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Corpus / Muddy Waters
short seller

Muddy Waters

133 documents across the library, active from 2010 to 2026.

133 Documents
4.0 Avg. narrative
1.8 Avg. visual

Activity by year

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All documents

Muddy Waters Mar 30, 2026

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI booked a $312M JPMorgan borrowing as a loan sale, inflating ~$1B of EBITDA and enriching management while shareholders absorb ~15% annual dilution.

N4 V3 C2
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Muddy Waters Mar 22, 2026

SoFi Technologies SOFI

SOFI's silence on 11 specific accounting questions confirms Muddy Waters' view that 2025 Adjusted EBITDA is inflated ~90% via mislabeled financings, hidden debt, and misstated risk retention.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Mar 17, 2026

SoFi Technologies, Inc. SOFI

SoFi's $1,054M reported 2025 EBITDA is ~90% inflated via manipulated charge-off rates, off-balance-sheet VIEs and subsidized seller-financed sales that feed CEO Noto's comp — real EBITDA is ~$103M.

N5 V3 C3
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Muddy Waters May 07, 2025

AppLovin Corporation APP

Muddy Waters is short AppLovin; the CEO and CTO's March 2025 denials of persistent identifiers are demonstrably false, exposing APP to deplatforming, regulatory, and margin-compression risks.

N4 V3 C3
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Muddy Waters Mar 27, 2025

AppLovin APP

AppLovin's e-commerce ad boom is built on fingerprinting that violates Meta/Google/Apple TOS; only 25-35% of sales are incremental and Q1 churn is already 23%.

N4 V3 C2
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Muddy Waters Mar 03, 2025

FTAI Aviation, Ltd. FTAI

An FTAI Aviation Module Factory box appears in an Iranian MRO's LinkedIn posts, suggesting FTAI may have indirectly violated U.S. OFAC sanctions on Iran.

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Muddy Waters Jan 15, 2025

FTAI Aviation Ltd. FTAI

FTAI is a dressed-up engine-leasing business posing as a high-margin MRO — whole-engine sales counted as three modules and intra-segment depreciation transfers fabricate the aerospace-aftermarket story.

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Muddy Waters Nov 20, 2024

e.l.f. Beauty, Inc. ELF

ELF's imports collapsed while inventory and revenue kept soaring; reconciling the two suggests $138-188mm of overstated sales and a likely fraud.

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Muddy Waters Jul 23, 2024

Eurofins Scientific SE ERF

Eurofins' €556m 'excess cash' earned just 1.42% vs banks' quoted ~2.88%, echoing the NMC Health fraud tell; only radical disclosure on cash, entities, and Dr. Martin's real estate can clear it.

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Muddy Waters Jul 03, 2024

Eurofins Scientific SE ERF

Eurofins' 800+ immaterial subsidiaries and 18 auditors enable sham sales and cash double-counting; new evidence, including a factoring denial contradicted by a former BU head, argues the financials cannot be trusted.

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Muddy Waters Jun 24, 2024

Eurofins Scientific SE ERF

Muddy Waters is short Eurofins: controlling shareholder Dr. Gilles Martin has siphoned capital via above-market real-estate leasebacks for 20 years, and the financials appear engineered to overstate revenue, profits, and cash.

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Muddy Waters Jun 03, 2024

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI PG's controlling shareholder Vitek swapped €273m of personal debt for Dubai properties still under construction, sticking CPI PG with ~€220m of hidden progress payments while pocketing ~€118m.

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Muddy Waters May 29, 2024

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI Property Group's luxury London transactions — same-day flips, offshore proxies, and uneconomic sales to PEPs — bear hallmarks of money laundering integration using bondholder funds.

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Muddy Waters Apr 08, 2024

CPI Property Group CPIPG

CPIPG's 2023 results show undisclosed related-party transfers to controlling shareholder Vitek, aggressive fair-value inflation, and an unreconciled 92% equity collapse at GSG Berlin — management must answer on the call.

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Muddy Waters Feb 15, 2024

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters poses five forensic questions to Fairfax management that, if answered honestly, would expose return-of-capital dividends, off-balance-sheet debt via NCIs, and fair-value gain engineering.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters Feb 08, 2024

Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd. FFH

Muddy Waters is short Fairfax Financial, arguing it is 'the GE of Canada' — a serial accounting manipulator whose book value is overstated by ~$4.5bn (~18%) through value-destructive transactions.

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Muddy Waters Jan 25, 2024

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI PG's Italian landbank and St. Tropez villa deals show ~€100M in unexplained cash and receivables gaps, suggesting controlling shareholder Vitek is using bondholder money to strip assets and launder cash.

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Muddy Waters Jan 22, 2024

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

Muddy Waters is short CPI Property Group's credit: its €19.2B portfolio appears inflated via implausible Berlin gains, cherry-picked Bubny landbank comps, and occupancy rates realtor listings show are overstated by ~2x.

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Muddy Waters Dec 06, 2023

Blackstone Mortgage Trust, Inc. BXMT

BXMT's borrowers only stay current because of expiring rate swaps; as ~$16B of swaps terminate in 2024, dividend cuts of 33-85% and $2.5-4.5B of loan losses could wipe out the $4B market cap.

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Muddy Waters Nov 30, 2023

CPI Property Group CPIPGR

Follow-up to Muddy Waters' Part 1 report: a list of pointed questions challenging CPI Property Group to explain self-dealing transactions through which controlling shareholder Radovan Vitek is allegedly asset-stripping the company.

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Muddy Waters Nov 21, 2023

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

Muddy Waters is short CPI PG's credit: controlling shareholder Radovan Vitek is brazenly looting the company via undisclosed related-party deals — ~50% of €1.2bn examined transactions appear suspect.

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Muddy Waters Nov 01, 2023

Sunrun RUN

Sunrun's Subscriber metric is fabricated — inflated ~20% above EIA filings — letting it overclaim ~$205M in IRS tax credits and prop up a fictitious valuation; Muddy Waters remains short.

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Muddy Waters Oct 25, 2023

Sunrun Inc. RUN

Sunrun's non-GAAP Subscriber count exceeds mandatory EIA filings by ~20%, implying phantom customers, ~$1.5B of overstated Net Earning Assets (62.5% of market cap), and possible ITC tax fraud.

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Muddy Waters Aug 04, 2023

Vivion Investments

Vivion's proposed bond exchange rests on inflated UK hotel valuations — illustrated by Crowne Plaza Heathrow, marked at EUR94.6m versus CBRE's EUR72.9m — serving insiders, not bondholders.

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Muddy Waters Jun 07, 2023

Chinook Therapeutics KDNY

Chinook manipulated 2021-2022 revenues via its Chinese JV SanReno; strip out the accounting tricks and reported revenue collapses by 95% and 68% respectively, reinforcing our short.

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Muddy Waters May 16, 2023

Chinook Therapeutics Inc KDNY

Muddy Waters is short Chinook (KDNY): lead drug atrasentan is inefficacious, harmful, and blocked by sparsentan's IgAN orphan-drug exclusivity — FDA approval is highly unlikely.

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Muddy Waters Mar 28, 2023

Vivion Investments

Muddy Waters stays short Vivion bonds: the December 2022 rebuttal is misleading, asset values are inflated, rent24 exposure is hidden, and shareholder loans are being cashed out with bondholder money.

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Muddy Waters Dec 14, 2022

Vivion Investments S.à.r.l.

Vivion's €1.44bn bond issuer is a multi-billion euro shell game — fabricated shareholder loans, inflated occupancy and fair value gains, and related-party rents enriching controlling shareholder Amir Dayan.

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Muddy Waters Dec 01, 2022

dLocal DLO

DLO's refusal to reconcile 2020 cash flows in writing, while verbally denying misuse on broker calls, confirms Muddy Waters' view that client funds financed the pre-IPO special dividend.

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Muddy Waters Nov 16, 2022

DLocal Ltd. DLO

Muddy Waters is short DLO: contradictory TPV disclosures, implausibly high FX-driven take rates, governance failures and ~$1bn of insider selling point to likely fraud at the Uruguay-based payments processor.

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Muddy Waters Aug 25, 2022

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is 'dumb money' in renewables JVs — sponsors cash out while HASI books non-cash HLBV income on investments unlikely to ever pay out, inflating reported earnings over real economics.

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Muddy Waters Aug 03, 2022

Sunrun RUN

Muddy Waters rebuts Sunrun's response: the 90% PPA-renewal assumption on 20-year-old panels is fantasy, the $668M panel-removal liability is real, and RUN hides its tax basis.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters Jul 28, 2022

Sunrun Inc. RUN

Sunrun's equity story rests on three shaky pillars — inflated subscriber values, abusive IRS tax-basis gaming, and fragile ABS — that together imply an 85% haircut to Net Earning Assets.

N4 V2 C2
⌂ ◫
Muddy Waters Jul 12, 2022

Hannon Armstrong Sustainable Infrastructure Capital HASI

HASI is a short: its GAAP and non-GAAP 'Distributable Earnings' are inflated by three non-cash accounting tricks and roundtripped SunStrong loans, masking a cash-losing, capital-raise-dependent business.

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Muddy Waters Dec 16, 2021

KE Holdings BEKE

BEKE is systemic fraud: platform scraping and field work show new-home GTV inflated ~126%, revenues inflated 77-96%, with ghost stores, clone stores, and a sham acquisition masking the deception.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Sep 15, 2021

Danimer Scientific DNMR

DNMR is a post-SPAC bioplastics story whose 'sold-out' demand, $200M take-or-pay contracts, and $1 trillion TAM are misrepresentations — actual utilization is ~28% and Novomer is a Hail Mary.

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Muddy Waters May 24, 2021

Solutions 30 S30

EY's refusal to sign Solutions 30's 2020 audit — after S30 blocked access to information on suspect transactions — confirms Muddy Waters' two-year-old fraud and money-laundering thesis.

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Muddy Waters May 13, 2021

Lemonade, Inc. LMND

Muddy Waters is short Lemonade after discovering a critical session-fixation flaw that exposed customer PII to Google's index — a negligence that shatters Lemonade's 'trustworthy' digital-native brand.

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Muddy Waters Mar 10, 2021

XL Fleet XL

XL Fleet's March 8 rebuttal fails to deny Muddy Waters' core claims — exaggerated pipeline, ~10% reorder rate, overstated fuel savings — confirming XL is SPAC trash.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters Mar 03, 2021

XL Fleet Corp XL

XL Fleet is SPAC trash: salespeople were paid to fabricate pipeline, most touted customers are inactive, ROI is actually negative, and the stock is worth a fraction of its billion-dollar SPAC valuation.

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Muddy Waters Nov 18, 2020

Joyy Inc. YY

JOYY is a multibillion-dollar fraud: ~90% of YY Live and ~80% of Bigo revenue is fabricated via bots and gift roundtripping, and Baidu's pending $3.6bn acquisition is buying air.

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Muddy Waters Nov 11, 2020

MultiPlan Corp MPLN

MultiPlan is a financially-engineered SPAC corpse losing its biggest customer UHC to UHC's own competitor Naviguard; expect 35% revenue loss and 8x+ leverage by 2022.

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Muddy Waters Sep 22, 2020

Nano-X Imaging Ltd. NNOX

Nanox's $1.3B medical-imaging story is a stock promotion: the ARC device appears to be a prop, distribution partnerships are shams, and a convicted felon engineered the IPO.

N5 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 02, 2020

eHealth, Inc. EHTH

EHTH books Medicare Advantage revenue today that takes nine to twenty years to collect, masking a cash-incinerating, high-churn business reminiscent of Enron-style accounting.

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Muddy Waters May 28, 2020

GSX Techedu GSX

GSX's rebuttals to our fraud report are evasive techno-drivel; meanwhile GSX openly recruits engineers to run cell-phone bot farms, confirming it is a nearly empty box.

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Muddy Waters May 18, 2020

GSX Techedu Inc. GSX

GSX Techedu is a near-total fraud: at least 73% — likely 80%+ — of paid K-12 users are bots, and Chairman Chen's $319M pledged stock heightens crash risk.

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Muddy Waters May 12, 2020

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's 2019 financials rely on reclassifications and definition changes to mask an -11.8% drop in cash receipts, -35.5% drop in deployments, and $20.6m of unexplained fair-value gains.

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Muddy Waters Apr 08, 2020

eHealth Inc. EHTH

eHealth books three years of Medicare Advantage commissions upfront while true churn has spiked to 47%; corrected, every MA enrollee loses $135-$402 — a cash-incinerating stock promotion.

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Muddy Waters Feb 10, 2020

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's dismal H2 2019 — 85% YoY collapse in realized gains, Petersen sold to its own fund, vanishing cash, and a lost Perry Ellis ruling — validates Muddy Waters' short thesis on aggressive marks and a flawed model.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Feb 10, 2020

NMC Health plc NMC

Newly disclosed NMC share pledges corroborate Muddy Waters' hidden-debt thesis: likely Enron-style off-balance-sheet financing or subsidies from undisclosed Shetty-family related parties inflating margins.

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Muddy Waters Dec 17, 2019

NMC Health plc NMC.LN

NMC Health's UAE hospital empire is built on inflated capex, overstated cash, hidden reverse factoring and related-party self-dealing — Muddy Waters is short and sees deep, possibly fraudulent rot.

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Muddy Waters Nov 07, 2019

PeptiDream, Inc. 4587 JP

PeptiDream's 19 pharma 'partnerships' are largely dormant and 13 years of R&D have produced zero Phase 2 drugs — analyst 2027 revenue forecasts will miss by over 60%.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Sep 24, 2019

Burford Capital BUR

Burford cherry-picks which investments count as 'concluded' to avoid truing up marks; the 110% vs 19% gap between unconcluded and concluded returns exposes systematic fair-value manipulation.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters Aug 27, 2019

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal on Napo is a dodge: a 2013 Glenmark arbitration MW surfaces proves Napo was a failed investment BUR disguised as a winner.

N3 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Aug 16, 2019

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR

Muddy Waters hires ex-CIA behavioral analysts Qverity to show Burford management's rebuttal is riddled with evasion, aggression and persuasion — corroborating the original fraud thesis.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Aug 13, 2019

Burford Capital BUR

Burford's rebuttal confirms it: aggressive mark-to-model fair-value gains, manipulated ROIC/IRR, and a CEO-CFO marriage make BUR an Enron-style stock promotion the FCA should investigate.

N4 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Aug 07, 2019

Burford Capital Ltd. BUR LN

Burford is a poor litigation-finance business masquerading as a great one through Enron-like fair value accounting, four-case concentration, and a CEO-wife CFO — and is arguably insolvent.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jul 22, 2019

ANTA Sports Products 2020.HK

ANTA's largest 'third-party' supplier and its 'self-operated' online stores are secretly controlled by an ANTA employee, so reported margins and Fila's numbers cannot be trusted.

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Muddy Waters Jul 15, 2019

ANTA Sports Products 2020.HK

Muddy Waters Part 4 rebuts ANTA's responses — management has lied about owning all Fila stores, the Shanghai Fengxian disposal, and distributor independence, confirming the underlying fraud.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 10, 2019

ANTA Sports Products 2020.HK

ANTA's 'self-operated' Fila franchise is a fiction: 46 Beijing Fila stores are owned by an insider proxy, exposing fabricated Fila financials and rendering all ANTA numbers unreliable.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jul 09, 2019

ANTA Sports Products Limited 2020.HK

ANTA used IPO proceeds to grow Shanghai Fengxian, then stripped it to insider proxies via a straw buyer in 2008 — proof of fraudulent intent toward minority shareholders.

N4 V2 C3
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Muddy Waters Jul 08, 2019

ANTA Sports Products Ltd. 2020.HK

ANTA secretly controls at least 27 — and likely over 40 — of its 46 Tier 1 distributors via proxy owners, fraudulently inflating the margins behind its peer-leading financials.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters May 24, 2019

Casino Guichard-Perrachon CO

Rallye's safeguard filing vindicates Muddy Waters' 2015 warning that Casino was being hollowed out to sustain Jean-Charles Naouri's parasitic, debt-laden holding structure.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters May 24, 2019

Casino Guichard-Perrachon CO

Rallye, Finatis, Euris and Foncière Euris entering procédure de sauvegarde vindicates MW's 2015 warnings

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Muddy Waters Feb 25, 2019

Inogen INGN

INGN's growth narrative rests on an inflated $3-4B TAM that Medicare data contradicts; under a realistic 1.3M-user market, peak unit sales arrive this year or next.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Feb 08, 2019

Inogen, Inc. INGN

Inogen's growth story rests on a fabricated TAM sourced from a plagiarism-riddled WinterGreen report; real market is shrinking, peak sales arrive 2019-2020, target $46 (-67%).

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Oct 04, 2018

Manulife Financial Corporation MFC

Muddy Waters is short Manulife because a Saskatchewan verdict due by year-end could force MFC to accept unlimited deposits at a guaranteed 4%+ rate — an unhedgeable bleed its own expert admits could cause insolvency.

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Muddy Waters Jul 25, 2018

TAL Education Group TAL

TAL Education's core Peiyou business is shrinking, not 'healthy' as CFO Rong Luo claims; under every reasonable model TAL's FY2018 Q3-Q4 disclosures fail to reconcile.

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Muddy Waters Jul 23, 2018

TAL Education Group TAL

TAL's own Peiyou Q3 disclosures, common-sized, mathematically imply offline enrollment declined YoY — contradicting the growth narrative and signaling fabricated results.

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Muddy Waters Jul 02, 2018

TAL Education Group TAL

TAL inflated Firstleap's acquired deferred revenue by 90-175%, pumping $21-29M of fake profit through FY2017 via an above-the-line accounting lever obscured by an overlooked small acquisition.

N4 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 13, 2018

TAL Education Group TAL

TAL is a real business with fake financials: two asset-parking transactions inflated FY2016-FY2018 pre-tax profits by $153M (28.4%) while Deloitte China was starved of audit hours.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Feb 08, 2018

IQE plc IQE

Muddy Waters is short IQE: the compound-semi maker inflated 2015/2016 net income by 58.5%/25.4% via transactions with its Cardiff University JV — an alter ego, not an arm's-length partner.

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Muddy Waters Jan 31, 2018

OSI Systems OSIS

OSIS's rebuttal fails: S2 Albania's financials prove ICMS contributed no capital, making its 49% concession stake an unjustified conduit for corruption and confirming management's lost credibility.

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Muddy Waters Dec 20, 2017

China Internet Nationwide Financial Services Inc. CIFS

CIFS is an old-style China reverse-merger fraud dressed up as a Reg A+ IPO; SAIC filings show 5x revenue overstatement, every disclosed borrower is a sham, and the equity is worthless.

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Muddy Waters Dec 06, 2017

OSI Systems, Inc. OSIS

OSIS is rotten to the core: the Albania concession was obtained via an apparent bribe, the Mexico turnkey is egregiously priced and up for renewal, and FCPA liability could erase a large chunk of the $1.6bn market cap.

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Muddy Waters Jun 29, 2017

Prothena Corp PLC PRTA

Short PRTA: publicly-available NEOD001 data does not show efficacy — organ responses are likely driven by prior PCD chemo, not the drug, and $1.5B peak sales are unrealistic.

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Muddy Waters Jun 16, 2017

Man Wah Holdings 1999.HK

Man Wah's response fails to address Muddy Waters' core fraud allegations: suspicious Macau profit-shifting, export revenue gaps vs. Panjiva data, tax inconsistencies, and undisclosed debt all remain unexplained.

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Muddy Waters Jun 05, 2017

Asanko Gold Inc. AKG

Asanko's reassurances on Nkran are 'puppies and rainbows': fresh drone images show wall failures, reserve accounting is non-compliant, and insider share counts don't reconcile with management's 'never sold' claim.

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Muddy Waters May 31, 2017

Asanko Gold Inc. AKG

Muddy Waters is short AKG: flawed geology, a collapsing Nkran pit, and a 2018 liquidity crunch make the Ghana gold miner highly likely to end up a zero.

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Muddy Waters Dec 19, 2016

China Huishan Dairy Holdings 6863.HK

Huishan's revenue is fabricated: tax-bureau data, cow-farm photos, and e-commerce scrapes all show the reported top line is dramatically overstated — the stock is a zero.

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Muddy Waters Dec 16, 2016

China Huishan Dairy Holdings 6863 HK

Huishan is a fraud worth close to zero — fabricated alfalfa self-sufficiency inflates margins, RMB 1.6bn of CapEx is fictitious, and Chairman Yang has siphoned farms to a related party.

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Muddy Waters Dec 13, 2016

Nidec Corp. 6594 JP

Nidec is a gigantic stock promotion: zero organic growth and aggressive accounting hide behind a Facebook-like multiple — fair value JPY 4,764, ~52% downside.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Aug 29, 2016

St. Jude Medical STJ

STJ's rebuttal to Muddy Waters' cybersecurity short report is 80% fluff and 20% substance, with admissions and deception cues that confirm its cardiac devices remain unsafe and need recall.

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Muddy Waters Aug 25, 2016

St. Jude Medical, Inc. STJ

St. Jude's $23B cardiac-device franchise rests on a Merlin ecosystem so insecure that hackers can crash pacemakers from 50 feet — a recall and two-year remediation imply 50%+ downside and likely covenant breach.

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Muddy Waters Aug 10, 2016

Ströer SE & Co. KGaA SAX

Muddy Waters publishes the translated transcript of Ströer's June 2016 AGM, where CEO Udo Müller defends the company against MW's short attack amid sharp shareholder questions.

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Muddy Waters Apr 28, 2016

Stroer SE & Co. KGaA SAX

Stroer's defense fails to rebut Muddy Waters' core allegations of overstated organic growth, misleading cash-flow netting and freeXmedia self-dealing, with a CIA polygrapher flagging Muller's response as deceptive.

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Muddy Waters Apr 21, 2016

Ströer SE & Co. KGaA SAX

Ströer's digital-transformation narrative is hollow: organic growth is 10x overstated, EBITDA and FCF are inflated, and insider self-dealing rivals Chinese fraud cases — short.

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Muddy Waters Mar 08, 2016

Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA CO

Casino's claimed France recovery is fiction: Mercialys property gains inflate EBITDA, suppliers are being stretched, and the CFO's earnings-call language shows deception clusters.

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Muddy Waters Jan 13, 2016

Groupe Casino CO

Casino is a highly-levered, deteriorating French retailer being hollowed out by controlling shareholder Naouri and using property-sale gains to inflate EBITDA; equity worth ~€7 per share.

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Muddy Waters Dec 16, 2015

Groupe Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA CO FP

Casino's financial statements mask 8.9x leverage and inflated EBITDA via related-party Mercialys real-estate sales; shares are worth €6.91 vs €48.97, an 86% decline.

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Muddy Waters Oct 15, 2015

TeliaSonera AB TLSN

Short TeliaSonera: disclosed Uzbekistan bribery is only the tip — ~SEK 17bn of suspect Eurasia/Nepal payments plus a multi-billion DOJ FCPA settlement threaten the dividend and cut stub fair value to SEK 27-29.

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Muddy Waters Apr 09, 2015

Noble Group NOBL

Muddy Waters is short Noble Group: a cash-burning commodities trader that manufactures EBITDA via sham affiliate transactions like the PT ALH $46M negative-goodwill scheme to keep credit flowing.

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Muddy Waters Feb 17, 2015

Bolloré SA BOL FP

Bolloré's Breton-Pulleys circular ownership masks that public float is 42.8% not 24.3%; at €4.37 shares trade at 41% of €10.63 NAV — 95% upside to €8.50.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Nov 20, 2014

Superb Summit International Group Limited 1228.HK

Superb Summit's HK$773m of reported revenue belongs to a coal company it never owned, and its HK$1.5bn JFT acquisition is a sham valuation routed through a mystery intermediary.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jul 06, 2014

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ's July 3 disclosures vindicate the fraud thesis: the audit chair resigned, PwC will never sign off, and insiders front-ran the news by dumping stock.

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Muddy Waters Jun 04, 2014

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ's own investigation committee confirmed widespread data tampering — the same pattern that preceded Sino-Forest's collapse — so Muddy Waters maintains its fraud rating.

N3 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Apr 13, 2014

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ Mobile's surprise Q4 loss and negative cash flow under PwC's tougher audit confirm Muddy Waters' fraud thesis: revenue, acquisitions, and cash balances are all fabricated.

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Muddy Waters Dec 19, 2013

NQ Mobile, Inc. NQ

NQ Mobile's independent-committee fraud probe is structurally compromised; Muddy Waters offers to fund Plante & Moran to audit the auditors and protect investors from another China-fraud whitewash.

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Muddy Waters Nov 12, 2013

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ Mobile's credible-looking US management is a veneer hiding a $1.1bn fraud — Mathison conceals JCAP ties, Co-CEO Khan knows nothing, and pre-IPO partners include a convicted racketeer.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Nov 06, 2013

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ Mobile's largest purported revenue source, Yidatong, is a controlled shell whose offices, tax filings, and carrier records all contradict NQ's story — we maintain a <$1 target.

N4 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Nov 01, 2013

NQ Mobile (NetQin) NQ

Muddy Waters maintains its sub-$1 price target on NQ Mobile after Chinese media reporting confirms that ZTE, Huawei, Lenovo and Coolpad never had the pre-installation partnerships NQ claims.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Oct 29, 2013

NQ Mobile NQ

NQ Mobile's Oct 25 rebuttal of Muddy Waters' fraud report contained ten provable lies — Yidatong is NQ, revenue and market share are fabricated; reiterating price target under $1.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Oct 24, 2013

NQ Mobile Inc. NQ

NQ Mobile is a 'China Fraud 2.0': 72%+ of China revenue is fictitious, real market share is 1.4% not 55%, and the $127.9M cash balance is likely forged — target price under $1.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Sep 06, 2013

American Tower Corporation AMT

AMT's $4.8bn purchase of Global Tower Partners at ~19x 2014 EBITDA looks engineered to mask decelerating US organic growth and preserve 20% dividend-growth optics; maintain Strong Sell.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters Sep 02, 2013

Olam International OLAM

Ten months after our initial short, Olam's FY13 results confirm the thesis: 1.8% ROA, S$800m cash burn, ossified board, no acknowledgement of the over-leverage problem.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Aug 12, 2013

American Tower Corporation AMT

AMT's $811M purchase of 4,456 NIHD towers at 21x EBITDA is a de facto loan to a near-bankrupt counterparty, masking weak growth and compounding accounting red flags from the prior Site Sharing deal.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Aug 01, 2013

American Tower AMT

AMT's international growth is a de facto lending / FX carry trade masking deteriorating economics, and ~$250M appears to have vanished from its Site Sharing acquisition.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 17, 2013

American Tower Corp AMT

AMT is a Strong Sell at $44.57 (40% downside): a $250M Brazil accounting discrepancy hints at fraud, international growth is a disguised lending/carry trade, and Wi-Fi will erode tower economics.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Feb 08, 2013

Olam International Ltd. OLAM

Olam's Q2 2013 results confirm Muddy Waters' Strong Sell thesis: debt is spiraling (9.5x EBITDA), cash is burning, and management's acquisitions and Gabon project reveal haphazard planning.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jan 24, 2013

Focus Media Holding Ltd. FMCN

New BVI registry evidence proves FMCN lied about its mobile-phone VIE acquisitions, reinforcing the long-running fraud thesis just as Carlyle's LBO consortium prepares to overpay.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Dec 04, 2012

Olam International OLAM

Olam's surprise $750m Temasek-backed debt raise — at an effective cost over 10% — validates Muddy Waters' thesis that the company is days from collapse; Strong Sell maintained.

N3 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Nov 30, 2012

Olam International OLAM

Olam's 45-page rebuttal ducks Muddy Waters' real points; we'll pay S&P to rate Olam's debt and prove the market underprices its accounting and acquisition risk.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Nov 27, 2012

Olam International Ltd. SGX:O32

Olam is an Enron-style agri trader whose aggressive non-cash accounting, off-the-rails CapEx binge, and 9.3x leverage mask a failing trading business — equity likely worthless, bonds 14-33¢.

N5 V2 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 18, 2012

New Oriental Education & Technology Group EDU

New Oriental is hiding an extensive franchising operation, filing fraudulent tax-exempt financials in Beijing and using a cosmetic VIE — expect a restatement and Deloitte to resign.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Feb 09, 2012

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's 'independent' verification of its 185,174 LCD network counted 30,500 cardboard posters as LCDs, confirming Muddy Waters' fraud thesis and impugning all reported financials.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jan 06, 2012

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's bizarre acquisition of a tiny border-town ginseng plantation from its own employee is fresh evidence the 'Olympus of China' is using fake M&A to launder fake cash off its books.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Dec 09, 2011

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's promise to have 'reputable' Chinese firms verify its LCD network is worthless — CTR, the firm most likely to be hired, previously rubber-stamped CCME's fabricated bus network.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Nov 29, 2011

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's rebuttal concedes Muddy Waters' core claims — inflated LCD network, 1,758% theater market share, phantom VIE acquisitions, and brazen insider self-dealing make the shares un-investable.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Nov 21, 2011

Focus Media Holding Ltd. FMCN

Focus Media is the Olympus of China: it inflates its LCD screen count by 50%, systematically overpays for acquisitions it writes off, and enriches insiders at shareholders' expense.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jun 28, 2011

Spreadtrum Communications SPRD

Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 20, 2011

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

Sino-Forest claims Huaihua Yuda is unrelated, but Muddy Waters shows Sonic Jita was once owned by TRE executives and still shares a key executive — undisclosed related-party transactions contradicting CEO Allen Chan's guarantees.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 13, 2011

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

TRE management's evasive Q1 call answers — unfinished E&Y review, undisclosed related parties, an unnecessary AI model, and dropped analyst questions — reinforce Muddy Waters' fraud thesis on Sino-Forest.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 02, 2011

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

Sino-Forest is a fraud: its Authorized Intermediary structure fabricates timber revenue, its Yunnan holdings are overstated by ~$900M, and equity is worth less than $1 vs. $18.21.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Apr 04, 2011

Duoyuan Global Water Inc. DGW

DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Mar 02, 2011

China MediaExpress Holdings CCME

CCME is a fraud: a recorded salesperson admits doubling the bus count for SEC filings, and Chairman Cheng's rebuttal cited fabricated license plates — fair value $3.54 vs $12.27.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Feb 03, 2011

China MediaExpress Holdings CCME

CCME is a pump-and-dump: reported revenue is overstated ~5x, its bus network is half the claimed size, and management is cashing out — fair value $5.28 vs $16.61.

N4 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Nov 10, 2010

RINO International Corp. RINO

RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.

N5 V2 C2
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Muddy Waters Jul 22, 2010

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

AMEX-listed Orient Paper is a Chinese reverse-merger fraud: tax records, shell-company suppliers, and customer interviews show revenues and profits are fabricated by orders of magnitude.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 13, 2010

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

ONP secretly swapped its paper-machine order from corrugating medium to kraft board to salvage a technically impossible 360,000-ton output claim, while overpaying the vendor $13-14 million.

N3 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 06, 2010

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 02, 2010

Orient Paper Inc. ONP

Muddy Waters stands by its ONP fraud thesis: the Baoding factory is incapable of producing reported output, and the 'rejected $300K research fee' vendetta narrative is fabricated.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jul 01, 2010

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

Muddy Waters reaffirms ONP is a fraud: SAIC-filed PRC financials, impossible equipment claims, and bogus acquisitions contradict ONP's SEC filings; Strong Sell.

N4 V1 C1
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Muddy Waters Jun 28, 2010

Orient Paper Inc. ONP

Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.

N5 V2 C2
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