 66. — Greg Goff"

"I am choosing to devote my time and energy to this effort because I believe Phillips 66 is not only a strong investment, but also a company where my support for Elliott’s campaign can make a difference for employees and investors alike. I have been disappointed by what I see as a breakdown in effective corporate governance at Phillips 66. — Greg Goff"

"“That doesn't mean life at Nidec is easy. Even in a nation renowned for devoted workers, the company stands out for its demands on employees. Meetings, Nagamori says, are held on weekends or after regular tasks are done. New staff are sometimes told to clean toilets, and taking days off is seen as lazy. Nagamori makes no apologies.” — Bloomberg"

"Electing new management nominees is itself likely to be seen as a vote for the old order; electing dissident nominees, if they carry meaningful credentials and experience, sends a far stronger signal to the incumbent board, and is thus more likely to effect change. — ISS Proxy Advisory Services, Barnes & Noble Proxy Contest, September 2010"

"The pattern is again similar to Sakti3 and Quantumscape: dangling groundbreaking data ("testing to over 2,000 cycles", "commercially viable formats", "high yield"); promoting its "first pilot line" just as QS has begun to do in recent weeks; and pointing to a major strategic investor, Samsung, as "a vote of confidence.""

"A vote for Trian’s nominees is a vote for a minority slate of four directors with extensive operating, strategic, and financial experience and a history of generating long-term shareholder value – individuals committed to working collaboratively with the continuing directors to achieve the great potential of DuPont"

"Ancora will vote “AGAINST” Chair George S. Mayes, Jr., Director Javier Polit and Director Laurie A. Tucker at the 2025 Annual Meeting to send a message that the status quo is unacceptable in light of the significant value that has been destroyed and the time-sensitive opportunity currently in front of Forward Air."

"In a separate action, the board voted to reduce for 2003 the management fee rate to 24 percent from the current 25 percent... this action was taken after the board's consideration and review of the relative financial position of the Erie Insurance Exchange and the Erie Indemnity Company. — Company Transcripts"

"Хотел бы уточнить о возможности размещения четырех детей из ДНР и ЛНР в вашем отеле 22-27 марта 2026 г. для размещения их в семьи. Милые девочки возрастом 14-17 лет. Красотки! Трое - сироты, у еще одного ребенка где-то родители на Украине. У всех удочерение — Anonymous email sender to NOVOTEL Krasnoyarsk."

"We intend to vote all of our shares against the proposals related to the proposed acquisition, and, should the transaction be voted down by shareholders at the Company’s upcoming Special Meeting of Shareholders scheduled to be held on April 12, 2019, we have also nominated a slate of director candidates."

"We seek to safeguard shareholder value by giving shareholders an opportunity to vote on resolutions (the “Resolutions”) which, if passed in their entirety, will immediately: (i) remove seven directors from the Capricorn board... (ii) appoint as directors six highly qualified, independent candidates."

"We intend to vote “AGAINST” George S. Mayes, Jr., Javier Polit and Laurie A. Tucker at the 2025 Annual Meeting to hold them accountable for their missteps and to send a message to the Board that shareholders will not tolerate more episodes of avoidable value destruction at Forward Air."

"Darden also contends that it asked the buyer, Golden Gate Capital, for a shareholder vote on the sale, but that it refused. That position is laughable, of course, because Golden Gate would obviously decline such a vote unless Darden demanded it. — New York Times on May 20, 2014"

"The Annual General Meeting of Phillips 66 (the “Company”) shareholders is scheduled to be held virtually on May 21, 2025. You can vote your shares using one of the voting options listed below. Elliott urges you to use the GOLD universal proxy card or voting instruction form."

"As Chair of the Compensation committee for each of the last 3 years, Glass Lewis has recommended that shareholders vote AGAINST Ms. Evans' continued service on the Board of Office Depot and has questioned whether she should even serve on any other public company board."

"Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX) shareholders, it's time to vote for a brighter future and better corporate governance. Vote the GOLD card FOR Elliott's board nominees Brian Coffman, Sigmund Cornelius, Michael Heim and Stacy Nieuwoudt, and FOR corporate governance enhancements."

"Believes Company Announcement to De-Stagger Board Two Days Before Annual Meeting and 10 Years after More than 85 percent of Common Shareholders Voted for this Measure is Too Little Too Late and Fails to Address Deeply Imbedded Issues with Taubman Governance Structure."

"a vote for Trian’s nominees is a vote for four highly qualified individuals who will seek to work collaboratively with the Board to: Assess the corporate structure and determine whether management is capable of achieving best-in-class revenue growth and margins"

"Research and development costs primarily consist of salaries, consulting and other costs. The Company expenses these costs as incurred — p. F-11; We have devoted an increasing proportion of our research and development budget to software development — 10-K, p.7"

"Vivendi opportunistically used the 19 member cap in TIM's by-laws to allow its executives onto the Board, although a majority of other investors voted against this as well as objecting to using TIM's funds to pay for compensation for these additional directors"

"To ensure the election of Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, it is essential that shareholders vote “FOR” Trian Nominees, Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, and “WITHHOLD” on Disney Nominees Michael B.G. Froman and Maria Elena Lagomasino and All Three Blackwells Nominees"

"To ensure the election of Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, it is essential that shareholders vote “FOR” Trian Nominees, Nelson Peltz and Jay Rasulo, and “WITHHOLD” on Disney Nominees Michael B.G. Froman and Maria Elena Lagomasino and All Three Blackwells Nominees"

"At Phillips 66 (NYSE: PSX), the numbers don't lie. The company has dramatically underperformed its peers since 2019, and shareholders have missed out on substantial returns. Vote the GOLD proxy card today to support a better tomorrow with #Streamline66."