48 documents showing 1–48
United States Steel Corporation X
U.S. Steel has lagged peers by 227 points under Burritt; with the Nippon deal dead, Ancora's slate would install Stelco-turnaround CEO Kestenbaum to fix the company as a standalone public co.
Amcor plc (pro forma Amcor-Berry Global combination) AMCR
The Amcor-Berry merger creates a $36B packaging leader; executing $650M of conservatively-estimated synergies and a re-rate from 8x to 11x EBITDA delivers ~$16/share, a 50-70% upside.
Rio Tinto RIO
Rio Tinto's 29-year-old dual-listed structure has destroyed ~US$50bn of value; unifying into a single Ltd-led entity unlocks +27% near-term upside and restores scrip-M&A firepower.
Solvay SA SOLB BB
Post-spin Solvay — a #1 essential-chemicals business — trades at ~7x trough 2024 EPS with ~10% dividend yield; normalized 2028 earnings support roughly doubling the stock.
Glencore Plc GLEN
Glencore's unsolicited Teck bid is structurally flawed; Glencore should first demerge thermal coal, Oil Marketing and Viterra, then merge with Teck to unlock a world-class transition-metals leader.
Rogers Corporation ROG
Starboard's 6.5% stake in Rogers Corporation backs a board slate of specialty-materials veterans, arguing undervalued shares warrant fresh director expertise after the failed DuPont sale.
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman failed all 2016 and 2018 Investor Day EBITDA and share-price promises
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman underperformed the S&P 500 by 337% from IPO to Starboard's involvement
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman has broken every major Investor Day commitment since 2014 — fooled shareholders three times
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman returned just 80% since its 2005 IPO vs. 642-822% for peers, a ~562% deficit under CEO Peter Huntsman
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman has underperformed peers by 575% since IPO and missed three straight Investor Day targets; elect four Starboard nominees on the BLUE card to restore board accountability.
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Huntsman has underperformed proxy peers by 575% since its IPO
Huntsman Corporation HUN
A decade of missed EBITDA targets: 2014, 2016 and 2018 Investor Day aspirations all unmet
Huntsman Corporation HUN
Three consecutive Investor Days (2014, 2016, 2018) missed EBITDA targets by hundreds of millions
Hokuetsu Corporation 3865
Hokuetsu's 13-year CEO resists change as its paper business declines; selling Daio Paper cross-holdings and pivoting to biomass power can quadruple market cap to ¥533.9bn.
Danimer Scientific DNMR
DNMR is a post-SPAC bioplastics story whose 'sold-out' demand, $200M take-or-pay contracts, and $1 trillion TAM are misrepresentations — actual utilization is ~28% and Novomer is a Hail Mary.
Teck Resources TECK
Teck is the overlooked pick-axes play on the EV/green-electrification copper boom — QB2 doubles its copper mix and at forward-curve copper the stock is worth ~C$59, nearly double.
Corteva, Inc. CTVA
Corteva's spin-off potential is squandered by CEO Jim Collins and a complacent Board; Starboard nominates eight directors to force leadership change and unlock operating value.
GCP Applied Technologies GCP
Starboard rebuts GCP: stock has lagged peers on every milestone since the 2016 spin-off, and Starboard's superior director slate can finally drive the turnaround management hasn't delivered.
GCP Applied Technologies GCP
Four years post-spinoff, GCP has lagged peers on growth, margins, and stock price under an insular, interconnected Board; replace nine directors and unlock ~600 bps of EBIT margin expansion.
New Pacific Metals NUAG
Bolivia-focused silver developer New Pacific trades 17x peers on concessions likely acquired illegally under a now-ousted regime; Hindenburg targets C$0.37, 90%+ downside.
PPG Industries, Inc. PPG
PPG has underperformed peers by 3,500 bps under CEO McGarry; Trian wants Chuck Bunch reinstalled, the balance sheet levered, and the portfolio split into Architectural and Industrial to unlock ~40% upside.
Asanko Gold Inc. AKG
Asanko's reassurances on Nkran are 'puppies and rainbows': fresh drone images show wall failures, reserve accounting is non-compliant, and insider share counts don't reconcile with management's 'never sold' claim.
Asanko Gold Inc. AKG
Muddy Waters is short AKG: flawed geology, a collapsing Nkran pit, and a 2018 liquidity crunch make the Ghana gold miner highly likely to end up a zero.
BHP Billiton BHP
US$46bn value unlock: demerger (+$15bn) + capital return (+$20bn) + franking credits (+$11bn)
BHP Billiton BHP
DLC structure traps US$9.7bn of franking credits and a 12.7% Plc/Ltd discount
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD
DuPont is a chronically underperforming conglomerate; electing Trian's four nominees forces structural review, cost cuts, and governance reform to unlock $120+/share by 2017 — a 21% IRR.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD
DuPont is bottom-quartile under Ellen Kullman; electing Trian's four nominees unlocks $120/share by 2017 by cutting $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and ending 'crony' compensation.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) DD
DuPont is a chronically underperforming conglomerate bloated with $2-4bn of excess costs; putting Trian on the board unlocks a $120+/share, 21% IRR path by 2017.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) DD
DuPont is a chronic underperformer under CEO Kullman; electing Nelson Peltz and three nominees unlocks $2-4bn of excess costs and drives DuPont stock to $120 by 2017 (21% IRR).
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD
DuPont's consolidated structure masks ~86% upside; separating GrowthCo, Performance Chemicals, and CyclicalCo/CashCo plus peer-level margins delivers an implied $122 target value by end-2017.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD
DuPont is a bloated conglomerate hiding $2-4bn of excess corporate costs and crony compensation; Trian's board nominees can unlock $120/share by 2017 — a 21% IRR.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (DuPont) DD
DuPont is an underperforming conglomerate burdened with $2-4bn of excess costs; elect Trian's four nominees to drive separation, cost cuts, and board accountability.
Superb Summit International Group Limited 1228.HK
Superb Summit's HK$773m of reported revenue belongs to a coal company it never owned, and its HK$1.5bn JFT acquisition is a sham valuation routed through a mystery intermediary.
Agrium AGU
Agrium rebuts JANA's break-up case: the sum-of-parts math is contrived, Retail already trades at ~9x within Agrium, and no analyst endorses JANA's methodology.
Agrium Inc. AGU
Agrium's board has no retail-distribution expertise to manage a business that's half its value; JANA's 5 nominees can unlock cost, capital and conglomerate-discount value worth hundreds of millions.
TPC Group Inc. TPCG
TPC Group's $40/share take-private by First Reserve/SK Capital is a self-dealt, low-balled sale; a proper auction plus MLP re-rating would deliver materially higher value to shareholders.
Tronox Incorporated TROX
Post-Exxaro Tronox is the lowest-cost, fully-integrated TiO2 producer; levering up for a $24-$43/share special dividend plus relisting unlocks $183-$194/share, 56-66% upside.
Rubicon Limited RBC
Rubicon's NZ-listed holdco structure hides two world-class US assets — ArborGen and Tenon — that a Tenon auction, ArborGen NASDAQ relisting, and three new shareholder directors can unlock for 200-300%+ upside.
Sino-Forest Corporation TRE
Sino-Forest claims Huaihua Yuda is unrelated, but Muddy Waters shows Sonic Jita was once owned by TRE executives and still shares a key executive — undisclosed related-party transactions contradicting CEO Allen Chan's guarantees.
Sino-Forest Corporation TRE
TRE management's evasive Q1 call answers — unfinished E&Y review, undisclosed related parties, an unnecessary AI model, and dropped analyst questions — reinforce Muddy Waters' fraud thesis on Sino-Forest.
Sino-Forest Corporation TRE
Sino-Forest is a fraud: its Authorized Intermediary structure fabricates timber revenue, its Yunnan holdings are overstated by ~$900M, and equity is worth less than $1 vs. $18.21.
Orient Paper, Inc. ONP
AMEX-listed Orient Paper is a Chinese reverse-merger fraud: tax records, shell-company suppliers, and customer interviews show revenues and profits are fabricated by orders of magnitude.
Orient Paper, Inc. ONP
ONP secretly swapped its paper-machine order from corrugating medium to kraft board to salvage a technically impossible 360,000-ton output claim, while overpaying the vendor $13-14 million.
Orient Paper, Inc. ONP
ONP claimed to own its China operating company HBOP for 16 months when it didn't, and replaced 80% of its top 10 customers while growing sales 56.5% — both flag fraud.
Orient Paper Inc. ONP
Muddy Waters stands by its ONP fraud thesis: the Baoding factory is incapable of producing reported output, and the 'rejected $300K research fee' vendetta narrative is fabricated.
Orient Paper, Inc. ONP
Muddy Waters reaffirms ONP is a fraud: SAIC-filed PRC financials, impossible equipment claims, and bogus acquisitions contradict ONP's SEC filings; Strong Sell.
Orient Paper Inc. ONP
Orient Paper is a fraud — revenues overstated 27x in 2008 and ~40x in 2009, assets inflated 10x, ~$30M of investor raises misappropriated; fair value under $1 vs. $8.43.