Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck initial thesis
2011-05-25 · 42 pages

Family Dollar Stores FDO

N 5 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 3 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    FDO trades at same ~9x forward EBIT as Dollar General despite 37% performance gap

  2. 2

    If FDO matched DG's productivity, EPS would hit ~$6 and stock ~$90 (70% upside)

  3. 3

    Under-leveraged balance sheet plus Trian's $5bn debt package make an LBO highly feasible

Primary demands

  • Close the productivity gap with Dollar General via margin and sales-per-sqft improvements
  • Consider a leveraged buyback (~$1.5bn of incremental debt) to exploit under-leveraged balance sheet
  • Evaluate a sale to a strategic or financial buyer as an alternative path to full value

KPIs cited

EBIT per square foot gap
DG $19.8 vs FDO $12.5 in 2010 — a 37% performance gap that didn't exist pre-KKR buyout
Sales per square foot
FDO 15% below DG in 2010 ($170 vs $199) vs only 8% below in 2003
EBIT margin
FDO 7.4% in 2010 vs DG 9.9% — FDO was 70bps higher than DG in 2003
Same-store sales growth
DG averaged ~7% post-KKR (2008-2009) vs FDO ~2-4%
Return on capital
20% average ROIC over 1999-2010, peaked at 25.8% in 1999
Private label consumables penetration
FDO 14% vs DG 22% — FDO targets 20%
Direct import share of COGS
Only 9% at FDO; could reach 15% for 1000-1500bps margin lift on those goods
Forward P/E
14.7x FY2012 consensus EPS of $3.68; pro-forma at full gap close only 8.9x
Pro-forma FY2012 EPS
$6.03 if DG gap fully closed; $4.79 if 50% closed; $5.47 combined with $1.5bn LBO

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (8)

Notes

Title 'All in the Family' is a wink at both FDO's brand and the Dollar Store family (FDO/DG/Dollar Tree). Unusually constructive tone: Pershing uses Dollar General post-KKR buyout as the benchmark 'what FDO could be', not as a villain — a rare case where a PE buyout is cast as the positive control. Pershing came in AFTER Trian's $55-60 hostile bid was rejected; deck frames Trian's offer and $5bn debt package as proof financing exists. No CEO attacked by name; Howard Levine (CEO, 7.9%) is shown in cap table without editorializing. Narrative spine is SCQA: Situation (dollar store secular tailwind) → Complication (FDO lagging DG badly) → Question (how to close the gap?) → Answer (ops + capital structure + maybe sale). Final 'Valuation Summary' waterfall on p41 is a clean closing-ask visual showing all four paths above current price. Campaign eventually resolved as a win — Dollar Tree acquired FDO in 2015 after bidding war with Dollar General.