Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck initial thesis
2005-11-15 · 79 pages

McDonald's Corporation MCD

N 5 Narrative
V 4 Visual
C 3 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    McDonald's real estate is worth ~$46bn, ~94% of enterprise value, but trades like a restaurant stock

  2. 2

    Separating McOpCo reveals a 60% EBITDA-margin real estate/royalty business that re-rates to 12.5-13.5x

  3. 3

    Leveraged recap + buyback unlocks $45-50/share, a 37-52% premium to $33

Primary demands

  • IPO 65% of McOpCo (the ~9,000 company-operated restaurants) at ~7x EBITDA
  • Issue $14.7bn of CMBS-style financing secured against McDonald's real estate
  • Use debt and IPO proceeds to repurchase ~316mm shares at $40/share
  • Leave Pro Forma McDonald's as a pure real estate / franchise royalty company (PropCo + FranCo)
  • Have McOpCo pay market rent and a market franchise fee, enforcing transfer pricing

KPIs cited

EV / 2006E EBITDA
McDonald's 8.7x vs Wendy's 9.3x, Yum! 8.9x
P / 2006E EPS
McDonald's 15.6x vs Wendy's 20.4x, Yum! 16.7x
Long-term EPS growth
McDonald's 9% vs Wendy's/Yum! 12%
Estimated real estate value
$46bn, ~94% of current Enterprise Value
Unlevered pre-tax ROIC (real estate + franchise)
17.5% at system level
PF McDonald's EBITDA margin (2006E)
60.4% vs standalone 26.9% and typical QSR 15-20%
PF McDonald's FCF margin (2006E)
33.0% vs standalone 14.7% and typical QSR 5-10%
Pro Forma leverage
3.5x Total Debt / EBITDA, 25% Debt/EV — investment grade
Implied FCF yield at target valuation
4.25%-5.25% vs 10-year TIPS yield ~2.1%
PF EBITDA contribution mix
63% real estate / 37% brand royalty — 'not a restaurant company'

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (9)

Notes

Landmark Ackman/Pershing Square thesis — first public McDonald's campaign, the deck that put Pershing on the map. Explicit sum-of-parts: splits McDonald's into Landlord (PropCo), Franchisor (FranCo) and Operator (McOpCo), argues reported consolidated financials understate margins because there is no transfer pricing for rent/franchise fee. Tone is conspicuously collaborative — deck opens by 'commending' management and notes McDonald's took the proposal seriously, not adversarial. Fred Turner quote on p22 ('Running a McDonald's is a 363-day-a-year business...') is used supportively, not as a gotcha. Section V rebuts management advisors' pushback ('PF McDonald's would trade like a restaurant stock') and is a good worked example of how to respond to the opposing valuation view. Page 48 pie chart ('Not a Restaurant Company', 63% real estate / 37% brand royalty) is the deck's money-line visual; page 49 comparable-company table is the valuation anchor. Visual execution is competent institutional — blue/yellow Pershing palette, diamond logo, clean type — but not editorial/Canadian-Pacific tier. Date set to mid-November 2005 per '30-day average trailing price as of 11/11/05' footnote; McOpCo IPO proposal was ultimately rejected by management in favor of a smaller buyback + real estate trust alternative.