Contrarian Corpus
activist full deck follow up
2015-10-30 · 39 pages

Valeant Pharmaceuticals International VRX

N 4 Narrative
V 3 Visual
C 2 Craft
Original source ↗

The three reasons

  1. 1

    Citron's 'next Enron' channel-stuffing claim is verifiably false; Philidor accounting is conservative

  2. 2

    Even zeroing out Philidor, VRX trades at ~8x 2016 Cash EPS with 15% organic growth YTD

  3. 3

    Like AmEx after the 1963 Salad Oil Scandal, the franchise is resilient and the dislocation is a buying opportunity

Primary demands

  • Valeant should terminate the Philidor relationship and develop new specialty-pharmacy channel partners
  • Valeant must dramatically increase transparency around its specialty pharmacy strategy
  • Ad hoc board committee should complete Philidor compliance review and publish findings
  • Valeant should invest in public, government and investor relations to match business complexity

KPIs cited

2016 EBITDA floor guidance
$7.5bn, translating to ~$15.50 Cash EPS
Forward P/E multiple
~7x 2016 Cash EPS at $111.50 Oct 29 close; ~8x if all Philidor profit lost
Philidor share of revenue
~1% in 2014; grew to ~7% of Q3 2015; 5.9% YTD
Organic revenue growth
15% YTD 2015; 13% in Q3 2015
Q3 2015 volume vs price mix
Volume +~8%, net realized price +~4%; volume drives ~90% of growth
2016 EPS consensus revision
$11.47 (Jan 2015) to $16.15 (Oct 2015), +~41%
Market cap / TEV
~$40bn market cap; ~$68bn TEV
Long-term model 2020 EPS
$22 conservative / $32 base case; DPV range $180-$350
Philidor option economics
$100mm premium paid for $0 strike option plus up to $133mm earn-outs in Dec 2014
Pershing Square cost basis
16.5mm shares at ~$196 avg (Feb-Mar 2015) plus 2mm added at ~$108 on 10/21/15

Pattern membership

Where this document fits across the library's 12 rhetorical / structural patterns.

Notable slides (7)

Notes

Third Pershing Square deck on Valeant, delivered October 30, 2015 at the peak of the Philidor scandal. Unusual specimen: an activist defending an existing long position during a short-seller attack (Citron's 'next Enron' report, 10/21/15) rather than mounting a new attack. Structure follows a defensive SCQA: (1) context on VRX strategy and transparency deficit under CEO Mike Pearson, (2) annotated share-price timelines documenting the crisis, (3) detailed refutation of the R&O/Russell Reitz narrative via court filings and email evidence, (4) Novartis specialty-pharmacy kickback case as a precedent showing even large fraud settlements need not destroy the business, (5) three unanswered questions Pershing still holds VRX management to, (6) floor-case valuation showing stock is cheap even if Philidor is zeroed, (7) closing analogy to AmEx's 1963 Salad Oil Scandal with a young Buffett buying the dip, plus the 'be fearful when others are greedy' quote. Rhetorical move worth studying: the deck concedes Valeant's failings (opacity, underinvestment in PR/IR, costly mistakes) to buy credibility before defending the franchise. Side-by-side supply-chain diagram (p12) and Philidor/R&O corporate timelines (p14, 15) are the most citation-worthy visuals. Campaign ultimately failed badly — Philidor was shut down days later, Pearson was later replaced, and Pershing Square exited VRX in March 2017 at an estimated ~$4bn realized loss. This deck is now a frequently-cited case study in activist overconfidence and sunk-cost escalation.