353 documents showing 301–353
Date
Fund
Target
Thesis
Scores
Apr 21, 2016
Muddy Waters
Ströer SE & Co. KGaA
SAX
Ströer's digital-transformation narrative is hollow: organic growth is 10x overstated, EBITDA and FCF are inflated, and insider self-dealing rivals Chinese fraud cases — short.
N4
V2
Mar 08, 2016
Muddy Waters
Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA
CO
Casino's claimed France recovery is fiction: Mercialys property gains inflate EBITDA, suppliers are being stretched, and the CFO's earnings-call language shows deception clusters.
N5
V1
Jan 13, 2016
Muddy Waters
Groupe Casino
CO
Casino is a highly-levered, deteriorating French retailer being hollowed out by controlling shareholder Naouri and using property-sale gains to inflate EBITDA; equity worth ~€7 per share.
N4
V2
Dec 16, 2015
Muddy Waters
Groupe Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA
CO FP
Casino's financial statements mask 8.9x leverage and inflated EBITDA via related-party Mercialys real-estate sales; shares are worth €6.91 vs €48.97, an 86% decline.
N4
V2
Oct 21, 2015
Citron Research
Valeant Pharmaceuticals
VRX
Valeant is channel-stuffing through a web of captive specialty pharmacies (Philidor, R&O, plus cloned shells) to fabricate invoices and book phantom revenue — a potential Pharmaceutical Enron; price target $50.
N5
V3
Oct 15, 2015
Muddy Waters
TeliaSonera AB
TLSN
Short TeliaSonera: disclosed Uzbekistan bribery is only the tip — ~SEK 17bn of suspect Eurasia/Nepal payments plus a multi-billion DOJ FCPA settlement threaten the dividend and cut stub fair value to SEK 27-29.
N4
V2
Apr 09, 2015
Muddy Waters
Noble Group
NOBL
Muddy Waters is short Noble Group: a cash-burning commodities trader that manufactures EBITDA via sham affiliate transactions like the PT ALH $46M negative-goodwill scheme to keep credit flowing.
N4
V1
Feb 17, 2015
Muddy Waters
Bolloré SA
BOL FP
Bolloré's Breton-Pulleys circular ownership masks that public float is 42.8% not 24.3%; at €4.37 shares trade at 41% of €10.63 NAV — 95% upside to €8.50.
N5
V2
Nov 20, 2014
Muddy Waters
Superb Summit International Group Limited
1228.HK
Superb Summit's HK$773m of reported revenue belongs to a coal company it never owned, and its HK$1.5bn JFT acquisition is a sham valuation routed through a mystery intermediary.
N4
V2
Jul 06, 2014
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ's July 3 disclosures vindicate the fraud thesis: the audit chair resigned, PwC will never sign off, and insiders front-ran the news by dumping stock.
N4
V2
Jun 04, 2014
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ's own investigation committee confirmed widespread data tampering — the same pattern that preceded Sino-Forest's collapse — so Muddy Waters maintains its fraud rating.
N3
V2
May 20, 2014
Spruce Point Capital
iRobot Corp
IRBT
IRBT is a narrow consumer-vacuum company riding a robotics bubble; aggressive accounting, insider selling and a decaying moat point to $20-$25, or 25-40% downside.
N4
V3
Apr 13, 2014
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ Mobile's surprise Q4 loss and negative cash flow under PwC's tougher audit confirm Muddy Waters' fraud thesis: revenue, acquisitions, and cash balances are all fabricated.
N4
V2
Apr 07, 2014
Kerrisdale Capital
BofI Holding
BOFI
conference presentation
N3
V3
Dec 19, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile, Inc.
NQ
NQ Mobile's independent-committee fraud probe is structurally compromised; Muddy Waters offers to fund Plante & Moran to audit the auditors and protect investors from another China-fraud whitewash.
N4
V2
Nov 12, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ Mobile's credible-looking US management is a veneer hiding a $1.1bn fraud — Mathison conceals JCAP ties, Co-CEO Khan knows nothing, and pre-IPO partners include a convicted racketeer.
N4
V1
Nov 06, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ Mobile's largest purported revenue source, Yidatong, is a controlled shell whose offices, tax filings, and carrier records all contradict NQ's story — we maintain a <$1 target.
N4
V2
Nov 01, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile (NetQin)
NQ
Muddy Waters maintains its sub-$1 price target on NQ Mobile after Chinese media reporting confirms that ZTE, Huawei, Lenovo and Coolpad never had the pre-installation partnerships NQ claims.
N3
V1
Oct 29, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile
NQ
NQ Mobile's Oct 25 rebuttal of Muddy Waters' fraud report contained ten provable lies — Yidatong is NQ, revenue and market share are fabricated; reiterating price target under $1.
N4
V2
Oct 24, 2013
Muddy Waters
NQ Mobile Inc.
NQ
NQ Mobile is a 'China Fraud 2.0': 72%+ of China revenue is fictitious, real market share is 1.4% not 55%, and the $127.9M cash balance is likely forged — target price under $1.
N4
V2
Sep 06, 2013
Muddy Waters
American Tower Corporation
AMT
AMT's $4.8bn purchase of Global Tower Partners at ~19x 2014 EBITDA looks engineered to mask decelerating US organic growth and preserve 20% dividend-growth optics; maintain Strong Sell.
N3
V1
Sep 02, 2013
Muddy Waters
Olam International
OLAM
Ten months after our initial short, Olam's FY13 results confirm the thesis: 1.8% ROA, S$800m cash burn, ossified board, no acknowledgement of the over-leverage problem.
N3
V1
Aug 12, 2013
Muddy Waters
American Tower Corporation
AMT
AMT's $811M purchase of 4,456 NIHD towers at 21x EBITDA is a de facto loan to a near-bankrupt counterparty, masking weak growth and compounding accounting red flags from the prior Site Sharing deal.
N4
V1
Aug 01, 2013
Muddy Waters
American Tower
AMT
AMT's international growth is a de facto lending / FX carry trade masking deteriorating economics, and ~$250M appears to have vanished from its Site Sharing acquisition.
N4
V1
Jul 17, 2013
Muddy Waters
American Tower Corp
AMT
AMT is a Strong Sell at $44.57 (40% downside): a $250M Brazil accounting discrepancy hints at fraud, international growth is a disguised lending/carry trade, and Wi-Fi will erode tower economics.
N4
V2
Feb 08, 2013
Muddy Waters
Olam International Ltd.
OLAM
Olam's Q2 2013 results confirm Muddy Waters' Strong Sell thesis: debt is spiraling (9.5x EBITDA), cash is burning, and management's acquisitions and Gabon project reveal haphazard planning.
N3
V1
Jan 24, 2013
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding Ltd.
FMCN
New BVI registry evidence proves FMCN lied about its mobile-phone VIE acquisitions, reinforcing the long-running fraud thesis just as Carlyle's LBO consortium prepares to overpay.
N4
V1
Dec 04, 2012
Muddy Waters
Olam International
OLAM
Olam's surprise $750m Temasek-backed debt raise — at an effective cost over 10% — validates Muddy Waters' thesis that the company is days from collapse; Strong Sell maintained.
N3
V2
Nov 30, 2012
Muddy Waters
Olam International
OLAM
Olam's 45-page rebuttal ducks Muddy Waters' real points; we'll pay S&P to rate Olam's debt and prove the market underprices its accounting and acquisition risk.
N4
V2
Nov 27, 2012
Muddy Waters
Olam International Ltd.
SGX:O32
Olam is an Enron-style agri trader whose aggressive non-cash accounting, off-the-rails CapEx binge, and 9.3x leverage mask a failing trading business — equity likely worthless, bonds 14-33¢.
N5
V2
Jul 18, 2012
Muddy Waters
New Oriental Education & Technology Group
EDU
New Oriental is hiding an extensive franchising operation, filing fraudulent tax-exempt financials in Beijing and using a cosmetic VIE — expect a restatement and Deloitte to resign.
N5
V2
Feb 09, 2012
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding
FMCN
FMCN's 'independent' verification of its 185,174 LCD network counted 30,500 cardboard posters as LCDs, confirming Muddy Waters' fraud thesis and impugning all reported financials.
N5
V2
Jan 06, 2012
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding
FMCN
FMCN's bizarre acquisition of a tiny border-town ginseng plantation from its own employee is fresh evidence the 'Olympus of China' is using fake M&A to launder fake cash off its books.
N4
V1
Dec 09, 2011
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding
FMCN
FMCN's promise to have 'reputable' Chinese firms verify its LCD network is worthless — CTR, the firm most likely to be hired, previously rubber-stamped CCME's fabricated bus network.
N4
V2
Nov 29, 2011
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding
FMCN
FMCN's rebuttal concedes Muddy Waters' core claims — inflated LCD network, 1,758% theater market share, phantom VIE acquisitions, and brazen insider self-dealing make the shares un-investable.
N4
V2
Nov 21, 2011
Muddy Waters
Focus Media Holding Ltd.
FMCN
Focus Media is the Olympus of China: it inflates its LCD screen count by 50%, systematically overpays for acquisitions it writes off, and enriches insiders at shareholders' expense.
N5
V2
Jun 28, 2011
Muddy Waters
Spreadtrum Communications
SPRD
Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.
N4
V1
Jun 20, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
Sino-Forest claims Huaihua Yuda is unrelated, but Muddy Waters shows Sonic Jita was once owned by TRE executives and still shares a key executive — undisclosed related-party transactions contradicting CEO Allen Chan's guarantees.
N4
V1
Jun 13, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
TRE management's evasive Q1 call answers — unfinished E&Y review, undisclosed related parties, an unnecessary AI model, and dropped analyst questions — reinforce Muddy Waters' fraud thesis on Sino-Forest.
N3
V1
Jun 02, 2011
Muddy Waters
Sino-Forest Corporation
TRE
Sino-Forest is a fraud: its Authorized Intermediary structure fabricates timber revenue, its Yunnan holdings are overstated by ~$900M, and equity is worth less than $1 vs. $18.21.
N5
V2
Apr 04, 2011
Muddy Waters
Duoyuan Global Water Inc.
DGW
DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.
N5
V2
Mar 02, 2011
Muddy Waters
China MediaExpress Holdings
CCME
CCME is a fraud: a recorded salesperson admits doubling the bus count for SEC filings, and Chairman Cheng's rebuttal cited fabricated license plates — fair value $3.54 vs $12.27.
N4
V2
Feb 03, 2011
Muddy Waters
China MediaExpress Holdings
CCME
CCME is a pump-and-dump: reported revenue is overstated ~5x, its bus network is half the claimed size, and management is cashing out — fair value $5.28 vs $16.61.
N4
V2
Nov 10, 2010
Muddy Waters
RINO International Corp.
RINO
RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.
N5
V2
Jul 22, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
AMEX-listed Orient Paper is a Chinese reverse-merger fraud: tax records, shell-company suppliers, and customer interviews show revenues and profits are fabricated by orders of magnitude.
N4
V1
Jul 13, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
ONP secretly swapped its paper-machine order from corrugating medium to kraft board to salvage a technically impossible 360,000-ton output claim, while overpaying the vendor $13-14 million.
N3
V1
Jul 06, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.
N4
V1
Jul 02, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper Inc.
ONP
Muddy Waters stands by its ONP fraud thesis: the Baoding factory is incapable of producing reported output, and the 'rejected $300K research fee' vendetta narrative is fabricated.
N4
V1
Jul 01, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper, Inc.
ONP
Muddy Waters reaffirms ONP is a fraud: SAIC-filed PRC financials, impossible equipment claims, and bogus acquisitions contradict ONP's SEC filings; Strong Sell.
N4
V1
Jun 28, 2010
Muddy Waters
Orient Paper Inc.
ONP
Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.
N5
V2
—
White Diamond Research
GreenPower Motor Company
GP
GreenPower imports Chinese Eurise minibuses, re-decals them as 'EV Stars,' and survives only on California subsidies — fair value ~$1.54/share vs. declining revenues and 92% customer concentration.
N3
V1
—
White Diamond Research
ADOMANI
ADOM
ADOMANI is an electric-drivetrain reseller founded by convicted felons with zero 2017 revenues against a $69M forecast, yet trading at a $500M cap — White Diamond sees 90%+ downside.
N4
V1
—
Viceroy Research
Quintis Limited
QIN
Quintis is a Ponzi-like Australian sandalwood MIS where bogus sales channels, CEO cash-skimming via Arwon Finance, and conflicted experts mask fraud — equity worth $0.00.
N4
V2