Contrarian Corpus

670 documents showing 601–660

Corvex 2012-10-24

ADT Corporation ADT

ADT is drastically under-levered post-Tyco spin; levering to 3.0x EBITDA and repurchasing ~30% of the float delivers ~44% upside to a $55 target.

N4 V3 C3
ValueAct 2012-10-01

Multiple (ValueAct portfolio: Moody's, CBRE, Motorola Solutions, Adobe, Halliburton, Autodesk, Gardner Denver, Sara Lee, Verisign, CR Bard)

ValueAct's edge is concentrated, board-level positions in differentiated, recurring-revenue businesses — picking quality and avoiding leverage, complexity and bad governance.

N4 V2 C2
Sandell 2012-10-01

TPC Group Inc. TPCG

TPC Group's $40/share take-private by First Reserve/SK Capital is a self-dealt, low-balled sale; a proper auction plus MLP re-rating would deliver materially higher value to shareholders.

N4 V2 C2
Marcato 2012-10-01

Alexander & Baldwin (ALEX); GenCorp (GY); Brookfield Residential Properties (BRP)

Three stocks — ALEX, GenCorp, Brookfield Residential — hide land assets on their balance sheets at decades-old cost, offering 46-286% upside once marked to market.

N3 V3 C2
Muddy Waters 2012-07-18

New Oriental Education & Technology Group EDU

New Oriental is hiding an extensive franchising operation, filing fraudulent tax-exempt financials in Beijing and using a cosmetic VIE — expect a restatement and Deloitte to resign.

N5 V2 C2
Trian Partners 2012-06-18

Lazard Ltd LAZ

Lazard's premier advisory and asset-management franchise trades at a discount; executing the April 2012 plan to 25%+ margins, disciplined capital return, and stronger governance can nearly double the stock to ~$51.

N4 V3 C3
Elliott Management 2012-05-31

BMC Software BMC

BMC has underperformed every peer and index over 1-, 2-, 3-year and YTD windows

N5 V4 C4
Starboard Value 2012-05-23

AOL, Inc. AOL

AOL's board lets management burn Access/Search cash on a Display strategy losing $500M+ a year; elect three Starboard nominees to enforce discipline and restructure or exit Patch.

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2012-05-16

J.C. Penney Company, Inc. JCP

Ron Johnson (Target, Apple Retail) can repeat his retail magic at chronically mismanaged JCP

N5 V4 C4
Pershing Square 2012-04-04

Burger King Worldwide Holdings BKW

Back best-in-class 3G management team retaining 70%+ equity

N3 V2 C2
Muddy Waters 2012-02-09

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's 'independent' verification of its 185,174 LCD network counted 30,500 cardboard posters as LCDs, confirming Muddy Waters' fraud thesis and impugning all reported financials.

N5 V2 C2
Pershing Square 2012-02-06

Canadian Pacific Railway CP

CP has the worst operating ratio of any Class I railroad while closest peer CN has the best

N5 V4 C5
Muddy Waters 2012-01-06

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's bizarre acquisition of a tiny border-town ginseng plantation from its own employee is fresh evidence the 'Olympus of China' is using fake M&A to launder fake cash off its books.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2011-12-09

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's promise to have 'reputable' Chinese firms verify its LCD network is worthless — CTR, the firm most likely to be hired, previously rubber-stamped CCME's fabricated bus network.

N4 V2 C2
Sandell 2011-12-01

Tronox Incorporated TROX

Post-Exxaro Tronox is the lowest-cost, fully-integrated TiO2 producer; levering up for a $24-$43/share special dividend plus relisting unlocks $183-$194/share, 56-66% upside.

N3 V2 C2
Muddy Waters 2011-11-29

Focus Media Holding FMCN

FMCN's rebuttal concedes Muddy Waters' core claims — inflated LCD network, 1,758% theater market share, phantom VIE acquisitions, and brazen insider self-dealing make the shares un-investable.

N4 V2 C2
Muddy Waters 2011-11-21

Focus Media Holding Ltd. FMCN

Focus Media is the Olympus of China: it inflates its LCD screen count by 50%, systematically overpays for acquisitions it writes off, and enriches insiders at shareholders' expense.

N5 V2 C2
Pershing Square 2011-11-08

Lowe's Companies, Inc. LOW

LOW trades at 13.3x depressed EPS with ~8% FCF yield — cheap

N3 V3 C2
Pershing Square 2011-10-18

Fortune Brands Home & Security FBHS

Orphaned post-spin-off stock — recovery optionality mispriced at $13

N4 V3 C3
Greenlight Capital 2011-10-17

Green Mountain Coffee Roasters GMCR

GMCR's $9 EPS bull case ignores a smaller TAM, falling K-cup attachment rates, a September 2012 patent cliff, and accounting shenanigans at fulfillment agent MBlock — realistic EPS is ~$3.50.

N5 V2 C2
Trian Partners 2011-10-16

State Street Corporation STT

State Street subsidized growth at the expense of profitability; committing to 35% EBT margins, capital return, and a possible SSgA spin can lift shares from $34 to ~$99 by 2014.

N4 V3 C3
Sandell 2011-10-01

Rubicon Limited RBC

Rubicon's NZ-listed holdco structure hides two world-class US assets — ArborGen and Tenon — that a Tenon auction, ArborGen NASDAQ relisting, and three new shareholder directors can unlock for 200-300%+ upside.

N4 V3 C2
Third Point 2011-09-14

Yahoo! Inc. YHOO

Yahoo's Asian assets and cash alone cover its $14 price; with a new board and unlocked 40% Alibaba stake, intrinsic value is $20-32 per share — 40-122% upside.

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2011-09-14

Hong Kong Monetary Authority / HKD-USD Peg

HKD peg forces Hong Kong to import ultra-loose U.S. monetary policy despite a vastly stronger economy

N5 V3 C3
JANA Partners 2011-08-22

The McGraw-Hill Companies MHP

McGraw-Hill's conglomerate structure masks four independently attractive assets; separating MH Education, Information & Media and the S&P Index business plus an accelerated buyback unlocks ~60% upside to ~$65.

N4 V3 C2
Muddy Waters 2011-06-28

Spreadtrum Communications SPRD

Spreadtrum's 229.6% 2010 revenue jump cannot be reconciled with MediaTek's flat year, zero cash taxes were paid on $75M of profit, and CFO/auditor turnover points to material misstatement — Muddy Waters is short.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2011-06-20

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

Sino-Forest claims Huaihua Yuda is unrelated, but Muddy Waters shows Sonic Jita was once owned by TRE executives and still shares a key executive — undisclosed related-party transactions contradicting CEO Allen Chan's guarantees.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2011-06-13

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

TRE management's evasive Q1 call answers — unfinished E&Y review, undisclosed related parties, an unnecessary AI model, and dropped analyst questions — reinforce Muddy Waters' fraud thesis on Sino-Forest.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2011-06-02

Sino-Forest Corporation TRE

Sino-Forest is a fraud: its Authorized Intermediary structure fabricates timber revenue, its Yunnan holdings are overstated by ~$900M, and equity is worth less than $1 vs. $18.21.

N5 V2 C2
Pershing Square 2011-05-25

Family Dollar Stores FDO

FDO trades at same ~9x forward EBIT as Dollar General despite 37% performance gap

N5 V3 C3
Muddy Waters 2011-04-04

Duoyuan Global Water Inc. DGW

DGW is a massive fraud overstating revenue by 100x; forged PRC audits, empty factory, and related-party tunneling to Chairman Guo imply the stock is worth under $1.

N5 V2 C2
Elliott Management 2011-03-09

Iron Mountain Incorporated IRM

IRM's core storage is a compelling REIT — conversion unlocks ~$10.58/share in tax savings plus cap rate re-rating

N4 V3 C3
Muddy Waters 2011-03-02

China MediaExpress Holdings CCME

CCME is a fraud: a recorded salesperson admits doubling the bus count for SEC filings, and Chairman Cheng's rebuttal cited fabricated license plates — fair value $3.54 vs $12.27.

N4 V2 C2
Muddy Waters 2011-02-03

China MediaExpress Holdings CCME

CCME is a pump-and-dump: reported revenue is overstated ~5x, its bus network is half the claimed size, and management is cashing out — fair value $5.28 vs $16.61.

N4 V2 C2
Muddy Waters 2010-11-10

RINO International Corp. RINO

RINO is a near-zero: 94% of its reported revenue is fabricated, customers deny buying its FGD systems, and founders are draining cash via the VIE; fair value $2.45 vs. $15.52.

N5 V2 C2
Greenlight Capital 2010-10-13

The St. Joe Company JOE

St. Joe's Florida real estate empire is a value trap: developments are ghost towns, the airport catalyst is a bust, and the land is worth $7-10/share, not $24.54.

N5 V3 C3
Muddy Waters 2010-07-22

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

AMEX-listed Orient Paper is a Chinese reverse-merger fraud: tax records, shell-company suppliers, and customer interviews show revenues and profits are fabricated by orders of magnitude.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2010-07-13

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

ONP secretly swapped its paper-machine order from corrugating medium to kraft board to salvage a technically impossible 360,000-ton output claim, while overpaying the vendor $13-14 million.

N3 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2010-07-06

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2010-07-02

Orient Paper Inc. ONP

Muddy Waters stands by its ONP fraud thesis: the Baoding factory is incapable of producing reported output, and the 'rejected $300K research fee' vendetta narrative is fabricated.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2010-07-01

Orient Paper, Inc. ONP

Muddy Waters reaffirms ONP is a fraud: SAIC-filed PRC financials, impossible equipment claims, and bogus acquisitions contradict ONP's SEC filings; Strong Sell.

N4 V1 C1
Muddy Waters 2010-06-28

Orient Paper Inc. ONP

Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.

N5 V2 C2
Pershing Square 2010-05-26

General Growth Properties GGP

GGP is worth ~$20/share sum-of-parts ($15 PF GGP + $5 GGO) vs. $14 price — 43% upside by year-end

N5 V4 C4
Pershing Square 2010-05-26

NRSRO Rating Agencies (Moody's, S&P, Fitch)

Rating agencies caused trillions in losses by rubber-stamping structured finance and bond insurers

N4 V3 C2
Pershing Square 2009-12-07

Mall REIT sector (long General Growth Properties) GGP

Mall REITs still trade at 7.8% cap rates vs. 6.3% Baa — a historically wide spread

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2009-10-20

Corrections Corporation of America CXW

CXW trades at a 12% cap rate vs ~7% for Health Care REITs with near-identical attributes

N5 V4 C3
Greenlight Capital 2009-10-19

US/Japan Sovereign Debt & Fiat Currencies (Macro)

Bernanke and Geithner's short-termism has institutionalized too-big-to-fail and will debase fiat currencies — hedge with gold and long-dated options on higher US and Japanese rates.

N5 V1 C1
Pershing Square 2009-10-06

Realty Income Corporation O

Tenant base is mostly junk-rated discretionary retailers with high bankruptcy risk

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2009-05-27

General Growth Properties GGWPQ

GGP's assets materially exceed liabilities — this is a liquidity bankruptcy, not insolvency

N5 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2009-05-11

Target Corporation TGT

Target board lacks senior operating experience in retail, credit cards, and real estate

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2008-11-19

Target Corporation TGT

Target trades at only 5.8x '09E EV/EBITDA while REITs trade 14.5x-35.7x — 22% of EBITDA mispriced

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2008-10-29

Target Corporation TGT

Target owns 95% of its buildings — more real estate than any big-box peer, worth $39bn replacement value

N5 V3 C3
Greenlight Capital 2008-05-21

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman is using fair-value accounting tricks to hide CDO losses and inflate Level 3 marks; the firm is over-levered, opaque, and needs to recapitalize before the Fed has to step in.

N5 V2 C1
Pershing Square 2008-05-21

Wendy's International WEN

Wendy's is 93% a brand-royalty and real-estate business masquerading as a restaurant chain

N5 V3 C3
Greenlight Capital 2008-05-21

Lehman Brothers LEH

Lehman quietly disclosed $6.5bn of previously hidden CDO exposure but took only a $200m write-down

N5 V2 C2
JANA Partners 2007-08-02

Whole Foods Market, Inc. WFMI

N1 V1 C1
Pershing Square 2006-11-09

Borders Group, Inc. BGP

Book superstore industry is misunderstood — Amazon risk is exaggerated and superstores have gained share

N4 V3 C3
Carl Icahn 2006-02-01

Time Warner Inc. TWX

Time Warner has underperformed its peer index by 51% under Parsons; splitting into four SpinCos (AOL, Content, Publishing, Cable) plus a $20bn buyback unlocks $30-45bn — a 35-54% premium.

N5 V4 C4
Pershing Square 2006-01-18

McDonald's Corporation MCD

McDonald's is fundamentally not a restaurant company — 78-86% of EBITDA comes from Brand McDonald's

N4 V3 C3
Pershing Square 2005-11-15

McDonald's Corporation MCD

McDonald's real estate is worth ~$46bn, ~94% of enterprise value, but trades like a restaurant stock

N5 V4 C3