Pershing Square

Pershing Square Holdings PSH

Pershing Square's 22.6% 8-year NAV CAGR validates the permanent-capital model; 2025's 33.9% TSR narrowed the NAV discount and the HHH/Vantage transformation extends the compounding runway.

Howard Hughes Holdings Inc. HHH

HHH trades at a 40% NAV discount with no take-private bidders; Pershing's $900M primary investment at $90 converts it into a modern-day Berkshire Hathaway.

Pershing Square Holdings PSH

Fund-level recap: PSH's 22.9% seven-year NAV CAGR, conservative leverage and PSCM stake sale set up a narrowing of the persistent ~30% discount to NAV.

Uber Technologies UBER

Uber is a high-quality, network-effect marketplace trading at 29x due to overblown AV fears; 30%+ EPS growth should more than double the stock in 3-4 years.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Fannie and Freddie have already repaid Treasury at an 11.6% IRR; releasing them from conservatorship via modest IPOs unlocks ~$300bn of warrant value for taxpayers within two years.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Release Fannie and Freddie from conservatorship at a 2.5% capital standard and IPO them at ~$30+/share; Treasury's warrants generate ~$300bn while shares re-rate 5-6x from ~$6 today.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA/FMCC

Howard Hughes Holdings Inc. HHH

HHH has compounded at just 2.2% over 14 years; merging with Pershing Square Holdco at $85/share converts a market-orphaned real-estate company into a Berkshire-style permanent compounder.

Pershing Square Holdings PSH

PSH delivered 26.7% NAV / 36.0% TSR in 2023; 31.2% 5-yr CAGR

Pershing Square Holdings PSH

PSH's hedging-led 2022 outperformance and 25%+ five-year compounding deserve a narrower discount to NAV; buybacks, rising dividend and FTSE 100 inclusion are closing the gap.

Netflix NFLX

Pershing Square exits Netflix at a 4-point portfolio loss because the ad-tier pivot widens the outcome range beyond what a concentrated book can underwrite.

Pershing Square Holdings (fund portfolio) PSH

PSH delivered 26.9% NAV return in 2021 and 50.1% 3-year CAGR, beating most major indices

Netflix, Inc. NFLX

Pershing Square builds a top-20 Netflix stake after the post-earnings selloff, betting streaming economics, content moat and margin expansion make NFLX a long-term compounder at dislocated prices.

Pershing Square Holdings PSH

PSH returned 70.2% NAV / 84.8% TSR in 2020, beating S&P by 5,180 bps

Pershing Square Holdings (fund-level portfolio update) PSH

Pershing Square's 2019 return to its concentrated activist playbook drove a 58.1% NAV year; two new positions (Agilent, Berkshire) and a 28.9% NAV discount extend the compounding runway.

United Technologies; ADP UTX; ADP

Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. PSH

PSH offers an activist portfolio compounding well above the S&P 500, available at a 27% discount to NAV, with a new dividend, buybacks, and insider buying narrowing the gap.

Starbucks SBUX

Starbucks at 22x forward P/E vs. 26x historical average is a rare chance to own a category-killer coffee brand — fixable U.S. SSS and a $14bn buyback reverting the multiple doubles the stock.

Pershing Square Holdings (fund-level portfolio update) PSH

After a fourth losing year driven by Valeant and Herbalife, Pershing Square has downsized, returned to core principles, and offers PSH investors an attractive reset entry point.

Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. PSH

After a -4% 2017, Pershing Square restructures to a leaner investment-centric team, reaffirms core principles, and launches a $300mm PSCM tender to close PSH's ~20% NAV discount.

Automatic Data Processing, Inc. ADP

ADP is a sleeping giant earning 19% Employer Services margins versus peers' 35-40% potential; electing Pershing's nominees catalyzes a transformation worth 100%+ in under four years.

Herbalife HLF

Post-2012-short results confirm Herbalife's pyramid thesis: individual markets pop-and-drop, Q1'17 China growth is a pull-forward illusion, and questionable EPS add-backs mask structural decline.

Howard Hughes Corporation HHC

HHC is the public-market way to invest alongside a Donald-Bren-style MPC compounder: irreplaceable master-planned communities with 37M SF of remaining entitlements, roughly 10x what's already built.

Pershing Square Holdings Portfolio (MDLZ, APD, CMG, HHC, NOMD, HLF short, FNMA/FMCC) PSH

Pershing Square's 2017 European investor meeting recaps a concentrated multi-position book (MDLZ, APD, CMG, HHC, NOMD, HLF short, GSEs) and asks investors to approve a London LSE listing and 5% buyback to close PSH's NAV discount.

Pershing Square Holdings Portfolio (multi-position) PSH

After a -13.5% 2016 driven by Valeant, Pershing recaps a concentrated portfolio (Mondelez, Air Products, Restaurant Brands, Chipotle) where margin and turnaround catalysts should restore long-term outperformance versus the S&P.

Pershing Square Holdings Portfolio (multiple) PSH

2016 losses of -13.5% were driven overwhelmingly by Valeant; balance of portfolio performed well

Herbalife HLF

The FTC's July 2016 Herbalife complaint and forced restructuring vindicate Pershing's pyramid-scheme short thesis; normalized EPS collapses to $1.42–$2.22, far below the ~$65 share price.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

FTC findings satisfy the Koscot/Omnitrition/Vemma legal test for a pyramid scheme

Multiple holdings (Pershing Square portfolio)

Fund-level recap after Q1 2016's -25.6% drawdown: Ackman defends the contrarian book — MDLZ margin upside, APD turnaround, CP execution — while reaffirming the Herbalife pyramid-scheme short.

Multiple (portfolio-level LP update: MDLZ, APD, ZTS, QSR, CP, HHC, VRX, PAH, NOMD, HLF short)

Mondelez 13% EBIT margin vs 17-26% peers implies +600-700 bps optimized EBIT upside under 3G playbook

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. VRX

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. VRX

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International, Inc. VRX

Pershing Square portfolio (multi-holding LP update: MDLZ, VRX, APD, ZTS, CP, QSR, HHC, PAH, FNMA/FMCC, HLF short)

After a -20.5% 2015, Pershing concedes mistakes on Valeant/Platform/CP but argues its portfolio holdings trade at a substantial discount to intrinsic value and that permanent capital lets it wait for convergence.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International VRX

Citron's 'next Enron' attack on Valeant overstates the risk: Philidor is only ~6% of sales, and even written off, VRX trades at ~8x 2016 cash EPS with 135%+ long-term upside.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International VRX

Citron's 'next Enron' attack on Valeant is a 1963 AmEx Salad Oil rerun — Philidor is ~7% of sales, the franchise is intact, and VRX at 7x cash EPS offers 60-215% upside.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

Herbalife's fastest-growing segment — China, ~10% of sales — operates as an illegal pyramid scheme, with royalties disguised in SEC filings as 'China Sales Employees' SG&A to hide identical multi-level compensation.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

A leaked 71-minute video shows Herbalife CEO Michael Johnson admitting the business is a 'lottery ticket' with 'pyramiding' — Pershing demands he release the tape and the distributor failure data.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International VRX

Valeant is a platform compounder that traditional P/E undervalues; SOTP plus credit for ongoing M&A implies $330+/share vs $223 today, with up to $618 by 2020.

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International VRX

Valeant is mis-valued on a traditional earnings multiple; crediting its Pearson-led Platform Value — like Jarden or Danaher — unlocks $330+/share, ~48% upside from $223.

Pershing Square Portfolio (multiple positions)

Pershing Square's 2015 portfolio recap: 9 positions led by the Allergan win, new Valeant stake, ongoing CP/APD transformations, and the Herbalife pyramid-scheme short.

Herbalife HLF

Herbalife is a pyramid scheme built on recruitment, not retail: former distributors describe losing thousands while 88% of participants earn no commission.

Pershing Square Portfolio (multi-position annual update)

Pershing Square delivered 40.4% net in 2014 — Allergan's sale to Actavis, Herbalife's 50% drop and Seifi Ghasemi's Air Products turnaround — and IPO'd PSH for permanent capital.

Pershing Square portfolio (Allergan, Herbalife, Canadian Pacific, Air Products, Restaurant Brands, Platform Specialty, Zoetis, Howard Hughes, Fannie/Freddie)

Pershing Square's 2014 annual recap: 40.4% net return, Allergan sold at a 75% premium, Herbalife short down 52%, and a $2.8bn PSH IPO making 46% of AUM permanent capital.

Pershing Square portfolio (multi-target)

Pershing Square delivered 40.4% net returns in 2014, driven by Allergan's forced sale to Actavis, Herbalife's 52% decline, and Canadian Pacific's continued transformation under Hunter Harrison.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

Pershing urges Herbalife's first-ever Chief Compliance Officer to build a genuinely independent program, because a 4-million-distributor pyramid cannot survive real enforcement of its own rules.

Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC

Fannie and Freddie — not liquidated — should be reformed into higher-capitalized mortgage guarantors; at 60–100bps g-fees the GSEs are worth $23–$47/share versus $3.98 today.

Allergan, Inc. AGN

Allergan shareholders should accept Valeant's bid: Valeant is an 'Outsider'-style acquirer (25x TSR under Pearson) whose lean R&D and platform M&A will compound Val-gan's value far beyond Allergan standalone.

Procter & Gamble PG

P&G is a world-class franchise vastly under-earning under a distracted CEO McDonald; restoring 5% growth and 24% EBIT margins lifts EPS to $6 and shares 60% to $125.

Herbalife, Ltd. HLF

Herbalife is an illegal pyramid scheme: ~92% of distributor income comes from recruiting rather than retail, and the top 1% extracts 88% of rewards.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

Herbalife is an illegal pyramid scheme: distributors profit from recruiting not retail, the top 1% captures 88% of rewards, and the stock is ultimately worth zero.

Herbalife Ltd. HLF

Herbalife is an illegal pyramid scheme masquerading as a nutrition company; its $4.8bn market cap rests on recruiting, not real retail demand, and the stock should go to zero.

J.C. Penney Company, Inc. JCP

JCP has been chronically mismanaged for 20 years; new CEO Ron Johnson (ex-Target, ex-Apple Retail) with a dream team and a mall-within-a-mall remake can take the stock from $26 to $77-$125 by 2014.

Burger King Worldwide Holdings BKW

Justice pays $1.4bn to merge with 3G-owned Burger King and relist on NYSE, backing a proven operator to refranchise, turn around margins, and expand internationally.

Canadian Pacific Railway CP

CP is the worst-performing Class I railroad under Fred Green; replacing him with Hunter Harrison — who transformed CN via Precision Scheduled Railroading — closes the peer gap and unlocks ~$140/share.

Lowe's Companies, Inc. LOW

Lowe's is a cheap home-improvement duopolist whose 8% FCF yield funds a buyback worth ~40% of market cap — investors are paid to wait for the housing recovery.

Fortune Brands Home & Security FBHS

FBHS is an orphaned post-spin cyclical at trough housing demand; even with no recovery it's worth $14, and normalization delivers $18-$27/share — ~70% upside.

Hong Kong Dollar / Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) HKD

Hong Kong's USD peg forces the booming HKD to import US ultra-accommodative monetary policy, fueling inflation and property bubbles; a 30% revaluation to 6:1 offers ~44x upside via cheap call options.

Family Dollar Stores FDO

Family Dollar runs a 37% EBIT/sqft productivity gap to Dollar General post-KKR; closing it via ops, a leveraged buyback, or sale unlocks ~$90/share (70% upside).

NRSRO Rating Agencies (Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

Rating agencies caused the credit crisis through conflicted 'success fee' incentives; a 60-day new-issue moratorium plus pay-over-time fee structure would restore ratings integrity and market discipline.

General Growth Properties GGP

At $14, GGP implicitly prices spinco GGO at negative $1; PF GGP alone merits ~$15 on Simon's 6.6% peer cap rate, pointing to ~$20 combined intrinsic and ~43% upside by year-end emergence.

Mall REIT sector (long General Growth Properties) GGP

Market-feared mall-REIT collapse never arrived: leverage fell, $18bn equity was raised, cap rates compressed, and tenants now generate cash — making mall REITs still cheap versus Treasuries.

Corrections Corporation of America CXW

CXW is a misunderstood real estate business — 90% of EBITDA is owned prisons leased to governments; rerating to healthcare-REIT cap rates unlocks $40-$54 vs. $24.50.

Realty Income Corporation O

Realty Income trades at a 7.3% cap rate — a ~40% premium to 10-11% private-market rates for the same junk-credit retail properties; downside to ~$14 (-46%).

General Growth Properties GGWPQ

GGP filed for liquidity, not insolvency; with assets materially exceeding liabilities, a seven-year debt extension would deliver 10x–25x upside on equity trading at $1.19.

Target Corporation TGT

Target's insular board lacks CEO-level retail, credit-card, and real-estate expertise — replace four incumbents with Pershing's slate to close the 62-point performance gap versus Wal-Mart.

Target Corporation TGT

Target's land is mispriced inside a 5.8x retail multiple; a <20% IPO of 'TIP REIT' followed by a tax-free spin re-rates the real estate at REIT multiples and lifts the stock from $37 to $67 now, $80 by 2010.

Target Corporation TGT

Target's owned real estate is a $39bn hidden asset; a tax-free land-only REIT spin (TIP REIT) with a 75-year master lease unlocks ~$30/share and 74% upside.

Wendy's International WEN

Wendy's is fundamentally a franchise + real estate business trading at a peer-gap discount; the Triarc merger and OpCo turnaround unlock 75-85% upside to $49-$52.

Borders Group, Inc. BGP

Borders' high-quality Superstores franchise is obscured by money-losing Mall and International segments; rationalizing those while remodeling stores and buying back stock unlocks $36 vs. $21 today.

McDonald's Corporation MCD

McDonald's is fundamentally a franchise and real-estate royalty company hidden inside an underperforming restaurant operator; a 20% McOpCo IPO and segment financials force a sum-of-parts rerating to $46-$50/share.

McDonald's Corporation MCD

McDonald's is a hidden real-estate and franchise business trading as a restaurant operator; IPO'ing 65% of McOpCo and re-levering PropCo unlocks $45-50 per share, a 37-52% premium.