98 documents showing 1–60
Welltower Inc. WELL
Welltower's 10-year executive program could pay CEO Mitra up to $3 billion while incentivizing dilutive growth at a 144% NAV premium — shareholders should sell WELL and rotate into Ventas or AHR.
Pershing Square Holdings PSH.L
PSH NAV grew 20.9% and TSR 33.9% in 2025, beating S&P, FTSE 100 and HFRX Activist indices
Toyota Industries Corporation 6201.T
Toyota Real Estate's ¥18,800 TOB undervalues Toyota Industries by 39% versus NAV and 85% on core business; shareholders should refuse to tender and pursue a standalone plan instead.
Toyota Industries Corporation 6201
Toyota Industries' ¥18,800 take-private undervalues the company by 39%; shareholders should reject the tender and pursue a Standalone Plan worth >¥40,000 per share.
Toyota Industries Corporation 6201
Toyota Industries' ¥18,800 take-private undervalues NAV ¥26,134 by 40%; rejecting the TOB and executing Elliott's Standalone Plan unlocks >¥40,000 per share by 2028.
Toyota Industries Corporation 6201
Toyota Fudosan's ¥18,800 squeeze-out of Toyota Industries undervalues NAV by ~40%; reject the TOB and back Elliott's Standalone Plan targeting >¥40,000 per share by 2028.
CoreWeave, Inc. CRWV
CoreWeave is a debt-fueled, undifferentiated GPU rental stopgap with 71% Microsoft concentration and sub-WACC returns; fair value is $6–13, or 88–95% downside.
Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd. 8830
Sumitomo Realty trades at half its post-tax real-estate NAV due to excessive cross-shareholdings, weak payouts, and worst-in-class TOPIX 100 governance; fixing these unlocks 43% upside to ~¥8,000.
Keisei Electric Railway 9009
Keisei trades at a 39% discount because its US$5bn OLC stake masks chronic underperformance; capping it below 15% plus a refreshed 11-member board unlocks US$3bn.
Howard Hughes Holdings Inc. HHH
HHH stuck at ~40% NAV discount with no take-private bidder after 284 investors approached
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FNMA / FMCC
Treasury's warrants and residual stake could generate ~$300bn for taxpayers over time
Public REIT sector (vs. private real estate)
Public REITs have crushed private real estate over 30 years (9.9% vs 7.0%); with institutions at GFC-low underweights and supply rolling over, listed REITs are a generational buy.
Southwest Airlines LUV
Southwest's outdated strategy collapsed margins from best-in-class 21% to worst-in-class 8%
CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR
CPI PG's controlling shareholder Vitek swapped €273m of personal debt for Dubai properties still under construction, sticking CPI PG with ~€220m of hidden progress payments while pocketing ~€118m.
Keisei Electric Railway Co., Ltd. 9009.T
Palliser, a 1.6% holder, asks Keisei shareholders to vote on an advisory resolution forcing the board to publish a capital allocation plan and cut its OLC cross-holding below 15% by March 2026.
CPI Property Group CPIPG
CPIPG's 2023 results show undisclosed related-party transfers to controlling shareholder Vitek, aggressive fair-value inflation, and an unreconciled 92% equity collapse at GSG Berlin — management must answer on the call.
Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH
Muddy Waters poses five forensic questions to Fairfax management that, if answered honestly, would expose return-of-capital dividends, off-balance-sheet debt via NCIs, and fair-value gain engineering.
Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH
Muddy Waters is short Fairfax Financial, arguing it is 'the GE of Canada' — a serial accounting manipulator whose book value is overstated by ~$4.5bn (~18%) through value-destructive transactions.
Pershing Square Holdings (own closed-end fund review) PSH
PSH trades at a 27% discount to NAV despite 31.2% 5-yr compound NAV return
CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR
Muddy Waters is short CPI Property Group's credit: its €19.2B portfolio appears inflated via implausible Berlin gains, cherry-picked Bubny landbank comps, and occupancy rates realtor listings show are overstated by ~2x.
Blackstone Mortgage Trust, Inc. BXMT
BXMT's borrowers only stay current because of expiring rate swaps; as ~$16B of swaps terminate in 2024, dividend cuts of 33-85% and $2.5-4.5B of loan losses could wipe out the $4B market cap.
Sunrun Inc. RUN
Sunrun's non-GAAP Subscriber count exceeds mandatory EIA filings by ~20%, implying phantom customers, ~$1.5B of overstated Net Earning Assets (62.5% of market cap), and possible ITC tax fraud.
Keisei Electric Railway 9009 JT
Keisei's 22% stake in Oriental Land hides $4.5bn of value; right-sizing it below 15% and adopting a capital allocation framework unlocks 76% upside for shareholders.
Vivion Investments
Vivion's proposed bond exchange rests on inflated UK hotel valuations — illustrated by Crowne Plaza Heathrow, marked at EUR94.6m versus CBRE's EUR72.9m — serving insiders, not bondholders.
Vivion Investments
Muddy Waters stays short Vivion bonds: the December 2022 rebuttal is misleading, asset values are inflated, rent24 exposure is hidden, and shareholder loans are being cashed out with bondholder money.
Vivion Investments S.à.r.l.
Vivion's €1.44bn bond issuer is a multi-billion euro shell game — fabricated shareholder loans, inflated occupancy and fair value gains, and related-party rents enriching controlling shareholder Amir Dayan.
Six Flags Entertainment Corp. SIX
Six Flags' owned real estate is worth more than its entire equity value; spinning it to a REIT buyer like VICI plus fixing the botched 2022 repositioning can double the stock.
Capricorn Energy CNE
NewMed's all-share bid for Capricorn hands shareholders a 42% discount and a self-serving board deal; a cash-return plus Egypt-focused optimisation path unlocks 400p/share instead.
Capricorn Energy PLC CNE
Capricorn's board must withdraw its Tullow merger recommendation — a nil-premium takeover that hands Capricorn's cash to junk-rated creditors while standalone value of 330p offers 67% upside.
Sunrun Inc. RUN
Sunrun's equity story rests on three shaky pillars — inflated subscriber values, abusive IRS tax-basis gaming, and fragile ABS — that together imply an 85% haircut to Net Earning Assets.
Digital World Acquisition Corp DWAC
DWAC's $8bn pro-forma SPAC merger with Trump's TMTG will never close because the SEC is actively investigating it and can kill the deal via a stop order — fair value is the $10 trust cash (-80%).
REIT sector (thematic)
REITs hedge inflation, but only short-lease high-margin sectors — residential, self-storage, warehouses — work; office and net lease are bond-like losers in a 6%+ CPI world.
N/A (asset-class advocacy)
Publicly traded REITs have outperformed private real estate by 165–590bps annually for 20 years, offer better liquidity, cheaper valuations vs. bonds, and superior inflation-era returns.
Multiple REIT subsectors (urban office, retail, business hotels, movie theaters)
Post-vaccine pent-up demand will mask permanent secular damage in urban office, retail, business hotels, and movie theaters — investors should sell the mirage, not buy it.
Apartment Investment and Management Company AIV
AIV's proposed taxable reverse spin-off won't close its 18% NAV discount and lets Considine duck 25 years of underperformance; demand a shareholder vote or explore a sale at $58 — 75% upside.
D.R. Horton and Invitation Homes DHI/INVH
COVID-19 has supercharged the suburban single-family thesis; entry-level homebuilder D.R. Horton and single-family rental REIT Invitation Homes trade 20%+ below highs despite accelerating demand.
Burford Capital BUR
Burford's 2019 financials rely on reclassifications and definition changes to mask an -11.8% drop in cash receipts, -35.5% drop in deployments, and $20.6m of unexplained fair-value gains.
New Pacific Metals NUAG
Bolivia-focused silver developer New Pacific trades 17x peers on concessions likely acquired illegally under a now-ousted regime; Hindenburg targets C$0.37, 90%+ downside.
Burford Capital BUR
Burford's dismal H2 2019 — 85% YoY collapse in realized gains, Petersen sold to its own fund, vanishing cash, and a lost Perry Ellis ruling — validates Muddy Waters' short thesis on aggressive marks and a flawed model.
Burford Capital Ltd. BUR LN
Burford is a poor litigation-finance business masquerading as a great one through Enron-like fair value accounting, four-case concentration, and a CEO-wife CFO — and is arguably insolvent.
Pershing Square Holdings, Ltd. (annual portfolio update; covers CMG, ADP, QSR, LOW, SBUX, HLT, UTX, HHC, FNMA/FMCC) PSH
PSH trades at 27% discount to NAV despite 13.8% net CAGR since 2004 vs 8.4% for S&P 500
Dell Technologies (Class V / DVMT tracking stock) DVMT
Dell's $109 buyout of the DVMT tracker is really $90 — a 42% discount engineered to transfer $11bn from public holders to Michael Dell and Silver Lake. Vote no.
SandRidge Energy SD
SandRidge trades at a ~45% discount to its own PV-10 because the post-bankruptcy 'bankruptcy board' destroys value via dilutive deals; replace it with Icahn's slate to run a real sale process.
Assured Guaranty AGO
Assured Guaranty is a melting-ice-cube bond insurer aggressively returning capital it hasn't earned; Puerto Rico losses alone (2-4x reserves) will force a capital raise or strip the AA rating it needs to write new business.
Telecom Italia SpA (TIM) TIT.MI
Vivendi controls TIM with just 24% voting stake, running it as a subsidiary while minorities suffer
The St. Joe Company JOE
St. Joe's Florida Panhandle land bank is worth a fraction of what bulls claim; absent the promised population boom, the stock is materially overvalued and a short.
China Internet Nationwide Financial Services Inc. CIFS
CIFS is an old-style China reverse-merger fraud dressed up as a Reg A+ IPO; SAIC filings show 5x revenue overstatement, every disclosed borrower is a sham, and the equity is worthless.
Taubman Centers TCO
Taubman's dominant Class A malls are still bustling and growing, yet TCO is down 25% YTD — management, not 'dead malls,' is the problem, with 50%+ upside if the board acts.
Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO
Taubman's best-in-class malls are worth ~$106/share (~70% upside), but the family's dual-class 30% voting block blocks reform — elect Litt and governance expert Elson.
Howard Hughes Corporation HHC
HHC owns the best public-market analogue to Donald Bren's $15B Irvine Ranch MPC empire
Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO
Taubman Centers has chronically underperformed Class A mall peers by 57% over five years under entrenched family governance; electing L&B's nominees can unlock 65% NAV upside.
BHP Billiton BHP
DLC structure traps US$9.7bn of franking credits and a 12.7% Plc/Ltd discount
China Huishan Dairy Holdings 6863 HK
Huishan is a fraud worth close to zero — fabricated alfalfa self-sufficiency inflates margins, RMB 1.6bn of CapEx is fictitious, and Chairman Yang has siphoned farms to a related party.
MGM Resorts International MGM
MGM's discredited CEO Murren was just handed a pay-for-showing-up contract; replacing him and unlocking real-estate value via MGM China, CityCenter and Bellagio sales delivers 35%+ upside.
Multiple (portfolio-level LP update: MDLZ, APD, ZTS, QSR, CP, HHC, VRX, PAH, FNMA/FMCC, NOMD, HLF)
Mondelez margin gap to peers (13% vs 17-26%) implies +600-700bps of optimized EBIT upside
Multiple (Pershing Square portfolio: MDLZ, APD, ZTS, QSR, CP, HHC, VRX, NOMD, HLF-short)
Mondelez EBIT margin of 13.1% is far below peers (Kraft Heinz 26.5%, Hershey 20.0%) and well short of 3G playbook results
Macy's, Inc. M
Macy's $21bn real estate portfolio implies a negative-value OpCo; a real estate JV plus $500m+ cost cuts can crystallize hidden value without sacrificing cash flow or investment grade.
Macy's, Inc. M
Macy's $21bn real estate portfolio exceeds its enterprise value; Starboard urges joint-venture structures plus $500M+ cost cuts to crystallize value without sacrificing cash flow or investment-grade rating.
Macy's Inc. M
Macy's owns $21bn of real estate — more than its entire enterprise value; spinning iconic and mall properties into two JVs unlocks ~$70/share, ~88% upside.
Groupe Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA CO FP
Casino's financial statements mask 8.9x leverage and inflated EBITDA via related-party Mercialys real-estate sales; shares are worth €6.91 vs €48.97, an 86% decline.