58 documents showing 1–58

Welltower Inc. WELL

Welltower's 10-year executive program could pay CEO Mitra up to $3 billion while incentivizing dilutive growth at a 144% NAV premium — shareholders should sell WELL and rotate into Ventas or AHR.

Multiple REITs (21 underperformers)

Land & Buildings names 21 REIT CEOs who trail their own proxy peers on 1-, 3-, and 5-year TSR yet collect multi-million packages — shareholders should vote against say-on-pay and the comp committees.

CTO Realty Growth, Inc. CTO

CTO Realty's management inflates AFFO by excluding recurring capex, used a sham loan to hide a tenant collapse, and is diluting shareholders 70% to fund a dividend it cannot cover.

Sumitomo Realty & Development Co., Ltd. 8830

Sumitomo Realty trades at half its post-tax real-estate NAV due to excessive cross-shareholdings, weak payouts, and worst-in-class TOPIX 100 governance; fixing these unlocks 43% upside to ~¥8,000.

US REIT sector (15 underperforming large-cap REITs)

15 large-cap REITs persistently underperformed their proxy peers over 1-, 3- and 5-year periods yet kept paying CEOs the same — shareholders should vote against comp committees and say-on-pay.

Howard Hughes Holdings Inc. HHH

HHH trades at a 40% NAV discount with no take-private bidders; Pershing's $900M primary investment at $90 converts it into a modern-day Berkshire Hathaway.

Howard Hughes Holdings Inc. HHH

HHH has compounded at just 2.2% over 14 years; merging with Pershing Square Holdco at $85/share converts a market-orphaned real-estate company into a Berkshire-style permanent compounder.

Public REIT sector (vs. private real estate)

Public REITs have crushed private real estate over 30 years (9.9% vs 7.0%); with institutions at GFC-low underweights and supply rolling over, listed REITs are a generational buy.

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI PG's controlling shareholder Vitek swapped €273m of personal debt for Dubai properties still under construction, sticking CPI PG with ~€220m of hidden progress payments while pocketing ~€118m.

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI Property Group's luxury London transactions — same-day flips, offshore proxies, and uneconomic sales to PEPs — bear hallmarks of money laundering integration using bondholder funds.

Crown Castle Inc. CCI

National Health Investors, Inc. NHI

NHI is an undervalued senior-housing REIT whose conflicted, interlocked board threatens to give away the upcoming NHC lease renewal — vote AGAINST Webb and Swafford to force change.

CPI Property Group CPIPG

CPIPG's 2023 results show undisclosed related-party transfers to controlling shareholder Vitek, aggressive fair-value inflation, and an unreconciled 92% equity collapse at GSG Berlin — management must answer on the call.

Zillow Group, Inc. Z

Zillow's Premier Agent core is saturated, NAR lawsuits will compress commissions, Flex/Super App cannot replace it, and aggressive revenue recognition masks decline — shares worth $23-$35 vs $57.

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

CPI PG's Italian landbank and St. Tropez villa deals show ~€100M in unexplained cash and receivables gaps, suggesting controlling shareholder Vitek is using bondholder money to strip assets and launder cash.

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

Muddy Waters is short CPI Property Group's credit: its €19.2B portfolio appears inflated via implausible Berlin gains, cherry-picked Bubny landbank comps, and occupancy rates realtor listings show are overstated by ~2x.

Blackstone Mortgage Trust, Inc. BXMT

BXMT's borrowers only stay current because of expiring rate swaps; as ~$16B of swaps terminate in 2024, dividend cuts of 33-85% and $2.5-4.5B of loan losses could wipe out the $4B market cap.

CPI Property Group CPIPGR

Follow-up to Muddy Waters' Part 1 report: a list of pointed questions challenging CPI Property Group to explain self-dealing transactions through which controlling shareholder Radovan Vitek is allegedly asset-stripping the company.

CPI Property Group S.A. CPIPGR

Muddy Waters is short CPI PG's credit: controlling shareholder Radovan Vitek is brazenly looting the company via undisclosed related-party deals — ~50% of €1.2bn examined transactions appear suspect.

Vivion Investments

Vivion's proposed bond exchange rests on inflated UK hotel valuations — illustrated by Crowne Plaza Heathrow, marked at EUR94.6m versus CBRE's EUR72.9m — serving insiders, not bondholders.

Alexandria Real Estate Equities, Inc. ARE

Alexandria's life-science office portfolio is being hit by the same WFH hurricane as traditional offices, and shares face 30-40% downside if re-rated to coastal office REIT peers.

Vivion Investments

Muddy Waters stays short Vivion bonds: the December 2022 rebuttal is misleading, asset values are inflated, rent24 exposure is hidden, and shareholder loans are being cashed out with bondholder money.

Vivion Investments S.à.r.l.

Vivion's €1.44bn bond issuer is a multi-billion euro shell game — fabricated shareholder loans, inflated occupancy and fair value gains, and related-party rents enriching controlling shareholder Amir Dayan.

KE Holdings BEKE

BEKE is systemic fraud: platform scraping and field work show new-home GTV inflated ~126%, revenues inflated 77-96%, with ghost stores, clone stores, and a sham acquisition masking the deception.

REIT sector (thematic)

REITs hedge inflation, but only short-lease high-margin sectors — residential, self-storage, warehouses — work; office and net lease are bond-like losers in a 6%+ CPI world.

N/A (asset-class advocacy)

Publicly traded REITs have outperformed private real estate by 165–590bps annually for 20 years, offer better liquidity, cheaper valuations vs. bonds, and superior inflation-era returns.

Multiple REIT subsectors (urban office, retail, business hotels, movie theaters)

Post-vaccine pent-up demand will mask permanent secular damage in urban office, retail, business hotels, and movie theaters — investors should sell the mirage, not buy it.

Apartment Investment and Management Company AIV

AIV's proposed taxable reverse spin-off won't close its 18% NAV discount and lets Considine duck 25 years of underperformance; demand a shareholder vote or explore a sale at $58 — 75% upside.

D.R. Horton and Invitation Homes DHI/INVH

COVID-19 has supercharged the suburban single-family thesis; entry-level homebuilder D.R. Horton and single-family rental REIT Invitation Homes trade 20%+ below highs despite accelerating demand.

Empire State Realty Trust ESRT

Empire State Realty Trust is uniquely exposed to NYC's 'existential hurricane' — COVID, WFH, SALT cap, and WeWork's collapse crush demand while observation-deck revenue vanishes, driving shares substantially lower.

Innovative Industrial Properties IIPR

Property-by-property forensic appendix shows IIPR overpaid for cannabis-grow real estate while tenants sit on empty or unbuilt sites, implying inflated rents and looming defaults.

Innovative Industrial Properties, Inc. IIPR

IIPR is a cannabis REIT propped up by overpriced sale-leasebacks to insolvent tenants and sham markups; fair value is $22.29 versus a $69 share price.

Unizo Holdings Company 3258.T

Unizo's board is dressing an insider-friendly employee buyout as a takeover defense; Elliott demands disclosure and conflict-of-interest safeguards under METI's Fair M&A Guidelines.

Healthcare Trust of America, Inc. HTA

HTA's suspiciously flat Same-Property NOI growth mirrors Brixmor's pre-restatement pattern; Spruce Point sees 20-40% downside to $15-$20 once the accounting unravels.

Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO

Taubman's persistent peer underperformance stems from a family-entrenched board and dual-class structure; electing Litt and collapsing Series B shares unlocks value common shareholders have been denied.

QTS Realty Trust QTS

QTS's CEO Chad Williams runs a culture of self-enrichment with no accountability; shareholders should withhold votes from him and the comp chair at the May 3 annual meeting.

The St. Joe Company JOE

St. Joe's Florida Panhandle land bank is worth a fraction of what bulls claim; absent the promised population boom, the stock is materially overvalued and a short.

Realty Income Corp O

Realty Income's 'magic dividend' flywheel is broken — true same-store rents are -0.8% (not +1.2%), and as rates rise and tenants disintermediate the stock re-rates 30-45% lower to $28-$35.

Taubman Centers TCO

Taubman's dominant Class A malls are still bustling and growing, yet TCO is down 25% YTD — management, not 'dead malls,' is the problem, with 50%+ upside if the board acts.

Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO

Taubman's best-in-class malls are worth ~$106/share (~70% upside), but the family's dual-class 30% voting block blocks reform — elect Litt and governance expert Elson.

Howard Hughes Corporation HHC

HHC is the public-market way to invest alongside a Donald-Bren-style MPC compounder: irreplaceable master-planned communities with 37M SF of remaining entitlements, roughly 10x what's already built.

Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO

Taubman Centers has chronically underperformed Class A mall peers by 57% over five years under entrenched family governance; electing L&B's nominees can unlock 65% NAV upside.

Taubman Centers, Inc. TCO

Taubman's sudden reversal on Board size is reactive and disingenuous; any new director must be vetted by shareholders and be truly independent of the Taubman family.

MGM Resorts International MGM

Land and Buildings will file its own proxy at MGM after the board rejected its four nominees, arguing a $1.5bn post-pitch rally proves shareholders back its real-estate-unlock plan.

Brookdale Senior Living Inc. BKD

BKD trades at a wide discount because its owned real estate is buried inside an OpCo; a tax-free PropCo/OpCo REIT spin plus governance overhaul unlocks ~$49/share.

Crown Castle International Corp. CCI

Crown Castle is a U.S. tower REIT 'betwixt and between' — raising the 2015 dividend to $4.00 (80% AFFO payout) re-rates the stock to a 4.0% yield, unlocking 27% near-term and 60%+ upside in 15 months.

American Tower Corporation AMT

AMT's $4.8bn purchase of Global Tower Partners at ~19x 2014 EBITDA looks engineered to mask decelerating US organic growth and preserve 20% dividend-growth optics; maintain Strong Sell.

American Tower Corporation AMT

AMT's $811M purchase of 4,456 NIHD towers at 21x EBITDA is a de facto loan to a near-bankrupt counterparty, masking weak growth and compounding accounting red flags from the prior Site Sharing deal.

American Tower AMT

AMT's international growth is a de facto lending / FX carry trade masking deteriorating economics, and ~$250M appears to have vanished from its Site Sharing acquisition.

American Tower Corp AMT

AMT is a Strong Sell at $44.57 (40% downside): a $250M Brazil accounting discrepancy hints at fraud, international growth is a disguised lending/carry trade, and Wi-Fi will erode tower economics.

Alexander & Baldwin (ALEX); GenCorp (GY); Brookfield Residential Properties (BRP)

Three stocks — ALEX, GenCorp, Brookfield Residential — hide land assets on their balance sheets at decades-old cost, offering 46-286% upside once marked to market.

Iron Mountain Incorporated IRM

Iron Mountain's 44%-margin NOAM storage cash cow is being squandered on low-ROIC Digital and Int'l bets; capital discipline plus a REIT conversion can lift the stock from $25 to $52-$77.

The St. Joe Company JOE

St. Joe's Florida real estate empire is a value trap: developments are ghost towns, the airport catalyst is a bust, and the land is worth $7-10/share, not $24.54.

General Growth Properties GGP

At $14, GGP implicitly prices spinco GGO at negative $1; PF GGP alone merits ~$15 on Simon's 6.6% peer cap rate, pointing to ~$20 combined intrinsic and ~43% upside by year-end emergence.

Mall REIT sector (long General Growth Properties) GGP

Market-feared mall-REIT collapse never arrived: leverage fell, $18bn equity was raised, cap rates compressed, and tenants now generate cash — making mall REITs still cheap versus Treasuries.

Corrections Corporation of America CXW

CXW is a misunderstood real estate business — 90% of EBITDA is owned prisons leased to governments; rerating to healthcare-REIT cap rates unlocks $40-$54 vs. $24.50.

Realty Income Corporation O

Realty Income trades at a 7.3% cap rate — a ~40% premium to 10-11% private-market rates for the same junk-credit retail properties; downside to ~$14 (-46%).

General Growth Properties GGWPQ

GGP filed for liquidity, not insolvency; with assets materially exceeding liabilities, a seven-year debt extension would deliver 10x–25x upside on equity trading at $1.19.