Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck follow up
2006-01-18 · 58 pages

McDonald's Corporation MCD

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    McDonald's is fundamentally not a restaurant company — 78-86% of EBITDA comes from Brand McDonald's

  2. 2

    Lack of segment transparency masks the high-multiple brand/real-estate cash flows and depresses the stock

  3. 3

    A 20% McOpCo IPO unlocks $46-$50/share (45-57% upside) with no new debt and minimal execution risk

Primary demands

  • Issue transparent segment financials for arm's-length McOpCo and Brand McDonald's
  • IPO 20% of McOpCo with its own board (including a franchisee representative); McDonald's retains 80% control
  • Require McOpCo to pay arm's-length market rent (9%) and a 4% franchise fee
  • Commence McOpCo refranchising program of 1,000 units in mature markets (U.S., Canada, U.K.) over 2-3 years; redeploy capital to China/Russia
  • Raise dividend payout to 90% of after-tax free cash flow and initiate incremental share buybacks using IPO proceeds and cash on hand

KPIs cited

McOpCo U.S. average unit 4-Wall EBITDA margin (adjusted)
12.7% vs. 14.8% for U.S. franchisees
McOpCo International average unit 4-Wall EBITDA margin (adjusted)
8.8% vs. 14.8% for U.S. franchisees
Brand McDonald's EBITDA margin
~60% (EBITDA-maintenance capex ~55%)
Share of 2004 EBITDA adjusted for market rent/franchise fee
Brand McDonald's 78% / McOpCo 22% (vs. 54%/46% as reported)
Share of FY2005E EBITDA minus maintenance capex
Brand McDonald's 86% / McOpCo 14%
EV / 2006E EBITDA
MCD trades at 8.9x vs. 12.5x-13.5x implied for Brand McDonald's (Choice 12.2x, PepsiCo 19.1x, Coca-Cola 12.0x)
Sell-side sum-of-parts valuations
UBS $46, Goldman Sachs $44
New dividend yield
5.7% ($1.93/share in 2006E) vs. current ~2% ($0.67/share in 2005)
Systemwide units not pricing optimally
~27% (the McOpCo base of 8,119 of 30,516 stores)
G&A per systemwide unit
$68k at McDonald's vs. $35k at YUM! Brands
Potential McOpCo EBITDA margin
current ~7.3% post-allocation, capable of ≥10% (275bps improvement)

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (8)

Notes

Revised/second deck explicitly titled 'A Plan to Win/Win' — plays off McDonald's own 'Plan to Win' slogan. This is a follow-up to Pershing's Sept 2005 Initial Proposal (presented to investors 11/15/2005) and is structured as a direct response to management pushback (frictional costs, credit impact, alignment). Softer ask than v1: drops 65% McOpCo IPO + $14.7bn CMBS financing in favor of a 20% minority IPO with no incremental debt. Core narrative device is the sum-of-parts reveal that 'McDonald's is fundamentally not a restaurant company' (pie chart, p21) — a classic Ackman SOTP setup later reused on Wendy's/Tim Hortons and others. Tone is notably collaborative/analytical rather than adversarial; no villains named, no proxy threat, framed as alignment with management and franchisees. Before/after framing is explicit (p26 'Concerns' vs. p30 'Addressing Concerns'; p24 Initial Proposal vs. p28-29 Revised Proposal). Peer-gap chart on p8 (McOpCo vs. U.S. franchise unit EBITDA). Valuation waterfall on p44 ($50 → $52 → $56 → $61) is the clearest visual argument. Visual style is early-Pershing institutional Word/PPT — clean but plain; predates the high-production Ackman decks (CP 2012, Herbalife 2012). Outcome: McDonald's rejected the McOpCo IPO but did adopt significant refranchising and capital-return elements in 2006-2007.